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People v. Castro, }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 Opinion\tab Page }{\field{\*\fldinst {\fs20\insrsid2302627 PAGE }}{\fldrslt {\fs20\lang1024\langfe1024\noproof\insrsid14813596 18}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  of 28
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\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM}{\insrsid14813596 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 PEOPLE OF GUAM }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par Plaintiff-Appellant,
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 v. }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 FRANK RONALD CASTRO}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par Defendant-Appellee.}{\insrsid14813596 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Supreme Court Case No.:}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 CRA01-002
\par Superior Court Case No.:}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 CF0324-98}{\insrsid14813596 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam}{\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Argued and submitted on December 11, 2001}{\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam}{\insrsid14813596 
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\par }{\ul\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 For Plaintiff-Appellant:}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par Gerad Egan
\par Assistant Attorney General
\par Office of the Attorney General
\par 2-200E Guam Judicial Ctr.
\par 120 W. O}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Brien Dr.
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910\cell 
\par }{\ul\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 For Defendant-Appellee:}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par Richard Parker Arens, }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Esq}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 .
\par Cunliffe & Cook, P.C.
\par Suite 200
\par 210 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910
\par \cell }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\intbl\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \trowd \irow0\irowband0\lastrow \ts11\trqc\trgaph120\trleft-120\trftsWidth1\trpaddl120\trpaddr120\trpaddfl3\trpaddfr3 \clvertalt
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\par BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, JR., Chief Justice; F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO, Associate Justice; and JOHN A. MANGLONA, Designated Justice.}{\insrsid14813596 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 CARBULLIDO, J.:}{\b\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [1]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The Defendant-Appellee Frank Ronald Castro (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ) was convicted by a jury of one count of negligent homicide.}
{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Subsequent to entry of the verdict, the trial court granted Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for new trial on the ground that there was a reasonable possibility that extraneous information before the jury could have possibly affected the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The Plaintiff-Appellant People of Guam (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Government}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ) appeals the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s grant of Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a new trial.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Specifically, the Government argues that the trial court abused its discretion in conducting an evidentiary hearing on Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion and that, even if the evidentiary hearing was pr
oper, the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the extraneous information before the jury could have affected the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We reject the Government}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s challenges and find that the trial court properly held a hearing and admitted juror testimony for the purpose of determining Castro}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion, and did not abuse its discretion in granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s decision.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 I.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [2]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab 
On May 6, 1998, Castro was indicted for manslaughter and the concomitant weapons possession special allegation, and criminal negligent homicide and the concomitant weapons possession special allegation.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The case was tried before a jury.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 After the Government rested its case, Castro moved for judgment of acquittal on the manslaughter charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The lower court granted the motion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The remaining counts were submitted to the jury.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
On December 22, 2000, the jury returned a guilty verdict as to the negligent homicide charge, but found that Castro was not guilty with regard to the special allegation.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Transcript, vol. IV, p. 120 (Trial, Dec. 22, 2000); Record on Appeal, tab 149 (Verdict Form, Dec. 21, 2000).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [3]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab After the verdict was rendered, Juror Number 8 sent a letter to the trial judge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s Excerpts of Record, pp. 4-6 (Letter from Juror, Jan. 3, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The court provided counsel with a copy of the letter.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
In the letter, the juror made references to two facts: first, the fact that Christmas was a few days away and, second, that the original manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Based on the contents of this letter, Castro filed a motion for a new trial on the ground of juror misconduct.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [4]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab On Januar
y 26, 2001, the trial court conducted a sealed evidentiary hearing wherein the court accepted testimony from the jurors regarding the two facts identified in Juror Number 8}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s letter.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 At the hearing, the trial ju
dge asked each juror questions regarding their knowledge of the above-mentioned facts.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Based on the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  testimony, the trial court granted Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a ne
w trial, finding that there was a reasonable possibility that the extraneous information received by the jury regarding the manslaughter charge could have affected the verdict, and that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the inf
ormation did not contribute to the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s Excerpts of Record, pp. 7-14 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 This appealed followed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 II.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [5]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab This court has jurisdiction over this appeal from an order granting a new trial pursuant to Title 7 GCA }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  3107(a) (1994) and Title 8 GCA }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  130.20(a)(1) (1993).
