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\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Cite as: 2009 Guam }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14037283\charrsid11697034 3}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
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\par Superior Court Case No.: CF0292-02
\par Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
\par Argued and submitted on May 14, 2007
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam
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\par F. Randall Cunliffe, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Esq.
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Cunliffe & Cook, P.C.
\par 210 Archbishop Flores Street
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910
\par \cell }{\ul\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Appearing for Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par Clyde Lemons, Jr., }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Esq}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4728712 .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par Office of the Attorney General
\par Major Crimes and Government Corruption
\par The Justice Building
\par 287 West O\rquote Brien Drive
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910
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\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par BEFORE: F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Chief Justice; ROBERT J. TORRES, Associate Justice;}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4018394 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057 
 Prior to the issuance of this Opinion, Associate Justice Robert J. Torres assumed the role of Chief Justice while Chief Justice F. Philip Carbullido assumed the role of Associate Justice.
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  and, RICHARD H. BENSON, Justice }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Pro Tempore}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 .

\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2825895 BENSON, J}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 :
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [1]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab The court issued an earlier opinion in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
People v. Tennessen}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 2008 Guam 21.  The opinion did not address the insufficiency of the evidence arguments.  On rehearing, we determine
d that this court should have addressed the insufficiency of the evidence arguments in its earlier decision.  As a result, we now issue this Amended Opinion to supersede our earlier opinion in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Tennessen}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 2008 Guam 21.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [2]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Defendant Gene A. Tennes
sen appeals a conviction of two counts of Theft and two counts of Official Misconduct.  Specifically, Tennessen appeals the Superior Court\rquote s denial of both a motion for acquittal and a motion in arrest of judgment.  
Insofar as the appeal of these denials argues insufficiency of the evidence, we find the evidence to be sufficient.  Tennessen also appeals the denial of a motion to dismiss, arguing that Attorney General Douglas Moylan had a conflict of interest.  
While we do not agree that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid416488\charrsid11697034 Tennessen}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \rquote s indictme
nt should have been dismissed due to the conflict of interest, the conflict wall erected around Moylan was clearly ineffective.  We hold that the trial court abused its discretion in not disqualifying the entire Attorney General\rquote 
s office in October of 2005.  For this reason alone, }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid416488\charrsid11697034 Tennessen}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \rquote 
s judgment of conviction must be vacated, and we need not reach the remaining issues presented in this appeal.  The People\rquote s cross appeal is dismissed as moot.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }\pard\plain \s19\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [3]}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab In late November 1999, the police were called to respond to a disturbance involving Gerald Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as and his sister.  There was an argument between the siblings concerning possession of firearms, in particular a .38 caliber Rossi revolver and an Ithaca shotgun.  
The guns belonged to their late father, Francisco Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as, who had recently passed away.  
Police Officer David Manila advised Gerald Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as to turn in the firearms to the police for safekeeping.  Gerald Due}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as agreed and handed the firearms to Officer Manila.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [4]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab According to Manila\rquote s testimony, Officer Manila was approached at the precinct by then-Lieutenant }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid416488\charrsid11697034 Tennessen}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , his supervising officer.  
As Manila began filling out property receipts for the firearms, Tennessen allegedly told the officer that he would take care of the weapons.  No property receipts were ever filed or completed for the firearms. }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [5]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab In February of 2002, Tennessen\rquote s home was burglarized.  
Investigating police officers inquired as to what had been stolen, and Tennessen reportedly replied that there had been a .38 caliber gun in the safe.  While executing a warrant to search the residence of the individual suspected of burglarizing Tennessen
\rquote s home, the police found the .38 caliber Rossi revolver belonging to Francisco Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [6]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Late
r that year, a Grand Jury returned an indictment against Tennessen, charging him with multiple crimes including Theft of a Firearm and Official Misconduct.  
Tennessen moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that Attorney General Douglas Moylan had a conflict of interest.  The alleged conflict of interest resulted from Tennessen being listed as a witness in a criminal case against Moylan.}{
\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057  The criminal action involved an accusation of domestic assault made by Moylan\rquote s former wife.  Tennessen advised Moylan\rquote 
s former wife to file criminal charges after she confided the alleged assault to Tennessen.}}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   
Prior to the motion, Moylan discussed the possibility of erecting a conflict wall with his office staff and eventually agreed to do so.  The trial court heard 
the motion to dismiss, and on March 26, 2004, Judge Unpingco issued a Decision and Order denying Tennessen\rquote s motion but ordering that a conflict wall be erected to screen Moylan from the case.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 

\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [7]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab 
A month before trial was scheduled to begin, Tennessen renewed his motion to disqualify the entire Office of the Attorney General (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 the AG
\rquote s Office}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ) based on a conflict of interest.  In a declaration submitted in support of the motion, Tennessen\rquote s counsel
 described a conversation with Mindy Fothergill from KUAM news that occurred more than nine months earlier.  In that conversation, Fothergill allegedly described an interview with Moylan where he said Tennessen would be subject to new criminal charges.  
Three days later, new charges were filed against Tennessen alleging witness tampering in the underlying case against him.  On October 21, 2005, Judge Maraman denied Tennessen\rquote s motion to recuse the AG\rquote 
s Office but ordered that the conflict wall remain in effect.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [8]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab The jury trial began on October 27, 2005 based on an Amended Indictment.  
On the second day of trial, Tennessen moved for a judgment of acquittal.  The court subsequently granted an acquittal on one of the Official Misconduct charges, but denied Tennessen\rquote s motion on the remaining charges.  
At the end of trial, a jury convicted Tennessen of two counts of Theft of a Firearm under 9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b) and two counts of Official Misconduct under 9 GCA \'a7 49.90(b).  Tennessen then moved for an arrest of jud
gment, arguing that the indictment was defective in not describing all elements of the charges.  Tennessen timely filed a notice of appeal.  
The People timely cross-appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in merging some of the counts for purposes of sentencing.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 II}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 . }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW}{
\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [9]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals of final judgments of convictions entered by the Superior Court.  
7 GCA \'a7\'a7 3107(b), 3108(a) (2005); 8 GCA \'a7 130.15(a) (2005); 48 U.S.C.A 1424-1(a)(1) (West 2008).  It is unnecessary to establish our jurisdiction over the cross-appeal, which we dismiss as moot.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 

\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [10]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab The standard of review for the denial of a motion for vicarious disqualification of an entire prosecutor
\rquote s office is abuse of discretion.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Gatewood v. State}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 880 A.2d 322, 330 (Md. 2005) (citing }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Young v. State}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 465 A.2d 1149 (Md. 1983)).  This court reviews a ruling on a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 de  novo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 .  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Jung}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 2001 Guam 15 \'b6 21 (citing }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Quinata}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 , 1999 Guam 6, \'b6 9).
