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\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 July 2, 2010
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\par Argued and submitted on March 11, 2010
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam
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\par Assistant Public Defender
\par Alternate Public Defender
\par Suite 902 DNA Bldg.
\par 238 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910\cell }{\ul\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 For Real Party in Interest}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 :
\par Sally Tobin, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Esq.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par Assistant Attorney General
\par Office of the Attorney General
\par Prosecution Division
\par 287 West O\rquote Brien Drive
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910\cell }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\intbl\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \trowd \irow0\irowband0\lastrow 
\ts11\trgaph108\trleft-216\trftsWidth1\trftsWidthB3\trftsWidthA3\trautofit1\trpaddl108\trpaddr108\trpaddfl3\trpaddft3\trpaddfb3\trpaddfr3\tbllkhdrrows\tbllklastrow\tbllkhdrcols\tbllklastcol \clvertalt\clbrdrt\brdrtbl \clbrdrl\brdrtbl \clbrdrb\brdrtbl 
\clbrdrr\brdrtbl \cltxlrtb\clftsWidth3\clwWidth4788\clshdrawnil \cellx4572\clvertalt\clbrdrt\brdrtbl \clbrdrl\brdrtbl \clbrdrb\brdrtbl \clbrdrr\brdrtbl \cltxlrtb\clftsWidth3\clwWidth4788\clshdrawnil \cellx9360\row }\pard 
\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par BEFORE:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ROBERT J. TORRES, Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; KATHERINE A. MARAMAN, Associate Justice.
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 MARAMAN, J:}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par [1]\tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Petitioner Roland S. Quinata filed a Verified Petition for Writ of Mandate (\'93Petition\'94) on December 22, 2009.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The Petition alleged that Quinata\rquote 
s statutory right to a speedy trial had been violated, and requested that this court issue a writ of mandate, ordering the Superior Court to vacate its December 22, 2009 order denying Quinata\rquote s motion to dismiss.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 For the reasons stated below, we deny the Petition, finding that Quinata\rquote s speedy trial right has not been violated.}{
\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\ql \fi720\li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\cs16\super\insrsid3548462 \chftn }{\insrsid3548462   This Opinion supersedes the Order denying the Petition issued on April 7, 2010.}}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\highlight7\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 

\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par [2]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab On September 18, 2009, Petitioner Roland S. Quinata was indicted on multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct and child abuse.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 On September 23, 2009, he was arraigned, pleaded not guilty, requested a jury trial, and asserted his right to a speedy trial.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata, who was first incarcerated on September 10, 2009, remained incarcerated at the time of the arraignment.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Two days after t
he arraignment, the Superior Court held a trial-setting at which it scheduled the trial to begin on November 5, 2009, forty-four days after the arraignment date and one day before the anticipated expiration of the speedy trial clock.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [3]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab On November 3, 20
09, a hearing was held at which Quinata was denied bail or release to a third-party custodian, and he remained in custody.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Quinata asserts that he maintained his right to a speedy trial at this bail hearing.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
However, the Decision and Order reflects that at this hearing, the court advised both the People and Quinata that the matter \'93would have to toll another asserted matter before the Court at that time.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
 }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Dec. & Order on Mot. to Dismiss at 3 (Dec. 22, 2009).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 T
he court minutes reveal that Quinata was present during the following exchange:}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s15\qj \fi720\li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs16\super\insrsid3548462 \chftn }{\insrsid3548462  }{\insrsid3548462\charrsid11564555 
 In ruling on a petition for a writ of mandate, this court sits in original, not appellate, jurisdiction.  To resolve an apparent discrepancy between Quinata\rquote s account of what transpired at the November }{\insrsid3548462 3rd}{
\insrsid3548462\charrsid11564555  hearing and the account of Respondent, as reflected in the Superior Court\rquote s citation to the hearing Minutes in the Decision and Order, we }{\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid11564555 
independently obtained the Court Minutes as well as hearing transcripts from the Cler
k for the November 3rd and November 13th hearings.  These transcripts were not furnished as exhibits in support of or in opposition to the Petition, but assisted us in our determination.}} }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 THE COURT:\tab Now, there are a few matters I\rquote d just like you to be advised of.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 First this trial set for Mr. Quinata, this is set for - -}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 MR. HATTORI: \tab I think it\rquote s - -
\par THE COURT: \tab - -\tab Set for the 5th of November would trail the Mannix Songeni trial.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
And I will let you know, Mr. Hattori, since [sic] that trial is over with, we\rquote ll call this back for another pretrial conference. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par Transcript (\'93Tr.\'94) at 3 (Mot. To Dismiss, Nov. 3, 2009). }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [4]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab 
The court and counsel for both parties went on to discuss a number of related issues, including pending motions, the People\rquote s notice of intention to offer evidence, and witness lists.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 3, 6.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Then the court stated:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 THE COURT:\tab Okay.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Now, we won\rquote t \endash  not \endash  know when we\rquote re going to begin or what the trial scheduling hours would be, and I\rquote ll save that for the continued pretrial conference
 in this matter. 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
I will be awaiting, Counsels, as soon as you possibly can, at least before the next hearing, your brief statements regarding the case and the issues.