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 III.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [6]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The issue before the court is whether the trial court erred in granting a new trial on the ground that the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s verdict may have possibly been affected by the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s knowledge that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge or that the manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
We must first determine whether the trial court, in determining whether a new trial was warranted, erred in holding a hearing and admitting juror testimony.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
If no error is found, we must next determine whether a new trial was warranted based on the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 testimony.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 A.}{\b\insrsid14813596  }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Evidentiary Hearing.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [7]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The Government argues that the trial court erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing regarding the existence of extraneous information after the verdict was rendered.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Specifically, the Government argues that there is nothing in Juror No. 8}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s letter which reveals that the juror was apprised of extraneous information, thereby precluding the need for an evidentiary hearing.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We disagree.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [8]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab A criminal defendant may be granted a new trial based on juror misconduct.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
One type of juror misconduct that forms grounds for a new trial is the possession of extraneous information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Under this circumstance, a defendant is entitled to a new trial if there is a reasonable possibility that the extrinsic information could have affected the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Keating}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d 895, 900, 901 (9th Cir. 1998);}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  United States v. Herrero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 893 F.2d 1512, 1539 (7th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted), }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Durrive}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 902 F.2d 1221 (7th Cir. 1990); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also United States v. Cheek}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 94 F.3d 136, 144 (4th Cir. 1996); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 1996).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 When a colorable showing of extrinsic influence appears, a court must investigate the asserted impropriety.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Ruggiero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 56 F.3d 647, 652 (5th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In other words, once the trial court becomes aware that the jury possessed extra-judi
cial information, it is required to hold a hearing to determine }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
the probable effect of the information on the jury, the materiality of the extraneous material, and its prejudicial nature.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 People v. Palomo}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , Crim. No. 96-00070A, 1997 WL 209048, at *5 (D. Guam App. Div. Apr. 21, 1997) (citation omitted), }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 aff}{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 d by }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 139 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 1998); }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 898 (
recognizing its previous remand to the trial court for the purpose of conducting an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the extraneous information prejudiced the verdict).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Extraneous prejudicial information has been defined as a fact learned through }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
outside contact, communication, or publicity.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Tran}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 122 F.3d 670, 673 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s failure to testify was not extraneous prejudicial information); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Maree}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 934 F.2d 196, 202 (9th Cir. 1991) (providing that extraneous information is new or }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 additional information applicable to the facts of the case}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  that the jury did not receive as a result of their presence at trial).}{\insrsid14813596 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [9]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 A judge}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s decis
ion to hold a hearing to investigate alleged juror misconduct is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Wilson v. Vermont Castings, Inc.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 170 F.3d 391, 395 n.5 (3d Cir. 1999).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The admission of juror testimony fo
r the purpose of impeaching the verdict is similarly reviewed for an abuse of discretion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See People v. Evaristo}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 1999 Guam 22, }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  6.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [10]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In this case, Juror Number 8}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s letter included the following statement: }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
We assumed that the dropping of the original, Felony 1 Manslaughter, charge was all the mitigation the law would allow.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s Excerpts of Record, p. 6 (Letter from Juror, Jan. 3, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We find that it was not unreasonable for the trial court to interpret this statement to mean that Juror Num
ber 8 was given outside information that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge or that manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The information in Juror Number 8}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s letter amounted to a colorable showing of extraneous information because those facts were not presented during the trial.}{
\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 As will be discussed later in this Opinion, we disagree with the Government}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
s contention that the facts regarding the manslaughter ch
arge were presented through Jury Instruction Number 33.  Furthermore, the Government has not identified anywhere in the record where the jury was informed, either through the evidence or the instructions, that Castro was acquitted of manslaughter, or that
 the manslaughter charge was dropped.  }}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the evidentiary hearing.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Cf. United States v. Swinton}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 75 F.3d 374, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that because the information before the jury amounted to }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 extraneous prejudicial information,}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  the trial court erred in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a new trial was warranted).}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 B.}{\b\insrsid14813596  }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 New Trial.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [11]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The next issue we must address is whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s new trial motion based on extrinsic information before the jury.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See J.J. Moving Servs., Inc.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 v. Sanko Bussan (Guam) Co.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 1998 Guam 19 at }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  14 (reviewing the grant of a new trial based on extraneous information for an abuse of discretion); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Palomo}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 1997 WL 209048, at *5.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [12]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to an impartial jury, to confront witnesses, and to the assistance of counsel.
}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Virgin Islands v. Gereau}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 523 F.2d 140, 150 (3d Cir. 1975).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 These rights may be co
mpromised if the jurors possess information that was not presented at trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 600; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also Gereau}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 523 F.2d at 150-51; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Bibbins v. Dalsheim, }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 21 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1994).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
[W]here jurors consider evidence, in the form of either fact or opinion, which has not been introduced in court, the confrontation and counsel rights of an accused are obviated as regards the particular evidence received.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Gereau}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 523 F.2d at 151.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The tendency of particular evidence to cause impartiality in the minds of the jurors is often only capable of being tempered by the controls imposed by the court; therefore, it is }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
necessary that all evidence developed against an accused come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right[s].}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Howard}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 506 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Turner v. Louisiana}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 379 1965 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S. Ct. 546, 550 (1965)) (internal quotations omitted); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also United States v. Bagnariol}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 665 F.2d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 1981) (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The sixth amendment demands that evidence material to the guilt or innocence of an accused be subject to judicial control and the rules of evidence.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Gereau}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 523 F.2d at 151.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [13]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Thus, it is axiomatic that }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s verdict must be based only upon the evidence as developed at the trial, and not on extrinsic facts.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Palomo}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 1997 WL 209048, at *5.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