}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 III. DISCUSSION}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [11]\tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Because }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a second trial once the reviewing court has found the evidence legally insufficient, the only \lquote just\rquote 
 remedy available for that court is the direction of a judgment of acquittal.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Burks v. United States}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978).  Therefore, even if Tennessen\rquote 
s conviction can be vacated on other grounds, his arguments relating to the sufficiency of the evidence must be considered.  This is because a finding of insufficiency would result in acquitta
l rather than a less favorable outcome to the defendant, such as vacating the conviction and exposing him to possible retrial.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See Justices of Boston Mun. Ct. v. Lydon}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 466 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1984) (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
[W]hen a defendant challenging his conviction on appeal contends both that the trial was infected by error and that the evidence was constitutionally insufficient, the court may not, consistent with the rule of }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Burks}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  . . .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 ,}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  ignore the sufficiency claim, reverse on grounds of trial error, and remand for retrial.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ).  We therefore begin by examining Tennessen\rquote s insufficient-evidence arguments as presented in his Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 

\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 A. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [12]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Tennessen argues the trial court erred in denying his motion as to the First Ch
arge of Theft of a Firearm (As a 3rd Degree Felony) under 9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b).}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid416488 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057  }{\insrsid2500057\charrsid5926532 Title}{
\insrsid2500057  9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b) states that \'93[t]heft constitutes a felony of the third degree . . . if the property stolen is a firearm . . . .\'94  9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b) }{\insrsid2500057\charrsid5926532 (2005)}{\insrsid2500057 .  
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   He asserts that the People failed to prove that the stolen items meet the definition of a }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  according to 10 GCA \'a7
 60100, because they did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt the items were capable of being discharged.  He therefore contends that the People failed to prove an essential element of the crime.  
The People contend that circumstantial evidence may be used to prove that a firearm is operable, and policy reasons support r}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 ejecting Tennessen\rquote s analysis.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [13]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Second, Tennessen argues the trial court er
red in denying the motion because the People failed to prove that Gerald Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
as had any legal or possessory interest in the stolen items.  The People contend that a reasonable jury could have found that Gerald Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as had a legitimate property interest in the firearms.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }\pard\plain \s25\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [14]}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Under Guam law, a trial court }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 shall order the }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 entry of a judgment of acquittal}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  of one or more offenses
 charged in the indictment . . . after the evidence on either side is closed }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  of such offense or offenses.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   8 GCA \'a7
 100.10 (2005) (emphases added).  Furthermore, in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Cruz}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 1998 Guam 18, we stated that a sufficiency of }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 the evidence analysis is used:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid2825895 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 A court determines whether a judgment of acquittal should be granted by app
lying the same test used when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged.  [citation omitted]  
Thus, an appellate court reviews the evidence presented in a light most favorable to the government and determines whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  \'b6 9.
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 1. Proof of Operable Firearms was Unnecessary }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [15]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Tennessen maintains that the trial court should have granted his motions for acquittal because the P
eople failed to prove that the stolen items met the statutory definition of a }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}
{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  according to 10 GCA \'a7 60100.}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \li0\ri720\sa120\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs16\fs20\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid2500057  }{\b\fs20\insrsid2500057 \'a7 60100.  Definitions.

\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sa120\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2500057 \tab As used in this Chapter:
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li720\ri720\sa120\widctlpar\tx9360\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2500057 (a) Firearm means any weapon, 
the operating force of which is an explosive. This definition includes pistols, revolvers, rifles, shotguns, machine guns, automatic rifles, noxious gas projectors, mortars, bombs, cannon and submachine guns. The specific mention of certain weapons does n
ot exclude from the definition other weapons operated by explosives.
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li720\ri720\sa120\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2500057 
(b) Pistol or revolver means any firearm of any shape whatever and designed to be fired with one hand with a barrel less than twelve inches (12\'94) in length and capable of discharging loaded ammunition or any noxious gas.
\par . . . .
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li720\ri720\sa120\widctlpar\tx8820\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2500057 
 (d) Shotgun means any firearm designed, made, redesigned or remade and intended to be fired from the shoulder and to fire through a smooth barrel either a number of projectiles (ball shot) or a single projectile, a
nd shall include any such firearm which may be readily restored to fire any of the above, and shall also include any firearm of any age designed and capable of firing the above-mentioned projectiles. . . .}{\fs20\expnd-4\expndtw-20\insrsid2500057 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\tx8820\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2500057 10 GCA \'a7 60100 (2005).
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   The plain words of the statute require that a pistol or shotgun be }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 capable of discharging}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  or }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 capable of firing}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 ammunition respectively.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   
Tennessen believes that the People were required to prove that the stolen items were operable, and there was no testimony that the weapons had been fired.  
In response, the People argue that circumstantial evidence presented at trial sufficed to prove that the guns met the statutory definition of }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [16]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab The People cite to }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Camacho}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
for the proposition that the prosecution may be able to provide sufficient circumstantial evidence showing that a weapon is a }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  according to 10 GCA \'a7 60100.  1987 WL 10}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7436948 9395 (D. Guam. App. Div. 1987).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  In }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Camacho}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , an on-duty police officer was accused of 
}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Reckless Conduct}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 for pointing his service revolver at a fellow officer.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 at *1.  
Although never directly stated in the opinion, the defendant was apparently charged under 9 GCA \'a7 19.40, which makes it a crime to }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
intentionally }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7436948\charrsid11697034 point [}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ] a firearm at or in the direction of another . . . .}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   9 GCA \'a7 90.40 (2005).   The defendant argued that the prosecution had failed to show that he had used a }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 as defined in 10 GCA \'a7 60100.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Camacho}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 1987 WL 109395 at *3.  The court disagreed, and found that }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 the prosecution provided sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove that Camacho\rquote 
s gun was capable of discharging loaded ammunition.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [17]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab A careful examination of our statutes reveals that the court of }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Camacho}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  may have been too quick to apply the definition of 10 GCA \'a7 60100 to the crimes described in Title 9.  
Chapter 60 of Title 10 is entitled }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Firearms}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  and sets forth the Guam regulations governing the sale, use, and ownership of firearms.  The definitions found in section 60100 apparently appl
y only to that chapter as indicated by the phrase: }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 As used in this Chapter . . . .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   10 GCA \'a7 60100.  Although the definition of }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  found in 10 GCA \'a7 60100 is explicitly incorporated into the Guam Gun-Free School Zone Act of 2004, 9 GCA \'a7 71.20(b),
 the balance of the criminal code leaves the term undefined.  It is not clear therefore, that the Legislature intended to modify the common-law definition of firearm as used elsewhere in the criminal code when it enacted 10 GCA \'a7
 60100 and the other provisions of Chapter 60, Title 10.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [18]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Even so, there is a rule of statutory construction that indicates }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Ratzlaf v. United States}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994).  Assuming, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 arguendo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
, that the rule would be applicable in the instant case, one need only examine 10 GCA \'a7 60117 for evidence that the Legislature meant to include inoperable weapons in the definition of }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 :}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid2701980 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \'a7 60117. Repair.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2701980 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid2701980 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 No person, ot
her than the owner or possessor of a firearm, may accept any firearm for repair without having first been shown a valid identification card showing the person delivering the firearm to such person accepting it for repair to be eligible to possess the fire
arm in question.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2701980 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid2825895 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 10 GCA \'a7 60117 (2005).  