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 7.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [5]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab After further discussion in which no objection was lodged, the court continued:}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 THE COURT:\tab 
And I think what I would do then, Counsel, noting what I have received so far, is continue this pretrial conference. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Mr. Hattori, hopefully you understand the Court is in an asserted matter and will go ahead and allow both sides to file whatever other information, statements, that they need to.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 And just so you would know, Mr. Hattori, more than likely the Court will be calling this case back either early next week, Monday or Tuesday, to give you an update.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 All right?
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 MR. HATTORI:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Yes, Your Honor. 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 8, 9. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [6]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab The court did not call the matter back on Monday or Tuesday of the next week.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Instead, on Friday, November 13, 2009, the court held another pretrial conference, resetting jury selection and trial to December 22, 2009.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Petitioner Quinata was present.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Tr.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 2 (Pre-trial Conf., Nov. 13, 2009).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata did not lodge an objection:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 THE COURT:\tab 
[. . .] jury selection will begin December 22nd being that he asserted; all right?
\par MR. HATTORI:\tab All right.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Thank you, Your Honor.
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 4.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [7]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab 
Less than one week later, on November 19, 2009, Quinata filed a motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the violation of his speedy trial rights.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The court set the motion for argument on November 27, 2009 and ordered the People to file an opposition by November 25, 2009.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata remained incarcerated until he waived speedy trial at the November 27 hearing, when he was released under supervision of third-party custodians and house arrest.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [8]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab At the motion hearing, Quinata argued that he s
hould have been afforded a trial within forty-five days after his arraignment, pursuant to 8 GCA \'a7 80.60, and also argued that none of the relevant exceptions to {\*\bkmkstart OLE_LINK3}8 GCA \'a7 80.60(a)(2){\*\bkmkend OLE_LINK3} applied.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata was in custody at the time of arraignme
nt and asserted his right to a speedy trial on September 23, 2009, starting a 45-day speedy trial clock that expired on November 6, 2009.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Petition}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Ex. G at 2 (Dec. & Order, Dec. 22, 2009).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata contended that as of November 18, 2009, the day before Quinata filed the motion to dismiss, the speedy trial clock had been expired for more than twelve days.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Petition}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Ex. D at 2 (Mot. Dismiss).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [9]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab The court took the motion under advisement and issued an oral denial at a pretrial conference on December 22, 20
09, filing a written decision and order later that day.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
On the afternoon of December 22, 2009, Quinata filed the Petition requesting this court to vacate the Decision and Order, and direct the Superior Court to dismiss with prejudice all pending charges against Petitioner in Superior Court Case No. CF0458-09.}
{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 II. JURISDICTION}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par [10]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab This court has jurisdiction over original proceedings for mandamus pursuant to 7 GCA \'a7 3107(b) and 7 GCA \'a7\'a7 31202 and 31203 (2005).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 A writ of mandate proceeding is an appropriate remedy when challenging a trial court\rquote 
s denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Nicholson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 2007 Guam 9 at \'b6 7, citing}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  Carver v. Super. Ct. (People)}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1998 Guam 23 at \'b6 9.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 III. ANALYSIS}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par [11]\tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In deciding whether to grant the 
writ of mandamus, we must first determine whether the Superior Court correctly decided that Quinata consented to postponing the trial beyond the statutory period each time he failed to object to the court\rquote s continuance of the trial, upon the court
\rquote s own motion.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 We then consider whether Quinata\rquote 
s subsequent trial dates were within the ten-day grace period established in 8 GCA \'a780.60(b)(1).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Finally, we address the Superior Court
\rquote s determination that there was good cause for the delay.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 A.}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The defendant\rquote 
s implied consent to a postponement under 8 GCA \'a780.60(b)(1)}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [12]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab In denying Quinata\rquote 
s motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, the Superior Court determined that the speedy trial clock was tolled on November 3rd, three days before the original speedy trial deadline of November 6, 2009.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }
{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Petition}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Ex. G at 3 (Dec. and Order). At the November 3rd hearing, the court continued the matter on its own motion, after having \'93advised both the People and Defendant that trial in this matter would have to toll anothe
r asserted matter before the Court at that time.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The court acknowledged that a continuance entered on the trial court\rquote s own motion may not typically be chargeable to the defendant.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 However, the court held that Quinata was deemed to have agreed to 
the continuance, because he and his counsel failed to object when the court stated it was continuing the matter.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [13]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Whether a de{\*\bkmkstart OLE_LINK4}fendant\rquote s failure to object to the court\rquote 