A defendant is entitled to a new trial if there is a reasonable possibility that extraneous information could have affected the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See id.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 1997 WL209048, at * 5;}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  see also Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 901-02; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Herrero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 893 F.2d at 1539 (citation omitted); }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also Cheek}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 94 F.3d at 144; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 600; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Ruggiero}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 56 F.3d at 652.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [14]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab A presumption of prejudice arises when the jury has received extraneous information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Keating}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 901; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 cf. Ruggiero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 56 F.3d at 652 (holding that when an extraneous influence affected the jury, there arises a }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 rebuttable presumption of prejudice to the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Swinton}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 75 F.3d at 382 n.6 (}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [P]roof that one juror had informed other jurors of defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s prior conviction would constitute a prima facie showing of prejudice.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ) (citation omitted); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Bibbins}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 21 F.3d at 16 (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [E]xtra-record information that becomes known to the jury is presumptively prejudicial.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Gereau}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 523 F.2d at 150 (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [C]onsideration by the jury of extra-record facts about the case . . . [is]}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Prima facie incompatible with the Sixth Amendment.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has similarly deemed }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
any private communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{
\fs20\insrsid2302627  to be }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 for obvious reasons, . . . presumptively prejudicial . . . .}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627    }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Remmer v. United States}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 451 (1954) (statement that o
ne juror was approached with a bribe).}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 But see}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Lloyd}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 269 F.3d 228, 238-39 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying the presumption of prejudice }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
only when the extraneous information is of a considerably serious nature}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The government bears the burden of showing that extraneous evidence did not contribute to the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902; }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also Ruggiero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 56 F.3d at 652 (stating that the government must rebut the presumption of prejudice by }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 proving the harmlessness of the breach}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Swinton}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 75 F.3d at 382.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [15]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The test employed in determining whether a new trial is warranted, i.e., whether the government has met its burden to rebut the presumption, varies among jurisdictions.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Compare Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 600, }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 with}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Ruggiero}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 56 F.3d at 653, }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Herrero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 893 F.2d at 1540-41, }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Swinton}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 75 F.3d at 382.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The trial court relied on the test as announced by the Ninth Circuit in the cases of }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries v. Wood}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 114 F.3d 1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1997) (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ), and }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson v. Sullivan}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 849 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1988) (}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, the court analyzed the following factors in determining whether the government met its burden to show that the verdict was not affected by the extraneous information:}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \fi-720\li1440\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin1440\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 1.\tab whether the material was actually received, and if so how;}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par 2.\tab the length of time it was available to the jury;
\par 3.\tab the extent to which the juror discussed and considered it;
\par }\pard \qj \fi-720\li1440\ri720\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin720\lin1440\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 4.\tab whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so at what point in the deliberations; and

\par 5.\tab any other matters which may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902 (quoting }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 849 F.2d at 406).}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , the court discussed several other factors to consider, including:}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \fi-720\li1440\ri720\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin720\lin1440\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 1.\tab whether the prejudicial statement was ambiguously phrased;
\par 2.\tab whether the extraneous information was otherwise admissible or merely cumulative of other evidence adduced at trial;
\par 3.\tab whether a curative instruction was given or some other step taken to ameliorate the prejudice; 
\par 4.\tab the trial context}{\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{
\insrsid2302627  }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 An analysis of this factor includes a consideration of the }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Dickson}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  factors.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Keating}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 147 F.3d at 902 n.5 (citing }{
\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Jeffries}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 114 F.3d at 1491-92).}{\i\insrsid2302627  }}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ; and
\par 5.\tab whether the evidence was insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence of the case.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Id.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902 (citing }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 114 F.3d at 1491-92).}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [16]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The Government does not challenge, and we do not disapprove of, the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s reliance on the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 and}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  Dickson }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
factors in deciding Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The issue, therefore, is whether the trial court erred in determining that, under an analysis of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 and}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  Dickson }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factors, there was a reasonable possibility that the verdict was affected by the extraneous information.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [17]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab A trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s grant of a new trial based on extraneous information before the jury is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See J.J. Moving}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 1998 Guam 19 at }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  14; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 see also Ruggiero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 56 F.3d at 653; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Caldwell}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 83 F.3d 954, 955 (8th Cir. 1996); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Herrero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 893 F.2d at 1539; }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Duncan}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 598 F.2d 839, 866 (4th Cir. 1979); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 600.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Furthermore, this court }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
must accord special deference to the trial judge}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s impression of the impact of the alleged misconduct.
}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Mills}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 280 F.3
d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The abuse of discretion standard has been adopted, and deference is given the trial judge}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s finding, because the trial judge is in a better position, by virtue of h
is or her observation of the jury over the case, to determine the probabilities that that particular jury was prejudiced by particular extra-judicial information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See J.J. Moving}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 1998 Guam 19 at }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  14; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Herrero}
{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 893 F.2d at 1539 (citation omitted); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 600.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [18]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab We first note that an analysis of whether the extraneous information could have affected the verdict is objective rather than subjective.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 901-02; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Duncan}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 598 F.2d at 866; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Swinton}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 75 F.3d at 382.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
In other words, in analyzing whether the information could have affected the verdict, courts do not rely upon statements by the jurors regarding the effect that knowledge of the infor
mation actually had on the verdict; rather, courts determine the likely effect on the verdict using a reasonable person or reasonable juror standard.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Bibbins}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 21 F.3d at 17; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Wilson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 170 F.3d at 394.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In fact, in accordance with Rule 606(b) of the Guam Rules of Evidence}{
\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 Rule 606(b) provides:
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's delibe
rations or to the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in connection therewith, }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 
except that a juror may testify on the question whether }{\b\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 extraneous prejudicial information}{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627  was improperly brought to the jury's attention }{\b\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 or}{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 
 whether any }{\b\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 outside influence}{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627  was improperly brought to bear upon any juror}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 . Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matte
r about what he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 Title 6 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
 606(b) (2000) (emphasis added).}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , in an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, a juror is only competent to testify as to two matters, extraneous prejudicial information and outside influence.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Title 6 GCA }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  606 (1994).}{