It would be absurd to assume that the Legislature intended this statute to govern only the repair of weapons that were already in working condition.  The intent of the law could not have been to prevent cosmetic rep
airs to operable weapons, as such repairs would present no public safety concerns.  Rather, the intent of the law was to prevent untraceable, inoperable weapons from becoming untraceable, operable ones.  Therefore, the phrase }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 capable of discharging loaded ammunition}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  must be read to mean capable }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 before or after repair}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 of discharging loaded ammunition.  10 GCA \'a7 60100(b) (2005).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [19]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab 
We reach a similar conclusion by examining how other courts have treated inoperable firearms in the absence of statutory definitions.  For example in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Jackson}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , a defendant found guilty of armed robbery argued that the penalty enhancement for using a firearm was improper because the weapon was actually inoperable.  
155 Cal. Rptr. 305, 305 (Ct. App. 1979).  The court rejected the claim and reasoned that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  must be read to include inoperable as well as operable weapons.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}
{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 306.   Thus, the court determined that the weapon }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
was a firearm because [it was] designed by the manufacturer to shoot [and] gave every appearance of having that capability.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 307.  
More importantly, the same dangers, such as whether the victim or some other party will be injured by his or her reaction, are present whether the gun is operable or not.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [20]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab One can apply the same reasoning to theft of a firearm under 9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b).  
According to notes made by the Guam Law Revision Commission, which drafted Guam\rquote s criminal code, the theft of firearms is treated as a felony because firearms }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 facilitate the commission of other offenses and aid in flight.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   
Guam Law Revision Commission, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Recommendation Relating to Crimes and Corrections}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , at 277-78 (May 1975).  
Certainly an inoperable firearm would aid in flight for the same reason that an inoperable firearm is capable of use in an armed robbery\emdash the pursuer or victim will comply because the weapon\rquote s operability is not visibly apparent.  
Similarly, a stolen but inoperable weapon is capable of use in other offenses, such as armed robbery.  Although a thief who stole an inoperable weapon woul
d not be immediately capable of causing injury by firing the weapon, neither would an armed robber be capable of firing a similarly inoperable weapon\emdash a point that never concerned the court of }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Jackson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 .  Finally, one can assume that in most cases a
 thief who stole a weapon would be unaware of whether the stolen weapon was operable until after he had committed the act of theft.  The degree of mental culpability would be the same, therefore, whether the firearm was operable or not.  
For all of these reasons, we hold that the term }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearm,}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  as used in 9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b), must mean a weapon }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
designed by the manufacturer to shoot}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  and with the }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 appearance of having that capability.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Jackson}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 155 Cal.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6584701\charrsid11697034  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Rptr. at 307.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6584701\charrsid11697034 [21]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab The guns at issue in the present case were clearly designed to shoot real ammunition.  
The weapons themselves are identified by the type of ammunition they use, specifically .38 caliber rounds and 12 gauge shotgun shells.  No one argued at trial that the weapons were merely toys or novelty i
tems, or that the weapons were designed for some purpose other than shooting real ammunition.  On the contrary, Gerald Due}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as appeared to believe that a firearm ID card was necessary to legally possess the weapons.  He testified, for example, that part of 
the reason he would not give the shotgun to his sister was because she did not p}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6584701\charrsid11697034 ossess a firearm ID card.  Tr., v}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ol. II 
at 78 (Jury Trial, Oct. 27, 2005).  In addition, the police themselves treated the weapons as if they were designed to shoot and appeared capable of doing so.  
Officer Quintana testified that in responding to the report of a firearm and in executing the search warrant in this case, }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
SWAT personnel [were] involved . . . [because] it\rquote s a firearm so for officers\rquote  safety purposes, we usually generally use SWAT to make entrance.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   Tr.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6584701\charrsid11697034 ,}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid6584701\charrsid11697034 v}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ol. II at 132 (Jury Trial).  Finally, the members o
f the jury were able to examine the guns themselves, and thus could have reasonably concluded that they were real guns designed to fire real ammunition.  
The prosecution did not explicitly show that the weapons were operable, but they were not required to do so.  Thus, the prosecution presented more than sufficient evidence to show that the weapons were }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 firearms}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  for purposes of theft under 9 GCA \'a7 43.20(b).
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 2. The Ownership Interest of Gerald Due}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
as is not an Element of Theft}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16401773\charrsid11697034 [22]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Tennessen also argues that the People failed to prove that the stolen items belonged to Gerald C. Due}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
as, who is named as the owner in the Amended Indictment, and that the identity of the owner is an essential element of the crime of Theft of a Firearm.  Tennessen argues that the testimony adduced at trial showed only that the items belonged to Due}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as\rquote s deceased father.  For the charge to stand, he argues that the People were required to prove that Due}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as had a legal or possessory interest in the items.  The People contend that t
he name in the Amended Indictment is provided primarily for description and identification and to show that Tennessen does not own the stolen items.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16401773\charrsid11697034 [23]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16401773\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
We first consider whether to prove an essential element of the charge of theft, the People must show that a specific individual named in the indictment had a legal or possessory interest in the stolen item.  
An examination of the case law reveals that this is not the case.  Courts have resoundingly rejected the argument that the identity of the victims is an element of the offense of theft or larceny:  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
[T]he names of the owners of the stolen property constitute no part of the offense. They are stated in the information primarily as a matter of description for the purpose of identification and to show owner
ship in a person or persons other than the accused.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Hearn v. State}
{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 55 So.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16401773\charrsid11697034  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 2d 559, 561 (Fla. 1951).  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See also}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Trunfio}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 156 A.2d 486, 487 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1959) (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
It is plain, therefore, that the essential element of larceny is not that the property belonged to a specific person, but rather that it was the property of someone other than the thief.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ); }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Lee}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 904 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Wash. 1995) (}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Other authorities agree that in cases of theft and larceny proof of ownership of the stole
n property in the specific person alleged is not essential. The State is required to prove only that it belonged to someone other than the accused.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16401773\charrsid11697034 [24]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Contrary to Tennessen\rquote s contention, it is well accepted that, in a theft or larceny statute, the Peo
ple need only prove that someone other than the defendant has some possessory interest in the stolen property. }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  State v. Lackey}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 132 S.W. 602 (Mo. 1910) (holding that it must be alleged and proved that the property stolen was the property of another); }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Geraci}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 323 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. Ct. App. 1974) (same); }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Wilmore}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 459 P.2d 531 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969) (same).  The person need not own the stolen items.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. McCray}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 517 So.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9127206\charrsid11697034  }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 2d 474, 477 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Proof of the ownership of stolen pr
operty is not an essential element of proof of the crime of theft. The state is required only to prove that the property belonged to someone other than the defendant.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9832917\charrsid11697034 [25]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Based on the above case authority, the People were not required to show that Gerald Due}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 n}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 as owned the firearms at issue here.  