s postponement on its own motion of trial beyond the prescribed statutory period may be deemed the defendant\rquote s implied consent under 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1){\*\bkmkend OLE_LINK4} is an issue of first impression for this court.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Title 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(a)(2) provides that the co
urt shall dismiss a criminal action if the trial of a defendant in custody at the time of his arraignment has not commenced within forty-five (45) days after his arraignment.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(a)(2) (2005).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 However, such an action will }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 not }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 be dismissed if the 
action is set on a date beyond the prescribed period upon motion of the defendant or with his consent, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 express or implied}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, and he is brought to trial on the date so set or within ten (10) days thereafter.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [14]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab The plain language of the statute provides that the defendant\rquote 
s consent to the postponement need not be express, but may be implied.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Our interpretation of whether a defendant\rquote 
s consent may be implied from the defendant\rquote s failure to object is informed by California decisions construing California Penal Code \'a7 1382, the statute from which Guam\rquote s law is derived.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In the case of }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Eshaghian v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , a California court of appeals explained the rationale behind the implied consent provision: }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
The statute itself contemplates that there may be implied consent on the part of a defendant.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
If there were not this acknowledgment by the Legislature that the consent may be implied from conduct, a sophisticated defendant might keep
 quiet while his counsel is seeking or consenting to a continuance for defendant's very benefit, and then blandly urge . . . that his silence constitutes failure to consent or even an \'93implied objection.\'94}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Eshaghian v. Los Angeles Dist. Mun. Ct.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 214 Cal. Rptr. 712, 717 (Ct. App. 1985).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [15]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab California courts have adopted the rule that a defendant\rquote s consent may be \'93
presumed when the defendant fails to object at the time the cause is set for trial beyond such period.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Ray v. Super. Ct. of San Diego County}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 281 P. 391, 392 (Cal. 1929) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Taylor
}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 338 P.2d 377, 378 (Cal. 1959) (en banc) (holding that the trial court did not err in denying a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 1382 where defendant did not object 
to the delays at arraignment or at the hearing upon which she entered her change of plea).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Even if the defendant does not seek or expressly consent to a continuance or setting beyond the period, a defendant may waive the right to dismiss by failing to object.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 5 Witkin, Cal. Crim. Law 3d (2000), Criminal Trial, \'a7 320.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The defendant\rquote s consent is implied: \'93Failure to object is the equivalent of consent.\'94 }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 citing }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. O\rquote Leary}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 278 P.2d 933, 937 (Cal. 1955).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See also People v. Anderson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, 272 P.2d 805, 806 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (stating rule that where cause was set for trial in presence of defendant and counsel, and no objection was made to date beyond statutory period, objection was deemed waived).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [16]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab The Appellate Division of Guam appears to have adopted this rule in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Palomo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , Nos. DCA 91-00061A, DCA 91-00062A, 1993 WL 129624, at *9 (D. Guam App. Div. 1993).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The Appellate Division determined, with minimal discussion, that defendants waived their right to a speedy trial when th
e court, without objection of any kind from any party, set a new trial date.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 (stating \'93time extensions made with appellants\rquote  express or implied consent are excludable pursuant to 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Appellants waived their right to a speedy trial by not objecting to the March 5th trial date.\'94).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [17]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab 
The purpose of the requirement that a defendant object at the time the cause is set for trial beyond the statutory period is two-fold.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \'93
First, by calling the attention of the trial court to the facts upon which the objection is founded, it may serve to procure an earlier trial of the defendant and thus earlier end his durance or encompass his conviction.\'94 }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Lind}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 229 P. 990, 991 (Cal. 1924) (citations omitted).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Second, \'93the objection must be made as
 a forerunner to a motion to dismiss, for it has been uniformly determined that on appeal an order denying the motion will be affirmed if the record does not show that the objection was made.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [18]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab In }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Wilson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , the court explained that the right to a speedy trial will be deemed waived unless the defendant both objects to the date set and thereafter files a timely motion to dismiss.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 {\*\bkmkstart OLE_LINK1}{\*\bkmkstart OLE_LINK2}383 P.2d 452, {\*\bkmkend OLE_LINK1}{\*\bkmkend OLE_LINK2}457 (Cal. 1963) (en banc).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 A statement by the defendant that he is ready for trial, without more, will not be construed as an objection to continuance of trial.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Johnson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, 23 Cal. Rptr. 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1962) (Defendant stated he was ready for trial prior to court\rquote s issuance of an order for a continuance; co