\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 Traditionally, under the common law, jurors were incompetent to impeach the verdict; therefore, }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 all}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  juror testimony was inadmissible to impeach the verdict once rendered.  }{
\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 See Tanner v. United States}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 483 U.S. 107, 117, 107 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (1987);}{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627  Gereau}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 523 F.2d at 148 (citing }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 McDonald v. Pless}{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 238 U.S. 264, 267, 35 S. Ct. 783, [ ] (1915)).  However, because a bright-line rule excluding juror testimony had the potential of allowing injustice, courts carved out an exception to the rule for certain types of juror testimo
ny.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 See Gereau}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 523 F.2d at 148-50; }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 McDonald}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 238 U.S. at 268-69, 35 S. Ct. at 785 (}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 [I]t would not be safe to lay down any inflexible rule because there might be instances in which such testimony of the juror c
ould not be excluded without violating the plainest principles of justice.}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
) (citation omitted).  Specifically, the emerging exception was that jurors are competent to give testimony regarding extraneous influences, and such evidence is therefore admissible in determining whether the defendant is entitled to a new trial.  }{
\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 See}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Tanner}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 483 U.S. at 117, 107 S. Ct. at 2746; }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Mattox v. United States}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
, 146 U.S. 140, 149, 13 S.Ct. 50, 53 (1892).  The rule and exception are now embodied in Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which is mirrored by Rule 606(b) of the Guam Rules of Evidence.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 See Tanner}{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 483 U.S. at 121, 107 S. Ct. at 2748.  }}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Furthermore, under Rule 606(b), jurors may only testify regarding the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 existence}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  of any extraneous information and the content of the information, but are incompetent to, and thus may not, testify as to their mental processes.}{\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 Testimony regarding a juror}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 s mental processes includes: 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 
(1) the method or arguments of the jury's deliberations, (2) the effect of any particular thing upon an outcome in the deliberations, (3) the mindset or emotions of any juror during deliberation, and (4) the testifying juror's own mental process during th
e deliberations.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid2302627 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Ruggiero}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 56 F.3d at 652.}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  6 GCA }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  606(b);}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  Ruggiero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 56 F.3d at 652; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Wilson}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 170 F.3d at 394; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 601;}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  Duncan}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 598 F.2d at 866.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In determining whether extraneous prejudicial material affected the verdict, thereby warranting a new trial, a judge}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s reliance on testimony regarding the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  mental processes amounts to an abuse of discretion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See, e.g., Cheek}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 94 F.3d at 144.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [19]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab A review of the January 26, 2001 hearing reveals that the trial court did not elicit testimony regarding the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  thought processes.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The court limited its questions to the existence and content of the extraneous information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Thus, testimony from the hearing was admissible under Rule 606(b).}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Furthermore, a review of the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s analysis of the }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  and }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 factors in its Decision and Order reveals that the trial court did not, at any point in its analysis, rely on or cite to the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  subjective opinions regarding the effect of the information on the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s Excerpts of Record, pp. 7-14 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The court}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s analysis was purely objective, and was therefore proper in this regard.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [20]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Because the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 testimony in this case was admissible to impeach the verdict, we must next determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion based on that testimony.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Specifically, we must review whether the trial court erred in its analysis of the jurors}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  testimony under the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
and }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors in arriving at its decision to grant Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}
{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 As the trial court correctly pointed out, no one factor is determinative.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See id}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 .}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [21]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab We will first review the lower court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s analysis of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factors.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The first four }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors are }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 whether the material was actually rec
eived, and if so, how; the length of time it was available to the jury; the extent to which the juror discussed and considered it; whether the material was introduced before a verdict was reached, and if so at what point in the deliberations.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Id.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  at 901.}{\insrsid14813596 
 }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The trial court held that the first, second, third, and fourth of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors weighed }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 heavily in favor of granting Defendant a new trial.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s Excerpts of Record, p. 11 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 This conclusion was based upon its finding that }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 more than half of the jury panel was in actual receipt of the information regarding Defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s acquittal; five jurors testified that there was some discussion surrounding this issue, and . . . [such discussion] 
ranged anywhere from 45 seconds to two hours; finally, the point in time at which the jurors recall the discussion occurred ranged from the beginning to the middle to the end.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s Excerpts of Record, pp. 11-12 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [22]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s findings are generally consistent with the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  testimony.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Based on the testimony, it is clear that four jurors testified that they actually received specific information about the manslaughter charge.}{\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627   }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
Seven jurors testified that they received information regarding the manslaughter charge.  However, only four testified as to the content of that information.}{\insrsid2302627   }}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Of those four, two jurors testified that they received information that the charge was dropped, and two testified that they received information that Castro was acquitted.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Several o
f these jurors testified that they received the information from an outside source, including the newspaper or televised news, and from a friend or co-worker, and that they received the information prior to deliberating.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Furthermore, three jurors testified that the jury actually discussed the information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Of the three, one juror testified that it was discussed for between 15 to 20 minutes, and the other testified that it was discussed for about a half an hour, a significant amount of time considering that
 the jury reached a verdict on the negligent homicide charge after deliberating for only six hours.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Finally, of these four jurors, one testified that the extraneous information was discussed but did not remember at what point, one testified that the infor
mation was discussed at the beginning and middle of the deliberations, and another testified that it was discussed at the end of the deliberations.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [23]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The facts the jurors testified to, outlined above, tip the first four }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors in favor of gra
nting a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 While the jurors presented varied testimony regarding when the information was received and the extent to which the information was discussed, it is clear from the jurors}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  testimony that extra
neous information was actually received prior to the verdict being rendered and that the jurors discussed the information for an undue amount of time while deliberating.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Keating}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902 (determining that the first four }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors weighed
 in favor of a new trial because the juror actually received the extraneous information from another juror during the trial, the information was available to the jury during the trial and throughout deliberations, the information was available before the 
verdict was reached, and several jurors testified that the information was discussed in the jury room).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Thus, we find that the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s analysis of these first four }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors was not in error.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [24]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The fifth }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factor requires a more detailed discussion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 This factor requires the court to consider }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
any other matters which may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict,}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  which includes an analysis of the nature of the extrinsic evidence.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Id}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 .}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