There was more than sufficient evidence introduced at trial to convince a reasonable trier of fact that someone other than Tennessen has a possessory interest in the firearms.  Therefore, the trial court did not
 err in denying the motions for judgment of acquittal.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 B. Motion in Arrest of Judgment}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9832917\charrsid11697034 [26]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9832917\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
Tennessen challenged the indictment in his Motion in Arrest of Judgment.  Specifically, Tennessen argues that the indictment failed to allege that he was a public official and that he knew his actions were unauthorized.}{
\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057  By way of illustration, the Amended Indictment read to the jury at trial included the following allegation regarding the .38 caliber handgun:
\par 
\par }\pard \s15\qj \fi720\li720\ri720\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12210429 {\insrsid2500057 On or about the period between November }{\insrsid2500057\charrsid12210429 1st, 1999 through January 15th}{
\insrsid2500057 
, 2000, inclusive, in Guam, Gene A. Tennessen, with the intent to benefit himself, did commit an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official function, that is, Gene A. Tennessen did knowingly prevent 
Guam Police Department Officer David Q. Manila, a subordinate officer, from properly confiscating a .38 caliber Rossi revolver, serial number W204054, in violation of 9 G.C.A. Section 49.90(a).
\par }\pard \s15\ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\insrsid2500057 
\par Tr., vol. II, at 10-11.  Under the statutory language, \'93
[a] public servant commits a misdemeanor if, with intent to benefit himself[,] . . . he commits an act relating to his office but constituting an unauthorized exercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is unauthorized . . . .\'94  9 GCA 
\'a7 40.90 }{\insrsid2500057\charrsid5926532 (2005)}{\insrsid2500057 .}}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   
The People counter that the indictment as written was sufficient to apprise Tennessen of the crimes with which he was being charged.  Because this opinion vacates Tennessen\rquote s conviction on other grounds, we need not decide the issue here.  
However, as explained below, there is one scenario whereby Tennessen might b}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12210429\charrsid11697034 e}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 acquitted as a result of his Motion in Arrest of Judgment, and we must therefore consider whether there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to prove that Tennessen was a public official who knew that his actions were unauthorized.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12210429\charrsid11697034 [27]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid12210429\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The effect of an order arresting the judgment is to place the defendant in the same situation he was before the indictment was found. . . .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "
}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   8 GCA \'a7 115.20 (2005).  
The specific remedy resulting from a successful motion in arrest of judgment depends ultimately on whether sufficient evidence was offered at trial to prove the elements omitted from the indictment:
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \'a7 115.30. Defendant; When to be Held or Discharged.}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
If, from the evidence on the trial, there is reason to believe the defendant guilty, and a new indictment . . . can be framed upon which he may be convicted, the court may order him to be held . . . pending the filing of a new indictment . . . . .  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 If no evidence appears sufficient}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
to charge him with any offense, . . .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 the arrest of judgment shall operate as an acquittal}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 of the charge upon which the indictment . . . was founded}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 .
\par 
\par 8 GCA \'a7 115.30 (2005) (emphasis added).  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See also People v. Morgan}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 141 Cal.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4086560\charrsid11697034  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Rptr. 863, 869 (Ct. App. 1977) (interpreting a substantially similar statute).  
Thus, if there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove the elements allegedly omitted from the indictment, Tennessen must be acquitted.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4086560\charrsid11697034 [28]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4086560\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Ten
nessen argues that the indictment did not allege that he was a public official or that he knew preventing a subordinate officer from confiscating a weapon was unauthorized.  
However, there was testimony from his fellow officers that Tennessen was a lieutenant with the Guam Police Department at the time of the alleged crime.  
In addition, there was testimony that Tennessen observed a subordinate officer attempting to inventory the weapons, that Tennessen offered to }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 take care of it,}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  that the weapons were never inventoried, and that i}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4086560\charrsid11697034 t}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  was police procedure to inventory confiscated weapons.  Tr., }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4086560\charrsid11697034 vol. II}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 40-42 (Testimony of Officer Manila).  Based on the testimony of his fellow officer, a }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Cruz}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 1998 Guam 18 \'b6 9.  
The overwhelming evidence introduced at trial reveals that Tennessen was a public official and knew that his actions in acquiring the weapons were contrary to police procedure.  Therefore, we ne
ed not determine whether the wording of the indictment was defective, as even a defective indictment would not result in Tennessen\rquote s acquittal, and turn instead to the question of whether the AG\rquote s Office should have been disqualified.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\b\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 C. Disqualification
\par }\pard\plain \s25\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8588307\charrsid11697034 [29]}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid8588307\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Although a prosecutor necessarily stands as an adversary to the accused, }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [r]ecusal is . . . appropriate where the prosecuting attorney has a personal interest in convicting the accused, since the state\rquote 
s interest is in attaining impartial justice, not merely a conviction.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Doyle}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d 893, 899 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987); }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 see also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 481 U.S. 787, 803 (1987) (}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ).  Guam has no specific statute governing recusal of a
 prosecuting attorney; however, case law from other jurisdictions suggests that the standard is whether prosecution by the conflicted attorney would result in the }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 appearance of impropriety.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Garcia}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 698 P.2d 801, 806 (Colo. 1985); }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
Doyle}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d at 899 (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
American courts have consistently held that the appearance of impropriety is sufficient to justify disqualification of a prosecuting attorney.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ).}{\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057 
 This standard is similar to that applied to judges in Guam; that is, whether a reasonable person, aware of all the relevant facts, would find that a judge had \'93the appearance of bias.\'94  }{\i\insrsid2500057 Van Dox v. Super. Ct.}{\insrsid2500057 
, 2008 Guam 7 \'b6 32 (quoting }{\i\insrsid2500057 Dizon v. Super. Ct.}{\insrsid2500057 , 1998 Guam 3 \'b6 10 n.3).