urt held this was not a proper objection to the court order for a continuance, made after the statement, with defendant and counsel silent).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [19]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Courts will not imply consent of a defendant from the acquiescence or failure of defense counsel to object, w
here the interests of counsel and defendant have diverged, due to the defense counsel\rquote s own calendar conflict.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
See, e.g., People v. Johnson,}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  606 P.2d 738, 744 (Cal. 1980) (en banc) (finding that request of counsel for three postponements over express objection of defendant did not waive defendant
\rquote s right to speedy trial under constitution and statute, where appointed counsel sought to resolve calendar conflicts and not to promote the best interests of the client, and where postponements were not granted \'93at
 the request of the defendant or with his consent\'94 within the meaning of the statute).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Likewise, the Appellate Division, citing to }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , refused to imply a defendant\rquote s consent from his counsel\rquote s actions, when counsel\rquote 
s consent was given to resolve the counsel\rquote s own calendar conflict.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Cruz v. People of Terr. of Guam}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , DCA No. 88-00035A, 1989 WL 265029 (D. Guam App. Div. 1989).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [20]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab In }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Cruz v. People of Territory of Guam}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , the court found there was a \'93real question\'94 whether a continuance had been entered upon motion of the defendant or with his implied consent within the meaning of section 80.60(b)(1).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at *3.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Defense counsel had made a motion to continue, but defendant, after having substituted counsel, later testified he had protested vigorously against the continuance.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
The court looked to the court minutes, which \'93shed much light on the subject\'94 although they had not been furnished as part of the record on appeal, but had been obtained independently from the Clerk:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 

\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The minutes show that Cruz\rquote 
s counsel, Cunliffe, made two separate motions for continuance of the trial on two successive days, January 6 and January 7, 1988. The minutes do not indicate that Cruz was present in court on either day, and we must assume he was not. The minutes label b
oth motions as having been made and heard \'93ex parte\'94.
\par  . . .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 If the motion made by Cruz\rquote s counsel is found to have been made over Cruz\rquote 
s objections, solely for the convenience of his appointed counsel, and with no benefit to Cruz (and if Cruz had not later pled guilty), this continuance might be deemed grounds for reversal. }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Johnson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 26 Cal. 3d 557, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1980) at n.1.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , defendant\rquote s public defender had twice requested and obtained continuances over the defendant\rquote s express o
bjection. He was finally tried 144 days after arraignment. In reversing, the California Supreme Court said \'93
the consent of appointed counsel to a postponement of trial beyond the statutory period, if given solely to resolve a calendar conflict and not to p
romote the best interest of his client, cannot stand unless supported by the express or implied consent of the client himself.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 . at 567, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 437.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Cruz, }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 1989 WL 265029, at *2-3 (footnote omitted).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Thus, the Appellate Division held in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Cruz }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
that, where no evidence showed that defendant was present at the ex parte hearings in which defense counsel moved to postpone trial, and where the court determined the motion had been brought to resolve counsel\rquote 
s calendar conflict over the defendant\rquote s express objection, the defendant\rquote s consent would not be implied from defense counsel\rquote s motions for continuance.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [21]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Similarly, the Ninth Circuit considered whether consent of counsel to a postponement due to the counsel\rquote 
s own calendar conflict was effective to exclude a period of time from the speedy trial statute under 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1) in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People of Territory of Guam v. Ibanez}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1993 WL 164764 (9th Cir. 1993).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In finding that counsel\rquote 
s waiver was ineffective without the \'93express or implied consent\'94 of the client, the }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Ibanez }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
court acknowledged that a defendant\rquote s consent need not always be express, but may be implied.}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs20\insrsid3548462 \tab }{\cs16\fs20\super\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607 \chftn }{
\fs20\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607  }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607 In }{\i\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607 People of Territory of Guam v. Munoz,}{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462  }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid11212604 
No. CR-94-00100A}{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462 ,}{\i\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607  }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid13860245 1995 WL 604346}{\i\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid13860245  }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid13860245 (D.}{
\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462  }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid13860245 Guam }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462 App. Div.}{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid13860245  1995)}{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607 , the Appellate Division 
analyzed whether a continuance due to counsel\rquote s calendar conflict was \'93good cause\'94 for delay under }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462 section }{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607 80.60(b)(3), but did not analyze directly whether defendant
\rquote s consent was express or implied under}{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462  section}{\fs20\cf1\insrsid3548462\charrsid12331607  80.60(b)(1), because in that case, defendant had expressly objected.