In determining that the fifth }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factor weighed in favor of a new trial, the tria
l court relied on the fact that the jurors considered the extraneous information despite the court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s instruction, through Instruction No. 33, that they were not to consider the fact that the manslaughter charge was no longer before them.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 As the Government points out, noticeably absent from the court
}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s analysis of the fifth }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factor was a discussion of the nature of the extraneous information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [25]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In its Brief, the Government repeatedly emphasizes that the extraneous information in this case was not prejudicial in nature.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Specifically, the Government argues that unlike the cases cited by the trial court which involved information of the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s prior conviction or other prior bad acts, the extraneous information in this case would, if anything, help the defendant.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
To scrutinize the Government}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s argument, it is useful to reference other courts}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  findings on this issue.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [26]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Mattox v. United States}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S. Ct. 50 (1892) is particularly useful in determining whether particular extraneous information is prejudicial in nature.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Mattox}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , the Supreme Court held that the extra-record information that the jurors possessed was prejudicial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Mattox}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 146 U.S. at 150-51, 13 S. Ct. at 53.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In that case, the defendant was on trial for murder. }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Id}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 . at 1
41, 13 S. Ct. at 51. During deliberations, the jurors were read a newspaper article on the trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The court held that statements in the article - that the defendant was previously tried for murder, that the evidence against him was very strong, that the prosecution}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s arguments were of such a nature that the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s friends gave up hope of an acquittal, and that the jury would probably return the verdict within an hour }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 66 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  were of such a damaging nature that they }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 could have no other tendency}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  than to be }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 injurious to the defendant.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Id}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 . at 150-51, 13 S. Ct. at 53.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Based on this finding, the Court reversed the judgment, holding that the lower court erred in failing to receive and consider the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}
}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  affidavits}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  which described the extra-judicial material. 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [27]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab As }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Mattox}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  indicates, the prejudicial nature of extraneous information may be characterized by
 the tendency of the information to be injurious to the defendant.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Several other courts have discussed the nature of the extraneous information, and have found that reversible prejudice occurs when there is }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 a direct and rational connection between the extrinsic material and a prejudicial jury conclusion, as distinguished from a connection that arises only by irrational reasoning.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Bagnariol}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 665 F.2d 
877, 885 (9th Cir. 1981).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [28]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In the instant case, the information before the jury was that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge or that the manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  
}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The question is whether this information has a tendency to be injur
ious to the defendant in that it directly and rationally results in a prejudicial jury conclusion, as distinguished from a connection that arises only by irrational reasoning.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Mattox}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 146 U.S. at 150-51, 13 S. Ct. at 53; }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Bagnariol}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 665 F.2d at 885.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [29]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab As stated earlier, the Government argues that the extraneous information in this case would, if anything, be helpful, rather than prejudicial, to the defendant.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We disagree.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s knowledge of the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s disposition of the manslaughter charge may reasonably have had the effect of influencing the jury in its decision about Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s guilt or innocence on the negligent homicide charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 A judge}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s decisions carry significant weight in the mind of the average juror.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See State v. Leep}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 569 S.E.2d 133, 146 (W. Va. 2002) (}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The trial judge in a criminal trial must consistently be aware that he occupies a unique position in the minds of the jurors and is capable, because of his position, of unduly influencing jurors in the discharge of their duty as triers of the facts.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
In reaching its verdict of guilt, the jurors may have attached significance to the fact that the trial judge dropped or acquitted Castro on the manslaughter charge, yet left the negligent homicide charge standing.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
It is not inconceivable for the jury to have thought that because the trial judge dropped or acquitted Castro of the manslaughter charge, then Castro may be guilty of the lesser-included offense of negligent homicide that was eventually submitted t
o the jury.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Furthermore, while the prejudicial impact of the extraneous information in this case may not be as obvious as in other cases dealing with this issue, we cannot say that the prejudicial impact on the question of Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s guilt was the result of irrational reasoning.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Berry}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 92 F.3d at 602 (deferring to the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s decision to grant the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s new tria
l motion notwithstanding that the unique facts of the case did }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
not necessarily give the impression of unfair prejudice}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [30]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The trial court failed to artic
ulate the prejudicial nature of the evidence; however, this omission was inconsequential considering our determination that the extraneous information in this case could have directly and rationally resulted in a prejudicial jury conclusion.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Therefore, we find that the lower court did not err in concluding that the fifth }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 factor weighed in favor of granting a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [31]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an analysis of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 factors weighs in favor of granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We must next review the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factors.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The first }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factor is }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 whether the prejudicial information 
was ambiguously phrased.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Keating,}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 147 F3d at 902.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The trial court held that this factor weighed in favor of granting a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s Excerpts of Record, p. 13 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The trial court determined that seven jurors testified regarding the information, and that the information was not ambiguous.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We find that the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s analysis of this factor was not in error.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Several of the jurors testified that they had information regarding the manslaughter charge, but did not articulate exactly what information they had.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Notwithstanding this, two jurors specifically testified that they received information that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Two other jurors specifically testified that they received information that the manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Thus, four jurors had specific unambiguous information regarding the mansla
ughter charge. 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [32]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The second }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factor is }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 whether the extraneous information was otherwise admissible or merely cumulative of other evidence.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Finding that this factor weighed in favor of granting a new trial, the trial court concluded that Jury Instruction No. 33 indicated that the information was not to be considered and therefore was not otherwise admissible and was not cum
ulative of any other evidence.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s Excerpts of Record, p. 13 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s conclusion was proper.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The fact that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge would be inadmissible under Title 6 GCA }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  401 and 403 (1995).}{
\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 Title 6 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  401 provides: }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627   Title 6 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
 401 (1995).  Title 6 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  403 provides: }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 Althoug
h relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cum
ulative evidence.}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627   Title 6 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  403 (1995).}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\insrsid2302627  
\par }}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See United States v. Gricco}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 277 F.3d 339, 352 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that evidence of acquittals are inadmissible); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