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   The }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 appearance of impropriety}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  standard means that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
[a] defendant need not prove actual bad faith or unethical conduct on the part of the prosecutor and his staff.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4408479\charrsid11697034 [30]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab A similar standard guides the decision whether to require vicarious disqualification of an entire prosecutor
\rquote s office.  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [T]he pertinent inquiry is whether the facts support the court\rquote s conclusion that the \lquote 
public would perceive continued prosecution by the district attorney\rquote s office, under the particular circumstances here, as improper and unjust, so as to undermine the credibility of the criminal process in our courts.\rquote }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Palomo}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 31 P.3d 879, 882 (Colo. 2001) (quoting }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. County Ct.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 854 P.2d 1341, 1344-45 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).  In deciding whether to disqualify the entire office, one must determine }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 whether a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the defendant should be satisfied that his or her interests will not be compromised.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Gonzales}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
, 119 P.3d 151, 159 (N.M. 2005) (quoting }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State ex rel. Romley v. Super. Ct.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 908 P.2d 37, 42 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995)).  }
{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4408479\charrsid11697034 [31]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4408479\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
The possible participation of Tennessen as a witness in Moylan\rquote s criminal case would certainly suggest to a reasonable person that Moylan might have a vindictive bias against Tennessen, whether or not such bias actually existed.  
It would also suggest to a reasonable person that Moylan might be motivated to discredit Tennessen as a witness by actively seeking his conviction.  Tennessen
 himself might reasonably assume that his chances of obtaining a fair plea agreement would be considerably reduced because of his involvement in Moylan\rquote s case.  For all of these reasons, Moylan was disqualified from participating in Tennessen
\rquote s criminal case.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 [32]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
The more difficult question is whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding not to disqualify the entire AG\rquote s Office.  There are two distinct inquiries here.  The first is whether Judge Unpingco abused his discretion in declining to d
isqualify the entire AG\rquote s Office in his March 26, 2004 Decision and Order.  The second is whether Judge Maraman abused her discretion in her October 21, 2005 Decision and Order when she refused to disqualify the entire AG\rquote 
s Office after Tennessen submitted additional evidence that Moylan may have violated the conflict wall.  We address each of these questions in turn.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 1. Disqualification of the AG\rquote s Office}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }\pard\plain \s25\ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard\plain \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 [33]}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The case law discussing the disqualification of prosecutors generally falls under two categories.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See Doyle}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d at 897.  
The first category concerns disqualification arising from a conflict of interest based on a professional, attorney-client relationship; for example, where the defendant is a former client of the prosecuting attorney.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 .; }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 see}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  e.g.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Tippecanoe County Ct.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 432 N.E.2d 1377 (Ind. 1982); }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Lepe}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 211 Cal. Rptr. 432 (Ct. App. 1985); }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
State ex rel. Keenan v. Hatcher}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 557 S.E.2d 361 (W. Va. 2001).  
A second category concerns disqualification arising from a conflict based on a personal interest in the litigation or on a personal relationship with the accused.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Doyle}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d at 897-98; }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 see}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ,}{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  e.g.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  People v. Choi}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922 (Ct. App. 2000).  The instant appeal falls within this latter category, and we therefore look to these cases for guidance.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 [34]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The court in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Doyle}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  suggested that the disqualification of a supervising prosecutor requires disqualification of the entire office:}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
The general rule is that a conflict of interest involving the elected county prosecutor himself requires recusal of the prosecutor and the entire staff.  Since assistant prosecutors act on behalf of the elected county prosecutor and are su
pervised by him, the policies of fairness to the defendant and the avoidance of an appearance of impropriety require this result.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Doyle}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d at 899.  However, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Doyle}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  is distinguishable from the present case because the court never considered whether a conflict wall might be used in place of disqualification of the entire office.  In fact, the court
\rquote s ruling was based in part on the fact that the prosecutor did not erect a conflict wall at all and instead continued to represent the government against the defendant.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
Recusal of the entire office is required because [the prosecutor] did not in fact withdraw from the [defendant\rquote s] case and because of [the prosecutor\rquote s] supervisory position in the prosecutor\rquote s office.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 [35]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid10422158\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 We therefore look to cas
es that have considered whether a conflict wall may be used in place of }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16397493\charrsid11697034 the }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 disqualification of the entire office.  In }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Gonzales}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
, the Supreme Court of New Mexico considered whether the entire office of the district attorney was disqualified by imputation.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Gonzales}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ,}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 119 P.3d at 163.  
Evidence was presented that the District Attorney in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Gonzales}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 disliked the defendant, a former employee of her office.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 154.  The court suggested that }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 screening mechanisms commonly utilized in public and private law offices may be effective to \lquote dissipate\rquote 
 the appearance of unfairness, as they were in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Pennington}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 .}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\qj \li0\ri0\sa120\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14884372 
\fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057  Although }{\i\insrsid2500057 Pennington}{\insrsid2500057 
 is distinguishable based on the fact that the disqualification at issue was the result of an attorney-client relationship with the defendant, the majority rule in such cases disfavors disqualification of the entire office:
\par }\pard \s15\qj \li720\ri720\sa120\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid14884372 {\insrsid2500057 
The great majority of jurisdictions have refused to apply a per se rule disqualifying the entire prosecutor's staff solely on the basis that one member of the staf
f had been involved in the representation of the defendant in a related matter. In their view the entire staff ordinarily need not be disqualified from prosecuting the defendant if the staff member who had previously worked for the defendant is isolated f
rom any participation in the prosecution of the defendant}{\i\insrsid2500057 . United States v. Caggiano}{\insrsid2500057 , 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1981); }{\i\insrsid2500057 United States v. Goot}{\insrsid2500057 , 894 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1990); }{
\i\insrsid2500057 Jackson v. State}{\insrsid2500057 , 502 So.2d 858 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Upton v. State}{\insrsid2500057 , 257 Ark. 424, 516 S.W.2d 904 (1974); }{\i\insrsid2500057 People v. Lopez}{\insrsid2500057 
, 155 Cal.App.3d 813, 202 Cal. Rptr. 333 (1984) (applying new state statute); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Bunkley}{\insrsid2500057 , 202 Conn. 629, 522 A.2d 795 (1987); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Fitzpatrick}{\insrsid2500057 
, 464 So.2d 1185 (Fla.1985); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Frazier v. State}{\insrsid2500057 , 257 Ga. 690, 362 S.E.2d 351 (1987); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Dambrell}{\insrsid2500057 , 120 Idaho 532, 817 P.2d 646 (1991); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. McKibben}{
\insrsid2500057 , 239 Kan. 574, 722 P.2d 518 (1986); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Summit v. Mudd}{\insrsid2500057 , 679 S.W.2d 225 (Ky. 1984); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Bell}{\insrsid2500057 , 346 So.2d 1090 (La. 1977); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Young v. State}{
\insrsid2500057 , 297 Md. 286, 465 A.2d 1149 (1983); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Pisa v. Commonwealth}{\insrsid2500057 , 378 Mass. 724, 393 N.E.2d 386 (1979); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Collier v. Legakes}{\insrsid2500057 , 98 Nev. 307, 646 P.2d 1219 (1982); }{
\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Camacho}{\insrsid2500057 , 329 N.C. 589, 406 S.E.2d 868 (1991); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Commonwealth v. Harris}{\insrsid2500057 , 501 Pa. 178, 460 A.2d 747 (1983); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Cline}{\insrsid2500057 
, 122 R.I. 297, 405 A.2d 1192 (1979); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Smart}{\insrsid2500057 , 278 S.C. 515, 299 S.E.2d 686 (1982); }{\i\insrsid2500057 Mattress v. State}{\insrsid2500057 , 564 S.W.2d 678 (Tenn. Crim. App.1977); }{\i\insrsid2500057 
State ex rel. Eidson v. Edwards}{\insrsid2500057 , 793 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc); }{\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Miner}{\insrsid2500057 , 128 Vt. 55, 258 A.2d 815 (1969); }{\i\insrsid2500057 see generally }{\insrsid2500057 
Annotation, T.J. Griffin, }{\i\insrsid2500057 Disqualification of Prosecuting Attorney on Account of Relationship with Accused}{\insrsid2500057 , 31 A.L.R.3d 953 (1970 & Supp. 1992).