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at *4.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The court relied on }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Johnson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, 606 P.2d (Cal. 1980), in which the Supreme Court of California interpreted an exclusionary provision essentially identical to 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1), stating:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 That court held that \'93
the consent of appointed counsel to a postponement of trial beyond the statutory period, if given solely to resolve a calendar conflict and not to promote the best interests of his client, cannot stand unless supported by the express or implied consent o
f the client himself.\'94 }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  In the present case, Mr. Phillips indicated he wished to postpone the trial because he was 
\'93not free\'94 until November 8th. This reason is a \'93calendar conflict\'94 within the meaning of }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
 Thus, Mr. Phillips\rquote  waiver is ineffective unless Ibanez expressly or impliedly consented to it. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Ibanez}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1993 WL 164764, at *4.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [22]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab In light of the foregoing authority, we turn to the case cited by Quinata at oral argument, }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Mendiola}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1999 Guam 8.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata contends that }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 bind
s this court to hold that Guam has broken from the California precedent relied upon above, by finding the speedy trial right to be a fundamental one that only the defendant may waive, and consequently in Guam the defendant\rquote 
s waiver must be express and may not be implied.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Quinata cites to the following excerpt of the }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 opinion:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Given the fundamental nature of the right to speedy trial, only the defendant, himself, and not his counsel, may waive this right. }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Johnson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 26 Cal. 3d 577, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738 (1980).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Such a waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.; see also Curlee Townsend v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 15 Cal. 3d 774, 781 543 P.2d 619 (1975).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In the instant case, there
 is no record of the defendant himself waiving or asserting the right to speedy trial specifically to allow the ten day extension period to take effect.
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1999 Guam 8}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \'b6 31. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [23]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab We decline to construe }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Mendiola}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  in the matter invited by Quinata.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 First, }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola\rquote s }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
holding did not concern an alleged statutory speedy trial violation, but instead, ruled on a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  \'b6\'b6 1, 29; }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 see also Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \'b6
 26, n.5 (stating that the analysis rested \'93exclusively\'94 on Constitutional grounds).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
In deciding the Constitutional question, the court applied the four factors set forth in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Barker v. Wingo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 We held that a four and one-half year delay in bringing a defendant to trial, though long, was counter-balanced 
by the defendant\rquote s inability to prove actual prejudice coupled with the justifiable reasons for the delay.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1999 Guam 8 \'b6 35.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [24]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab The excerpt cited by Quinata was part of the court\rquote s application of the third }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Barker }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 factor, which involved a determination of whether the defendant had consistently asserted his right to speedy trial.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \'b6 29.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In looking to whether defendant had consistently asserted his speedy trial right, we observed that the defendant had not expressly or impliedly consented under 8 GCA \'a7
 80.60(b)(1) to one of the postponements, because \'93[f]rom the record it is clear that defendant denied this consent explicitly in his motion to reconsider the trial date.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  \'b6 30.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 If there is a holding from }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 with respect to 8 GCA 
\'a7 80.60(b)(1), it is that a defendant\rquote s consent to a postponement will not be implied when the defendant has expressly denied his consent by filing a motion to reconsider the trial date.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [25]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Taken out of context, one can see how a party might construe the }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 dicta }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 in paragraph 31 as establishing a requirement that the defendant\rquote 
s consent to a postponement must always be expressly granted by the defendant personally, rather than through counsel.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
We clarify here that such a rule is not the law on Guam.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 First, the statements in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  about Guam\rquote s speedy trial statute were not essential to the court\rquote 
s holding, which construed only the Sixth Amendment right.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Second, in discussing the \'93fundamental nature of the right to speedy trial,\'94
 our court did not break with California precedent, but in fact, relied on California precedent.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 If }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
intended to break with this line of cases, it would have stated it was doing so, rather than citing to the California case law of }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Johnson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 606 P.2d,}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 and }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Curlee Townsend v. Super. Ct.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 543 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1975)}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 .}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Thus, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \rquote s statement, citing to }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , that \'93only the defendant, himself, and not his counsel, may waive this right,\'94