United States v. De La Rosa}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 171 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 1999); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Jones}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 808 F.2d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 1986); }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Kerley}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 643 F.2d 299, 300 (5th Cir. 1981).}{\insrsid14813596  
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [33]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Furthermore, we also find that the extraneous information was not cumulative of Jury Instruction No. 33.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
That instruction provided: 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The issues of the guilt of the defendant, Frank Roland Castro, as to Charge One, Manslaughter, and the first special alleg
ation in charge one are no longer before you.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 In other words, as you will recall, initially when this case started there was a manslaughter charge and that has now been removed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Do not consider this fact for any purpose.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par Transcript, vol. IV, pp. 103-04 (Trial, Dec. 22, 2000); Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s Excerpts of Record, p. 3 (Jury Instruction No. 33).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jury Instruction No. 33 merely informed the jurors that the manslaughter charge was removed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The instruction did not inform the jurors of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 reason}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 the charge was no longer before them, that is, because the trial judge acquitted Castro of that charge, or that the charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Thus, we do not agree that Jury Instruction No. 33 apprised the jury of the information they received through extra-judicial sources.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Therefore, because the fact that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge or that the manslaughter charge was dropped was not admitted into evidence and was not revealed through Jury Instruct
ion No. 33, that information was not cumulative of other information received at trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Eslaminia v. White}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 136 F.3d 1234, 1239 (9th Cir. 1998) (}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [T]o be truly considered cumulative, there must be an extreme
ly close relationship between the extrinsic evidence and the evidence actually admitted.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 )}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [34]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The third }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factor is }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 whether a curative instruction was given or some other step taken to ameliorate the prejudice.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The trial court held that because the court became aware of the jury misconduct }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 after}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  the jury returned the verdict, it coul
d not and, in fact, did not take any step to ameliorate the prejudice.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We agree with this reasoning.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [35]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab We recognize that through Jury Instruction No. 33, the jury was told that they were not to consider that the manslaughter charge was no longer
 before them in determining the remaining negligent homicide charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 However, we do not think that the instruction was curative in nature.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The term curative implies that a situation has already arisen which is the object to be cured.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Because the trial c
ourt was not aware that the jury received extraneous information until after the jury rendered its verdict, Jury Instruction No. 33 was not given in response to the extraneous information and was thus not a curative instruction.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See id}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 .}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 at 903 (agreeing that the lower court did not }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 offer a curative instruction because the court was unaware that the jurors had discussed the extrinsic evidence.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [36]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab 
Moreover, Jury Instruction No. 33 similarly cannot be seen as otherwise ameliorative because the instruction does not specifically address the acquittal or that the charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Here, the jury was able to reach their verdict on the negligent homicide charge without any specific instruction that the extraneous information before them was not to be considered.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
While Jury Instruction No. 33 may have informed the jury not to consider anything about the previously }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 removed}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 manslaughter charge, we do not think the instruction was specifically tailored as an admonishment that the jury was not to consider the specific extraneous information the jury }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 already}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 possessed}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  in this case.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Berry}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 92 F.3d at 601 (agreeing with the trial court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s determination that instruction given to the jury was not detailed enough considering the circumstances present in the case.)}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The instruct
ion did not specifically inform the jury that the particular extraneous information they possessed was both inadmissible and irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence on the remaining charges.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
See, e.g.,}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Pinto}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 486 F. Supp. 578, 582 (E.D. Pa. 1980).}{\i\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Thus, Jury Instruction No. 33 was neither a curative instruction, nor did it help to ameliorate the prejudicial effect of the extra-judicial information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Untied States v. Bagley}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 641 F.2d 1235, 1241 (9th Cir. 1981) (characterizing the lower court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s instruction, which was given after the parties became aware of the extra-judicial information and prior to the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s verdict, as a curative instruction).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Accordingly, because the lower court did not give a curative instruction or take any other step to ameliorate the prejudice, the third }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
factor weighs in favor of granting a new trial. 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [37]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The fourth }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factor, the trial context, requires an analysis of the five }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factors.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 902 n.5.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 As discussed above, an analysis of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factors weighs in favor of granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [38]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab The fifth and final }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factor is }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 whether the statement was insufficiently prejudicial given the issues and evidence in the case.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d at 903.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The trial court also found this factor to weigh in favor of granting a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Specifically, the court found that the extraneous information }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 centered around the same set of facts and events which also formed the basis of the charge that was before the jury at the time of the deliberation.}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Appellant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s Excerpts of Record, p. 13 (Decision and Order, May 2, 2001).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 We agree.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The manslaughter charge was submitted on the same facts which formed the basis for the negligent homicide charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Thus, it would not be unreasonable to conclude that the jury may have used the extraneous information regarding the manslaughter charge in reaching their verdict on the negligent homicide charge.}{\cs15\super\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \chftn 
{\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa297\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid2302627 \chftn }{\insrsid2302627  }{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
We note that in determining whether the extrinsic evidence was sufficiently prejudicial given the issues, one relevant consideration is the strength of the evidence against the defendant, that is
, whether the prejudicial information was harmless in light of the rest of the evidence.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 See Keating}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 , 147 F.3d at 903.  In }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 Keating}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
, the Ninth Circuit found that the evidence supporting the verdict was }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 not}{\fs20\insrsid2302627  overwhelming, which indicated that the introduction of extraneous evidence was probably not harmless error.  }{
\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 See id}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 ; }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 see also United States v. Winkle}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
, 587 F.2d 705, 715 (5th Cir. 1979) (taking into account the strength of the evidence against the defendant in determining prejudice caused by juror misconduct); }{\i\fs20\insrsid2302627 United States v. Bassler}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
, 651 F.2d 600, 603 (8th Cir. 1981) (}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 The strength of the Government}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 s case, however, has a bearing on the issue of prejudicial error.}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{
\fs20\insrsid2302627 ).  In the instant case, the Government}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 s challenge to the lower court}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid2302627 s decision does not reference the strength of the evidence against the Castro.  }}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [39]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that analysis of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors weighs in favor of granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s motion for a new trial. 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [40]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In sum, after analyzing the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  and }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 factors under the present facts, we find that the trial court was correct in determining that there was a reasonable possibility t