\par }\pard \s15\qj \li0\ri720\sa240\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin720\lin0\itap0\pararsid14884372 {\i\insrsid2500057 State v. Pennington}{\insrsid2500057 , 851 P.2d 494, 498 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993).
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  (citing }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 State v. Pennington}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 851 P.2d 494, 502 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993)).  However, the District Attorney under scrutiny in }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Gonzales}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 made no attempt to screen herself, and the Supreme Court of New Mexico therefore determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the entire office.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   
Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 at 163.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16397493\charrsid11697034 [36]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16397493\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
On the other hand, where conflict walls are effectively implemented, disqualification of the entire office may be unnecessary.  For example, the United States District Court of Puerto Rico considered whether the entire U.S. Attorney\rquote 
s Office should be disqualified because the U.S. Attorney\rquote s brother was a government witness in a grand jury investigation.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 In re Grand Jury Proceedings}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 700 F. Supp. 626, 629-30 (D.P.R. 1988).  The U.S. Attorney had recused himself from the proceedings, and the court therefore declined to disqualify the entire office.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 630.  The court considered the Model Code of Professional Conduct, Rule DR 5-105(D), which states that }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [i]f a lawyer is required to
 decline employment or to withdraw from employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employment.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  n.1 (quoting Model Code of Prof\rquote 
l Responsibility DR 5-105(D)).  The court was guided by commentary from the ABA Ethics Committee, which suggested that if DR 5-105(D) were construed to apply to government agencies negative consequences would result:}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The government\rquote 
s ability to function would be unreasonably impaired. Necessity dictates that government action not be hampered by such a construction of DR-5-105(D). The relationships among lawyers within a government agency are different from those among partners and a
s
sociates of a law firm. The salaried government employee does not have the financial interest in the success of departmental representation that is inherent in private practice. The important difference in the adversary posture of the government lawyer is
 recognized by Canon 7: the duty of the public prosecutor to seek justice, not merely to convict, and the duty of all government lawyers to seek just results rather than the result desired by a client. The channeling
 of advocacy toward a just result as oppo
sed to vindication of a particular claim lessens the temptation to circumvent the disciplinary rules through the action of associates. Accordingly, we construe DR 5-105(D) to be inapplicable to other government lawyers associated with a particular governm
ent lawyer who is himself disqualified by reason of DR 4-101, DR 5-105, DR 9-101(B), or similar disciplinary rules.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 (quoting ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 342, 62 A.B.A. J. 57 (1976)).}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14884372\charrsid11697034 [37]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab We find this reasoning to be persuasive.  Prosecutors within the AG\rquote 
s Office do not have a financial incentive to side with the Attorney General in every instance, as they would in a private law firm.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   Instead, they are guided by a duty to seek justice rather than a desire to vindicate a particular claim in favor of the AG\rquote s Office.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   While one can argue that an Attorney General\rquote 
s disqualification coupled with his supervisory power weighs in favor of disqualification of the entire office, we are confident that a non-disqualified prosecutor 
can effectively dispense justice if protected by an effective conflict wall surrounding his or her supervisor.  To hold that the entire AG\rquote s Office has a }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 disqualifying emotional stake in the [case would] stretch the concept of intra-office loyalty to a breaking point.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 at 630-31.  Thus, disqualification of the AG
\rquote s Office would only be necessary if the particular conflicted attorney were not properly screened from the case.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 2. Judge Unpingco\rquote s March 26, 2004 Decision and Order}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14884372\charrsid11697034 [38]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab While Judge Unpingc
o had the discretion to order erection of a conflict wall rather than disqualifying the entire office, we are not confident that he properly exercised that discretion in analyzing the pertinent facts and law.  
The present case is extraordinary in that the original prosecutor, Assistant Attorney General James J. Casey, filed a declaration in support of Tennessen\rquote s motion.  
In it, he described how he was impeded from finalizing the plea agreement that he and Tennessen\rquote s attorney had agreed to.  Casey also indicated he did not }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
believe that this case [could] ever be prosecuted without the influence of Attorney General Moylan having input because the powers that be know the importance of trying to effect [sic] Mr. Tennessen as a witness against the Attorney Gene
ral in his upcoming criminal case.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   Appellant\rquote s Excerpts of Record (}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ER}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ) at 26 (Decl. James J. Casey, Mar. 16, 2004).  Casey\rquote 
s prediction that Moylan would be incapable of avoiding Tennessen\rquote s case should have raised concerns as to the possibility of successfully implementing a conflict wall.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid14884372\charrsid11697034 [39]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Furthermore, Judge Unpingco applied a }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 prejudice}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  standard where none was warranted.  
The misapprehension apparently arose after the People\rquote s inappropriate cite to }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 In re Appeal of Infotechnology, Inc.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  for the proposition that Tennessen was required to prove by }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
clear and convincing evidence}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 the conflict will prejudice the fairness of the proceedings.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   
582 A.2d 215, 221 (Del. 1990).  However, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Appeal of Infotechnology}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  involved a party\rquote 
s standing in a civil suit to challenge the other party\rquote s attorney on the grounds of an alleged conflict of interest.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id. }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 at 218.  Similarly, }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Dawson v. City of Bartlesville}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
, 901 F. Supp. 314, 314 (N.D. Okla. 1995), another case cited by the People, also involves a question of standing in a civil suit.  We are unaware of any common law authority that suggests a defendant in a }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 criminal }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 case must show prejudice before he or she can challenge a prosecutor\rquote s alleged conflict of interest.}{
\cs16\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \s15\qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs20\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\cs16\super\insrsid2500057 \chftn }{\insrsid2500057  California, however, has a recusal standard that is set by statute.  Section 1424 of the California Penal Code states that a motion to recuse \'93
may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.\'94  Cal. Penal Code \'a7
 1424 (Westlaw 2008).  California courts have interpreted this requirement to mean actual prejudice to the defendant as opposed to an appearance of impropriety.  }{\i\insrsid2500057 People v. Neely}{\insrsid2500057 , 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 892 (Ct. App.