 must be read consistently with the }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 case. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [26]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab In }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Johnson, }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 the California Supreme Court stated the rule that the California counterpart to our speedy trial statute, section 1382, \'93permits a postponement \lquote 
at the request of the defendant or with his consent, express or implied . . . .\rquote }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Under this language, the 
failure of defendant or his counsel to make timely objection to a postponement constitutes implied consent to the postponement.\'94 }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 606 P.2d at 744 n.7.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 court also discussed the federal constitutional right to a speedy trial:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The federal constitutional right to a speedy trial, as explained in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Barker v. Wingo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
 (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, is a fundamental right, which can be waived only through a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent decision by the defendant himself. (}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See
}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  407 U.S. at pp. 525-526, 92 S. Ct. at pp. 2189.)}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Defendant Johnson, however, does not contend that the 144-day delay in the present case infringed his right to a speedy trial under the federal Constitution, and a comparison of the present case with }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Barker v. Wingo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, supra, and the cases there cited indicates that the delay in the case at bar was not sufficient to abridge defendant\rquote s rights under the federal Constitution.
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 744}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 n.6.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [27]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Thus, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Johnson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  contemplated both a constitutional right, the 
waiver of which must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent and could only be made by the defendant personally, and a statutory right, for which the defendant\rquote s consent could be implied.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The quoted language in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
may have conflated these two separate discussions.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Ultimately, the }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Johnson }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 case held that under the circumstances, defense counsel\rquote s request for three postponements over express objection of defendant did not waive defendant\rquote 
s right to speedy trial, where appointed counsel sought to resolve calendar conflicts and not to promote best interest of client.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 744.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
The holding did not rely on a finding that the defendant must expressly consent to a postponement.
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [28]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab In the other case cited in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Townsend v. Super. Ct.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 543 P.2d at 624,
 the California Supreme Court held that because section 1382 was enacted to supplement and define the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the statutory right to be tried within sixty days was }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 not}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  of a fundamental character and thus could ordinarily be waived by counsel.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 at 623-27; }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 see also People v. Johnson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 606 P.2d at n.6 (stating \'93we need not reconsider }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Townsend}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \rquote s holding that a defendant\rquote s rights under section 1382 . . . are }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 not}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  of fundamental character.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 (citations omitted, emphasis added)).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 In fact, in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Townsend, }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 the court expressly stated \'93
[w]e have concluded, subject to certain limitations, that consent of counsel alone without that of the client, satisfies section 1382, subdivision 2.\'94}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  at 624.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Townsend }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 was subsequently limited by other California decisions.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See Bryant v. Super. Ct.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 230 Cal. Rptr. 777, 779-82 (Ct. App. 1986).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 We discuss it here not to reflexively adopt its analysis, but merely to demonstrate that it cannot stand for Mr. Quinata\rquote s proposition that the statutory speedy tri
al right must be expressly waived by the defendant personally.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [29]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab The California cases cited in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Mendiola }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 do not stand for the proposition that only the defendant personally may expressly consent to postponement of trial beyond the statutory period.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
 }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Most importantly, this court, in interpreting the statutory right to speedy trial, must give meaning to the statutory provision which allows defendant\rquote 
s consent to a postponement to be either express or implied.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 As discussed above, a long line of cases, including those from California, Guam
\rquote s Appellate Division, and the Ninth Circuit, has countenanced the fact that a defendant\rquote s consent may be implied from the counsel\rquote s consent, and another line of cases has articulated situations in which it would be inappropr
iate for a court to imply the defendant\rquote s consent.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [30]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab This jurisdiction adopts the rule that a defendant\rquote 
s consent to a postponement may be implied by the failure of defense counsel or defendant to object at the time the trial is postponed outside the statutory period.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Applying the aforementioned rule to the facts on hand, we find that, when the court notified defense counsel in Quinata\rquote 
s presence that, due to another asserted trial, his pretrial conference would be postponed until the following week, and defense counsel failed to object to the postponement, Quinata was deemed to have consented to the postponement.