hat the extraneous information could have affected the verdict and that the Government did not meet its burden to overcome the presumption of prejudice.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Because we agree with the trial court}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s decision granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s new trial motion, we find it unnecessary to discuss whether Castro was entitled to a new trial based on the jurors}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  knowledge that Christmas was a few days away.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 IV.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [41]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In accordance with the foregoing, we find that there was reasonable possibility that the extraneous information before the jury could have affected the verdict.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s motion for a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Accordingly, we }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 AFFIRM}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  the lower court}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s decision and}{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  REMAND }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.}{\insrsid14813596 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 JOHN A. MANGLONA\tab \tab \tab \tab }{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 F. PHILIP CARBULLIDO
\par Designated Justice\tab \tab \tab \tab }{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Associate Justice
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 SIGUENZA, J., Dissenting}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 : 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [42]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab I disagree with the majority}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s opinion and therefore respectfully dissent.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 I believe that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached after weighing the }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 and }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  factors.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See People v. Tuncap}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 1998 Guam 13, }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 12 (stating that a trial court abuses its discretion when it commits a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of relevant factors).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
As discussed below, it is my view that many of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Jeffries }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 and }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Dickson}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 factors, when considered in light of the facts of this case,}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 clearly weigh against the grant of a new trial in this case.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 

\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [43]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab As the majority states, a criminal defendant is entitled to a new trial if there is a reasonable possibility that extraneous information could have affected the verdict.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 People v. Palomo}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , Crim. No. 96-00070A, 1997 WL 209048, at *5 (D. Guam App. Div. Apr. 21, 1997), }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 aff}{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 d by }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 139 F.3d 907 (9th Cir. 1998).}{\i\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Thus, the starting point of any analysis under this test is whether the jurors had knowledge of extrinsic information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Evidence is only considered extrinsic if 
it was not received at trial, either through the evidence presented or in the instructions.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Thompson v. Borg}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 74 F.3d 1571, 1574 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that juror misconduct occurs when a juror introduces into the jury's deliberation a matter which was not in evidence or in the instructions);}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 see also United States v. Maree}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 934 F.2d 196, 202 (9th Cir. 1991) (defining extraneous information as }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 additional information applicable to the facts of the case}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  that the jury did not receive as a result of their presence at trial).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [44]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab According to the testimony elicited from the jury at the January 26, 2001 hearing, seven jurors testified that they had knowledge about the manslaughter charge.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Of those seven, three did not testify as to what information they had.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Thus, because we do not know exactly the content of the information that was before these three jurors regarding the manslaughter charge, it cannot be concluded that these jurors in fact possessed extraneous information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Upon review of the hearing transcripts, it is evident that only four jurors testified as to specific facts relating to the manslaughter charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Of these four jurors, two testified that they received information that Castro was }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 acquitted}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , and the other two testified that the manslaughter charge was }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 dropped}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 .}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The question is whether these two facts were }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 extraneous}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 information as defined above.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [45]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab With regard to the first fact, that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge, I agree with the majority that this information was not revealed during the trial.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 However, I disagree that the other fact, that the manslaughter charge was dropped, was extraneous information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The jury was presented with the indictment listing both the manslaughter and negligent homicide charges, but was later asked to render a verdict only as to the latter.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Thi
s circumstance alone informed the jury that the manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Moreover, as the Government points out, the jurors were given information regarding the manslaughter charge in Jury Inst
}{\insrsid14813596 ruction No. 33, which provided:}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The issues of the gui
lt of the defendant, Frank Roland Castro, as to Charge One, Manslaughter, and the first special allegation in charge one are no longer before you.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
In other words, as you will recall, initially when this case started there was a manslaughter charge and that has now been removed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Do not consider this fact for any purpose.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par Transcript, vol. IV, p. 120.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Clearly, Jury Instruction No. 33 also informed the jury that the manslaughter charge was dropped.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Therefore, because it was received at trial, the fact that the manslaughter charge was dropped was not extraneous information, and should not have been considered in determining whether to grant Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s new trial motion based on juror misconduct.}{\insrsid14813596 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [46]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Thus, the only unambiguous extraneous information before the jury was the fact that Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 As provided earlier, only two jurors testified as to this specific fact.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Of those two, one indicated that the acquittal wa
s not discussed at any point during deliberations, and the other indicated that it was discussed but did not recall when it was discussed or for how long it was discussed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Based on the testimony of these two jurors, several of the relevant factors which would weigh in favor of a new trial were not met.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Specifically, it is unclear how long the information was available to the jury, how long the jury discussed it, if at all, and at what point in their deliberations the acquittal was discussed.
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [47]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Furthermore, while I agree that the information regarding the acquittal was probably inadmissible and not cumulative, I disagree with the majority}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s opinion that any alleged prejudice resulting from the information was not ameliorated.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The trial court specifically instructed the jury that the fact that the manslaughter charge was not before them could not be considered for any reason in reaching a verdict on the negligent homicide charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Thus, the jury was told that }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 any}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  information they possessed regarding the manslaughter charge was irrelevant to the remaining charges.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 While the instruction was not necessarily }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
curative}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  as defined
 by the majority, the instruction was tailored specifically enough to accomplish what a curative instruction would have accomplished; that is, to precisely warn the jury not to consider the manslaughter charge in reaching its verdict on the remaining negl
igent homicide charge.}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [48]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Moreover, it is hard to see how the fact of the acquittal is prejudicial in nature.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
As stated by the majority, an analysis of whether a new trial should be granted requires the consideration of }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 any other matters which may bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  including the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 nature}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  of the extrinsic evidence.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
See United States v. Keating}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 147 F.3d 895, 902 (9th Cir. 1998).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 A test that focuses on the }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 nature}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 of the information necessarily implies that there are varying degrees of possible prejudice, depending on the type of information before the jury.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See United States v. Bagnariol}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 665 F.2d 877, 887 (9th Cir. 1981) (recognizing that there is a }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
continuum in which jury misconduct fails to affect the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s verdict}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
As indicated by the majority, in determining whether certain extraneous information is prejudicial, courts look to see whether there is a rational connection between the extraneous information and a prejudicial jury conclusion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Id}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 . at 885.}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [49]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In cases where courts have found that a new trial is warranted, the information before the jury often relates to the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s prior bad acts or propensity to commit a crime.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See id}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 . at 885-86 (summarizing cases where courts found the extraneous information to be prejudicial in nature).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Mancuso v. Olivarez}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 292 F.3d 939, 953 (9th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the type of information which generally warrants a finding of sufficient prejudice to overturn the verdict includes }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 evidence of the facts surrounding a defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s prior conviction, bad reputation, or propensity to violate the law.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 With this type of evidence, there is clearly a rational connection between the evidence and the prejudicial jury conclusion.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Specifically, information regarding a defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s criminal history, or other similar information which reflects negatively on the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s character, can easily be seen as prompting a prejudicial jury conclusion as to the defendant}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s guilt or innocence as to the charges before the jury.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See United States v. Bagley}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 772 F.2d 482, 488 (9th Cir, 1985) (commenting on }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