 1999); }{\i\insrsid2500057 see also People v. Choi}{\insrsid2500057 , 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that the defendant\rquote 
s right to a fair trial was prejudiced).  In fact, section 1424 appears to have been enacted for the purpose of overruling the \'93appearance of impropriety\'94 standard set forth in }{\i\insrsid2500057 People v. Super. Ct. (Greer)}{\insrsid2500057 
, 561 P.2d 1164, 1173 (Cal. 1977).  }{\i\insrsid2500057 See }{\insrsid2500057 Ryan W. Herrick, }{\i\insrsid2500057 Hurry Up and Get On with It: Judicial Review of Prosecutor Recusal Order by Extraordinary Writ}{\insrsid2500057 
, 30 McGeorge L. Rev. 555, 558 (1999).
\par }}}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   We assume that no such authority exists.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9773861\charrsid11697034 [40]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Nevertheless, in denying Tennessen\rquote s motion to recuse the entire AG\rquote 
s Office, Judge Unpingco stated that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
[a]bsent proof that Tennessen is unfairly prejudiced by the conflict, this [c]ourt cannot make a finding that defendant is unable to obtain a fair and impartial trial.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   ER at 42 (Dec. & Order, Mar. 26, 2004).  This is not the correct standard for determining whether recusal of the entire AG\rquote s Office was necessary.  
Instead, the court should have considered all the relevant evidence, including Casey\rquote s declaration, and determined whether {\*\bkmkstart OLE_LINK1}{\*\bkmkstart OLE_LINK2}the continued participation of the AG\rquote 
s Office in the prosecution would result in an appearance of impropriety.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See Palomo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 31 P.3d at 882.  
{\*\bkmkend OLE_LINK1}{\*\bkmkend OLE_LINK2}While }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \lquote 
[a] trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is based on . . . an incorrect legal standard,\rquote }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Carlson v. Perez}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 2007 Guam 6 \'b6 15 (quoting }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
Fallini v. Hodel}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 783 F.2d 1343, 1345 (9th Cir. 1986)), this court cannot say that on March 26, 2004 it would have necessarily reached a different decision than Judge Unpingco did.  
We therefore look to the events leading up to Judge Maraman\rquote s October 21, 2005 Decision and Order for additional evidence of the conflict wall\rquote s ultimate effectiveness.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 3. Judge Maraman\rquote s October 21, 2005 Decision and Order}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9773861\charrsid11697034 [41]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid9773861\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The People argued\emdash 
and Judge Maraman agreed\emdash that the law of the case required the court to deny Tennessen\rquote s renewed motion to disqualify the entire AG\rquote s Office.  However, }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [a] court has discretion to depart from the law of the case where . . . changed circumstances exist.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Hualde}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 1999 Guam 3 \'b6 13.  
This exception is especially relevant to the present case, because the decision not to disqualify the entire AG\rquote s Office was contingent upon the continuing effectiveness of the conflict wall around Moylan.  
Evidence that the conflict wall was no longer effective would constitute }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 changed circumstances}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  allowing Judge Maraman to disqualify the entire office without violating the law of the case.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5444889\charrsid11697034 [42]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab In a similar case, a trial court disqualified an entire district attorney\rquote 
s office after initially allowing the District Attorney to isolate himself from the case through a conflict wall.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. Choi}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 926 (Ct. App. 2000).  In }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Choi}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ,
 a district attorney\rquote s office was prosecuting a defendant who was suspected of killing the District Attorney\rquote s personal friend.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 924.  The defendant was on trial for a different alleged murder and had not yet been charged with killing the District Attorney\rquote s friend.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   Nevertheless, a conflict wall was erected around the District Attorney at the inception of the case.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 at 926.  Subsequently, the District Attorney discussed his theory of the case with the media and eventually made an }
{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ex parte}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  motion to lift a gag order so he could publish a letter to the editor of a local newspaper.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 925.  The California appeals court determined that the District Attorney\rquote s }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 deep emotional involvement which stemmed from the loss of his close friend . . . 
prevented him from exercising the discretionary functions of his office in an evenhanded manner.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 at 926.  
As a result, the court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the lower court to recuse the entire office because it was }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
clear that the ethical wall in the district attorney\rquote s office did not prevent [the district attorney] from communicating about the case to others within the office.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  at 928.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1465689\charrsid11697034 [43]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Choi}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  stands for the proposition that a judge does not abuse his or her discretion in recusing the entire office once a conflict wall has been breached.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 ; }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 cf. Gonzales}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 119 P.3d at 163 (recusal of the entire office was not an abuse of discretion when no attempt was made to erect a conflict wall).  The case before us presents a slightly different question
\emdash whether a judge abuses his or her discretion in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 not}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
 recusing the entire office once a conflict wall has been breached.  While a court might be able to shore up a breached conflict wall through its contempt powers, the }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 policies of fairness to the defendant and the avoidance of an appearance of impropriety}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  would seem to require the more drastic remedy of recusing the entire office in this case.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Doyle}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d at 897-98.  We therefore hold that a court abuses its discretion in not recusing the entire AG\rquote 
s Office once the conflict wall surrounding the Attorney General has been shown to be ineffective.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15557810\charrsid11697034 [44]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid1465689\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
Next, we examine the ultimate effectiveness of the conflict wall erected in the present case.  Judge Unpingco\rquote s original order erecting the conflict wall was very specific:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
The [c]ourt hereby ORDERS that a conflict wall be in place to shield Moylan from any further participation in the prosecution of this case.  Moylan shall not discuss this case with anyone, shall not review files conc
erning this case, shall not have access to any files or information concerning this case, and shall not obtain or share confidential information concerning this case with anyone.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par ER at 42 (Dec. & Order).  Not only does the order forbid Moylan from participating in Tennessen\rquote s prosecution, it forbids him from having access to or sharing any information or files connected with the case.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Id.}{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15557810\charrsid11697034 [45]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15557810\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Tennessen\rquote 
s counsel presented a declaration in the lower court concerning a conversation with Mindy Fothergill of KUAM news.  
During the conversation, Fothergill recounted an interview with Moylan in which he allegedly indicated that a new case would be filed against Tennessen in the near future.  A new case against Tennessen was filed three days later.  