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par {\listtext\pard\plain\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \hich\af0\dbch\af0\loch\f0 B.\tab}}\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\ls1\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {
\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Applying the ten-day grace period established by 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1)}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par [31]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab When the court continued Quinata\rquote s case beyond the statutory period to \'93early [the following] week, Monday or Tuesday\'94 without objection, Quinata\rquote 
s consent was implied.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
However, the case was not called back until the following Friday, November 13, 2009, and Quinata had no opportunity to lodge an objection at a hearing on Tuesday, since the case was not called.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 We observe that, ordinarily, defense counsel might seek to appear ex parte to request a trial date, or could submit a written objection or motion to re-set the trial date.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Nonetheless, for purposes of determinin
g this petition, we will presume that Tuesday, November 10, 2009 was the last day to which defendant in any way consented.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
This invoked the 10-day grace period of 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(1), requiring trial to start within ten days of Tuesday, November 10th.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See,
 e.g.,}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 People v. Malone}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, 237 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1987).}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [32]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab 
Section 80.60(b)(1) provides that a case shall not be dismissed for speedy trial violation, where the action is set on a date beyond the prescribed period upon motion of the defendant or with his consent, express or implied, }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 and he is brought to trial on the date so set or within ten (10) days thereafter}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 .}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 8 GCA 80.60(b)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Under our statute, the 10-day grace period becomes operative once the defendant has consented, expressly or impliedly, to a trial date beyond the basic 60-day [or 45-day] limit.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 When the defendant objects to any further continuance, the critical 10-day period begins to run.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See People v. Malone}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 237 Cal. Rptr. 794, 798 (Ct. App. 1987).}{
\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\insrsid3548462 \tab }{\cs16\super\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 \chftn }{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880  }{\insrsid3548462  }{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 Normally, a statement by a defendant that he is ready for trial, without more, }{
\insrsid3548462 will }{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 not be construed as an objection to the continuance of the trial.  }{\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 People v. Johnson}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 , 23 Cal.}{\insrsid3548462  }{
\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 Rptr. 608, 612 (Ct. App. 1962).  However, where, due to defense counsel\rquote s own calendar conflict, a defendant has}{\insrsid3548462  already}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 
 expressly consented to trailing another trial, rather than to a specific postponed trial date, the 10-day grace period }{\insrsid3548462 may be}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880  triggered by counsel\rquote s announcement of \'93ready for trial.\'94 }{
\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 See }{\i\insrsid3548462 People v. Super. C}{\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 t}{\i\insrsid3548462 .}{\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880  (Alexander)}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 , 37 Cal.}{\insrsid3548462  }{
\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 Rptr.}{\insrsid3548462  }{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 2d 729, 737-38 (Ct. App. 1995)}{\insrsid3548462 . }{\insrsid3548462\charrsid14488880 
This announcement gives the People and the Court ten days to bring the matter to trial.  }{\i\insrsid3548462 Id.}}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [33]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Three days of the ten-day period had elapsed when the case was called again on Friday, November 13, 2009.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 On that date, the court informed Quinata that the trial would be scheduled for December 22nd.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
 }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Defense counsel again acquiesced, and consequently Quinata\rquote s consent to trial on December 22nd, or within ten days of the extended date, was implied.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [34]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Quinata\rquote 
s implied consent was effectively revoked less than one week later, on November 19, 2009, when Quinata filed a motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Had Quinata on that date instead filed an objection to the trial date or a motion for a ne
w trial date, a new 10-day grace period would have commenced, and the court would have been responsible for bringing Quinata to trial within ten days, absent a showing of good cause.}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid3548462 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\insrsid3548462 \tab }{\cs16\super\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924 \chftn }{
\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924  }{\insrsid3548462  \'93}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924 Reviewing courts routinely examine the record for the last date to which the defendant consented for the purpose of initiating the 10-day period.}{\insrsid3548462 
 . . .}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924 \'94  }{\i\insrsid3548462 Barsamyan v. App.}{\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924  Div. of Super}{\i\insrsid3548462 .}{\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924  Ct}{\i\insrsid3548462 .}{\i\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924 
 of Los Angeles County}{\insrsid3548462\charrsid795924 , 189 P.3d 271, 276 (Cal. 2008).}}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