the human tendency to draw a conclusion which is impermissible in law: because he did it before, he must have done it again}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [50]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab In cases where the prejudicial impact was less obvious, such as cases dealing with other types of extraneous information, the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s verdict has only been overturned where the court has conclu
ded that the extraneous information was somehow related to the charges or the conduct at issue in the trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Farese v. United States}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 428 F.2d 178, 182 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding that the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s discovery of c
ash inside the pocket of a shirt which was admitted into evidence resulted in a }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
strong probability of prejudice to the defendant then on trial upon a charge involving unlawful monetary gain}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ); }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 United States v. Littlefield}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 752 F.2d 1429, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (determining that the defendant was entitled to a new trial where a juror brought a copy of }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Time }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
magazine into the jury room which contained an article relating to tax fraud schemes similar to the charges against the defendant).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Even in these cases there was a rational connection between the extraneous information and a jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s conclusion of guilt.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 I have not found any case where the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s verdict was overturned based on the extraneous information present in this case.}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [51]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Here, the majority agrees with Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s argument that the ex
traneous evidence before the jury was prejudicial in that, upon learning it, the jury could have thought that because Castro was acquitted of the manslaughter charge, Castro must therefore be guilty of negligent homicide.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 While I agree that this jury conclusion is plausible, I cannot agree that such conclusion is the result of rational reasoning.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See Bagnariol}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 665 F.2d at 888 (declining to find that the extraneous material affected the verdict because such conclusion would require an improper }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 assumption that the jury members reached an irrational conclusion, lacking in common sense logic}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Simply put, unlike evidence which is probative of guilt, such as the defendant}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s prior bad acts or other evidence specifically related to the elements required to convict or the conduct at issue, the fact that Castro was acquitted on the greater offense of manslaughter has no }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 rational}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  bearing on the issue of Castro}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s guilt as to the lesser-included negligent homicide charge.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See United States v. Mills}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
, 280 F.3d 915, 923 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining that although there was a risk that the extraneous information may have had a prejudicial effect, }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 the risk was slight and did not distinguish th[e] case from most others}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ).}{\i\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The information about the acquittal in this case does not relate to the elements required to convict on the remaining charge or the conduct at issue.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [52]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab It is not at all uncommon that a jury will be presented with an indictment with several charges, but 
are then required to render a verdict on fewer charges than those originally presented.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
We cannot condone a practice of readily overturning the verdict in these cases on the belief that the verdict was affected by the fact that the more egregious charges were dismissed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The majority}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s attempt to do so in this case establishes a dangerous precedent in this jurisdiction.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [53]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab Courts have historically trusted that the jurors would act sensibly and in accordance with legal principles and instructions given by the court.}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The dangers inherent in substituting the court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s judgment for that of the jury are apparent, and courts have refused to do so even where the circumstances would seem to warrant such an inquiry into the verdict.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
As astutely acknowledged by the Fifth Circuit,
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid14813596 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
The essential feature of a jury lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 common sense judgment}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 of a group of laymen}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 .}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
To preserve that essential feature, the law trusts that a jury will understand and follow the law as instructed, and it indulges the jury when apparent gaps in understanding or logic later surface.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
A jury, for example, may render logically inconsistent verdicts on different counts of an indictment or as to different co-defendants.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 It is not the duty of the court }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 to unravel the ratiocinations of the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s collective logic.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid14813596  }{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Nor may a court speculate that a verdict may have been the result of compromise, mistake or even carelessness.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Juries may indulge in precisely such motives and vagaries.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 If courts were permitted to retry such verdicts, the result would be that every jury verdict would either become the court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s verdict or would be permitted to stand only by the court}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 s leave.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 This would destroy the effectiveness of the jury process which substantial justice demands and the constitution guarantees.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See United States v. D}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Angelo}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 598 F.2d 1002, 1005 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added) (internal footnotes and citations omitted).}{\insrsid2302627 
\par }{\insrsid14813596\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [54]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab I am cognizant of the argument that this case is distinguishable from cases where courts refuse to inquire into the verdict, because, in the case }{
\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 sub judice}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , the jury possessed extra-judicial information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 The majority, however, does not attribute significance to the proper re
medy in such circumstance, which is }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 not}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  to readily overturn the verdict upon a finding that there is }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 any}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
 possibility that the verdict was affected, but rather, to grant a new trial only after conducting an objective analysis to determine whether there is a }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 reasonable }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
possibility that the verdict could have been affected by the information.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 See United States v. Herrero}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 , 893 F.2d 1512, 1539 (7th Cir. 1990) (}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [A] new trial is not required automaticall
y whenever a jury is exposed to material not properly in Gevidence.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Rather, a new trial is required only when there is a }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 reasonable possibility}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  that the material affected the jury verdict.}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ) (citation omitted), }
{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Durrive}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 ,}{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 902 F.2d 1221, 1225 (7th Cir. 1990).}{\insrsid14813596  
}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [55]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab After reviewing the relevant factors, the distinction between thi
s case and most others loses its significance specifically because, in this case, it is unclear how long the jury was in possession of the extraneous information, whether the information was discussed for any significant length of time if it was discussed
 at all, and at what point during the trial the information was discussed.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
Moreover, the information the jury possessed in this case could not rationally lead to a prejudicial jury conclusion, and any irrational jury conclusion which could possibly have been reached was prevented at the outset by Jury Instruction No. 33.}{
\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid14813596 
\par }{\b\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 [56]}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 \tab 
Overall, while I agree that there was a possibility that the verdict was affected by the extraneous information regarding the acquittal, it is my opinion that, under an analysis of 
the relevant factors, such possibility was extremely remote, and was thus not a }{\i\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 reasonable}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596  possibility.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
I think that the trial court abused its discretion in overturning the jury}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 
s verdict and concluding that Castro was entitled to a new trial.}{\insrsid14813596  }{\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 Therefore, I respectfully dissent.}{\insrsid14813596  
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid14813596 {\insrsid2302627\charrsid14813596 PETER C. SIGUENZA, JR.
\par Chief Justice}{\insrsid14813596 
\par }}