Later, Assistant Attorney General Lewis W. Littlepage admitted in court that he had informed Moylan of the impending charges against Tennessen.  Littlepage\rquote s admissi
on lends credence to the allegation that Moylan communicated with Fothergill regarding Tennessen\rquote s case.  The communication with Fothergill, if true, raises serious concerns regarding Moylan\rquote 
s judgment and ability to maintain the confidentiality of the AG\rquote s Office.  Moreover, Moylan\rquote s discussions with both Littlepage and Fothergill were in direct violation of Judge Unpingco\rquote s order that Moylan }{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 shall not discuss the case with anyone, shall not review files concerning the case, shall not have access to any f
iles or information concerning [Tennessen\rquote s] case, and shall not obtain or share confidential information concerning [Tennessen\rquote s] case with anyone.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   ER at 42 (Dec. & Order).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15557810\charrsid11697034 [46]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15557810\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
Having thus called the conflict wall into question, the burden falls upon the government to show that the conflict wall provided an effective screen.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Gonzales}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 119 P.3d at 163.  Attorney R. Anthony Welch, who was assigned the prosecution of Tennessen\rquote s case sometime around September 2005, declared in an affidavit that the attorn
ey transferring the case to him had informed him of the existence of the conflict wall.  He indicated that he had no communication with Moylan, with the exception of an incident where Moylan attempted to assign him more work and he refused.  
Welch also declared that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 [t]he Attorney General has not been involved in any way in the management or preparation of this matter.  
Nor has the Attorney General been involved in consideration or decision making concerning any plea offer.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   ER at 55 (Decl. of Counsel, Oc
t. 14, 2005).}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4791765\charrsid11697034 [47]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid4791765\charrsid11697034 \tab }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 While Welch\rquote 
s declaration shows that the conflict wall was effective throughout the month of September, Welch justifies the earlier breach as follows:}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }\pard \ql \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The court\rquote 
s order made clear that the Attorney General was to have no input in this case.  Defendant is now attempting to say that information about another case somehow violates this court\rquote s order.  That argument is simply nonsense.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid11697034 {\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 The court order is crystal clear in its repetition of the phrase }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
this case.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   The order required that the A
ttorney General keep his nose out of this case and there is no evidence that the Attorney General had any participation in the case following the issuance of the order.
\par 
\par ER, at 52 (People\rquote s Response in Opp. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7286898\charrsid11697034 t}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 o Defendant\rquote s Mot. to Disqual. & Dismiss, Oct. 14, 2005).  
We disagree.  The case that Moylan discussed with Fothergill involved allegations that Tennessen tampered with witnesses in the underlying criminal case against him.  In our view, Moylan would have been conflicted from the witness tampering case
 for the same reasons he was conflicted from the underlying case.  Thus, the undisputed facts lead to the conclusion that Moylan violated Judge Unpingco\rquote s order.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7286898\charrsid11697034 [48]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Finally, the record does not account for the period of time between Casey\rquote s declaration i
n favor of Tennessen and the date when Welch took over the case.  We can only assume that by March 16, 2004, when Casey provided a declaration in favor of Tennessen, he was no longer assigned to Tennessen\rquote s case.  In Welch\rquote 
s declaration, he indicated that he was assigned Tennessen\rquote s case sometime in September of 2005.  The People provide no information as to who was in charge of the documents relating to Tennessen\rquote 
s case between March of 2004 and September of 2005.  At a minimum, the People would be obligated to provide at least }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 some}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  information regarding the status of the conflict wall during that period in order to meet their burden of proving that the conflict wall provided an effective screen.  }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See Gonzales}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 119 P.3d at 163.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7286898\charrsid11697034 [49]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab In the end, Judge Maraman found the evidence }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 insufficient to show that the Defendant [was] prejudiced or that Moylan obtained confidential information regarding this case which could affect the Defendant\rquote s right to a fair trial.
}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   ER at 63 (Dec. & Order, Oct. 21, 2005).  As with Judge Unpingco\rquote s order, Judge Maraman\rquote 
s order describes the wrong standard for determining whether recusal of the AG\rquote s Office is necessary.  Rather than applying a prejudice standard, the court should have noted the breach of the conflict wall and determi
ned whether continuing prosecution by the AG\rquote s Office would have seemed unfair to the public or to a reasonable person standing in Tennessen\rquote s shoes.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See Gonzales}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 119 P.3d at 159; }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Palomo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 31 P.3d at 882.  
Because the facts relating to the issue of disqualification are essentially undisputed, we can apply the correct standard without need to remand. }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16006941\charrsid11697034 [50]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab Tennessen has provided evidence that the conflict wall was not effective in screening Moylan from Tennessen
\rquote s case, and the People have failed to meet their burden of proving otherwise.  A reasonable person in Tennessen\rquote 
s shoes could have concluded that his interests, especially those related to obtaining a fair plea agreement, had been compromised.  }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 See Gonzales}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 119 P.3d at 159.  In addition, Moylan\rquote s apparent inability to isolate himself from Tennessen\rquote s prosecution reflected poorly on the AG\rquote 
s Office as a whole, which may have led to a public perception that }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 continued prosecution by the [AG\rquote 
s Office], under the particular circumstances here, [was] improper and unjust, so as to undermine the credibility of the criminal process in our courts.\rquote }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Palomo}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 31 P.3d at 882 (quoting }{
\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 People v. County Ct.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 854 P.2d 1341, 1344-45 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992)).  
In other words, by October of 2005 participation by the AG\rquote s Office was tainted with an }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 appearance of impropriety.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034 "}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034   }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 Doyle}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 , 406 N.W.2d at 899.  At that point, the court had no real option except to recuse the entire office, and failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.  
However, nothing in this opinion should be construed as either mandating or prohibiting recusal of the AG\rquote s Office at the present time, given that Moylan is no longer Attorney General of Guam.  
Because the only available remedy at this point is vacate Tennessen\rquote s judgment of conviction, we need not reach any of the remaining issues raised by Tennessen on appeal.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 IV. CONCLUSION}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid11697034\charrsid11697034 
\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid16006941\charrsid11697034 [51]}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 \tab The trial court properly denied Tennes}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid2771917\charrsid11697034 s}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 en\rquote s motion for acquittal and motion in arrest of judgment.  However, the court abused its discretion in not disqualifying the entire AG\rquote 
s office once it became clear that the conflict wall was ineffective.  As a result, we }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 VACATE}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  Tennessen\rquote 
s judgment of conviction and }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 REMAND}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  this matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  The People
\rquote s cross-appeal is }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 DISMISSED}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034  as moot.}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034   
This Amended Opinion supersedes our earlier opinion in }{\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 People v. Tennessen}{\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid5926532\charrsid11697034 , 2008 Guam 21.}{
\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid11697034 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1726737 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid1726737 ROBERT J. TORRES
\par Associate Justice
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1726737 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid1726737 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1726737 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7497826\charrsid1726737 RICHARD H. BENSON}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid1726737 

\par }{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7497826\charrsid1726737 Justice, }{\b\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7497826\charrsid1726737 Pro Tempore}{\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid1726737 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1726737 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid7497826\charrsid1726737 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid1726737 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid1726737 F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid6236098 {\b\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid6236098 Chief Justice}{\b\i\lang2057\langfe1033\langnp2057\insrsid15807434\charrsid6236098 

\par }}