However, Quinata filed a dispositive motion, seeking dismissal on statutory speedy trial grounds.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
This tolled the speedy trial clock for the time period during which the court worked diligently to resolve the motion.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
See Nicholson v. Super. Ct. (People)}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 2007 Guam 9 \'b6
 26 (\'93Generally a defendant must accept some reasonable delay as a consequence of filing a motion, but unreasonable delay does not toll the statute.\'94)}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 C. Good cause under 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(3)}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par [35]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Here, the Superior Court heard Quinata\rquote s motion to dismiss on November 27, 2009, within eight days of its filing.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The motion to dismiss was denied twenty-five days later, on December 22, 2009.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The court took in total thirty-three days to rule on the motion.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
The filing of the motion to dismiss tolled the speedy trial clock for the time period during which the court with promptness and diligence considered the motion.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Compare Carver v. Super. Ct. (People)}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 1998 Guam 23 \'b6\'b6 15-16 (good cause shown where motion filed for defendant\rquote 
s benefit was heard and resolved within nine days) }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 and}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
People v. Ibanez}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, DCA No. 91-0001A, 1992 WL 97221, at *2-3 (D. Guam App. Div. 1992) (good cause shown where motion to disqualify was decided fourteen days later and motion to dismiss was decided thirty-two days later) (}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 aff\rquote d}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 1993 WL 164764 (9th Cir. 1993)) }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 with Nicholson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 ,}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 2007 Guam 9 \'b6 28}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 (no good cause shown where delay in deciding motion to dismiss was for a period of nine months and record failed to reflect a showing by the trial court that it was diligent in working towards
 a prompt disposition of the motion during this time).}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [36]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab 
In our jurisdiction, whether there is good cause for delay depends on the facts and the circumstances of each case, and there is no bright-line rule for how much time a court may reasonably take to consider a motion.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 See}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Nicholson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 2007 Guam 9 at \'b613.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
This contrasts with the Federal Speedy Trial Act, which excludes from the speedy trial calculation periods of delay \'93reasonably attributable\'94 to a period of time in which the court has taken a matte
r under advisement, but sets a 30-day outer limit for such time.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 18 U.S.C.A. \'a7
 3161(h)(1)(H), current through P.L. 111-164 (excluding P.L. 111-148, 111-152, 111-159, and 111-163).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Although Guam law does not impose a hard-and-fast 30-day limit for disposing of a motion, we have cautioned that the record should reflect a showing by the trial court that it was diligent in the prompt disposition of the motion.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Nicholson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 2007 Guam 9 \'b6 25.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Relevant circumstances in determining good cause for delay certainly incl
ude the particular interest in the prompt disposition of a pre-trial motion alleging a speedy trial violation.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [37]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Here, the trial court heard the motion on November 27, 2009, within eight days of its filing.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The motion to dismiss was denied twenty-five days later, on December 22, 2009.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The court took in total thirty-three days to rule on the motion, one day longer than the time period upheld as reasonable in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Ibanez}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 We find that the delay caused by the court\rquote s
 consideration of the motion to dismiss was excusable under the \'93good cause\'94 exception of 8 GCA \'a7 80.60(b)(3).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
However, we reiterate our holding from }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Nicholson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
, that good cause for the delay must be apparent from the face of the record.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Nicholson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 , 2007 Guam 9 \'b6 28.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
Where a court takes longer than thirty-three days to rule on a pre-trial motion to dismiss alleging a speedy trial violation, it may wish to assist this court\rquote s review by including in the Decision and Order a statement explaining why such a perio
d of time was reasonable.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 V. CONCLUSION}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12338714 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 [38]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 \tab Quinata\rquote 
s consent to the court\rquote s continuance was implied from his counsel\rquote s failure to object, in Quinata\rquote s presence, to the court\rquote s continuance of the trial date.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Furthermore, the court had good cause for delay during the time in which Quinata\rquote s motion to dismiss was under advisement.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 Consequently, Quinata has failed to demonstrate a violation of his statutory speedy trial right, and it is unnecessary to reach the question of whether the court\rquote s preoccupation 
with another trial, without more, was in itself good cause for delay.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 The Petition for a Writ of Mandate is hereby }{
\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 DENIED}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid3548462 .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid3548462\charrsid12338714 
\par }}