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Brown v. Kodak}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 , Opinion\tab Page }{\field{\*\fldinst {\fs20\insrsid1275814 PAGE }}{\fldrslt {\fs20\lang1024\langfe1024\noproof\insrsid5261691 12}}}{\fs20\insrsid1275814  of 20
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\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM}{\insrsid10434085 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 MICHAEL B. BROWN}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
\par Plaintiff-Appellee
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 vs.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY and MICHELLE }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 NIGHTINGALE}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
\par Defendants-Appellants}{\insrsid10434085 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Filed: November 27, 2000}{\b\insrsid10434085 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Supreme Court Case No. CVA99-010
\par Superior Court Case No. CV1890-92}{\insrsid10434085 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Interlocutory review from the Superior Court of Guam
\par Argued and submitted on November 4, 1999
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam}{\insrsid10434085 
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\par }{\ul\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellee:}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  
\par G. Patrick Civille, Esq.
\par Ching Civille Calvo and Tang 
\par Suite 400, GClC Bldg. 
\par 414 W. Soledad Ave. 
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910\cell 
\par }{\ul\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Appearing for the Defendants-Appellants}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 : 
\par Joanne L. Grimes, Esq.
\par Carlsmith Ball 
\par Bank of Hawaii Bldg., Suite 401 
\par 134 W. Soledad Ave. 
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910 \cell }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\intbl\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \trowd \irow0\irowband0\lastrow 
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\par BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, JR., Chief Justice (Acting)}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\fs20\super\insrsid1275814 1}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 Chief Justice Benjamin J.F. Cruz recused himself from hearing this matter.  Associate Justice Peter C. Siguenza, Jr., as the senior member of the panel, presided as the acting Chief Justice. }}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , JOHN A. MANGLONA}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \ql \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\fs20\super\insrsid1275814 2}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 Justice Manglona was appointed as a Designated Justice pursuant to 7 GCA 3103(b);}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , and FRANCES TYDINGCO-GATEWOOD}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn 
{\footnote \pard\plain \ql \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\fs20\super\insrsid1275814 3}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 
Judge Tydingco-Gatewood was appointed as a Designated Justice pursuant to 7 GCA 3103(f);}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , Designated Justices.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 SIGUENZA, J.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 :
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid10434085 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [1]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Defendants-Appellants seek interlocutory review of the lower court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s set-aside of judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6) of the Guam Rules of Civil Procedure.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We have chosen to exercise our discretion}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn {\footnote 
\pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid1275814 \chftn }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 See Brown v. Kodak}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 , CV99-010}{
\i\fs20\insrsid1275814  }{\fs20\insrsid1275814 (Order May 13, 1999).}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  and have granted interlocutory review pursuant to Title 7 
GCA section 3108(b) to clarify issues of general importance in the administration of justice.}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid1275814 \chftn }{\b\fs20\insrsid1275814 Appealable judgments and orders.  (b) Interlocutory review.  }{\fs20\insrsid1275814 
Orders other than final judgments shall be available to immediate appellate review as provided by la
w and in other cases only at the discretion of the Supreme Court where it determines that resolution of the questions of law on which the order is based will: (1) Materially advance the termination of the litigation or clarify further proceedings therein;
 (2) Protect a party from substantial and irreparable injury; or (3) Clarify issues of general importance in the administration of justice.  Title 7 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid1275814 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid1275814  3108 (b), (1994).}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 For the reasons below, we affirm the set-aside.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 I.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [2]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Plaintiff-Appellee Michael B. Brown (}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
) was employed by Eastman Kodak Company (}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Kodak}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ) from 1988 until his termination in 1992.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
After his termination, Brown obtained the services of an attorney and filed suit against Kodak and certain of its employees, including Robert Bond, Benigno Bernardo, and Michelle Nightingale (collectively }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 original defendants}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The complaint alleged breach of express and implied contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fa
ir dealing, negligence, wrongful inducement, interference with contractual relationship, and constructive breach of contract.}{\insrsid10434085  
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [3]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab By the summer of 1993 Brown, no longer represented by his original attorney, obtained the services of a second attorney, Michael F. Perez, then a partner in a local firm.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown alleges that Perez did little work on the case while his firm handled it.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Instead, other attorneys in the firm did the bulk of the work.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown believed that Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s involvement would increase as the case neared trial.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [4]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab On June 13, 1995, the original defendants moved for summary judgment, and on July 12, 1995, Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s partner argued in opposition of the motion.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Apparently, sometime in late 1995 or early 1996 Perez and his partner parted ways.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown
 alleges that he learned of the dissolution of the firm during the early part of 1996.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Brown was informed that Perez was the attorney who retained custody of his file and would continue as attorney for the case.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 After learning of the breakup, Brown attem
pted several times to contact Perez but was unsuccessful.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The two finally met in March of 1996.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
At this meeting, Brown expressed concern with the difficulty he had contacting Perez and further stated that he was prepared to obtain other counsel.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown a
lleges that Perez reassured him that he would continue prosecution of the case.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [5]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab On March 20, 1996, the trial court denied the first motion for summary judgment.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
On or about May 21, 1997, the original defendants made three additional motions: a Guam Rule of Civil Procedure (}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 GRCP}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
) Rule 12(b) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction; a GRCP Rule 26(e) Motion to Compel Discovery; and a second GRCP Rule 56(b) Motion for Summary Judgment. }{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [6]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Opposition to the motions was due May 28, 1997, and a hearing on the motions was scheduled for June 11, 1997.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Perez failed to file a written response to any of the May 1997 motions.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 However, at the hearing Perez argued against the Rule 12 motion based on
 memoranda his partner had submitted in opposition to the first summary judgment motion and further agreed to provide discovery pursuant to the Rule 26 motion.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
When the summary judgment motion came on to be argued, Perez, having not filed a written opposition, asked the court for additional time to file a response.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Defendants-Appellants opposed and moved the court to grant judgment, arguing that Brown must show excusable neglect under the standards of GRCP 60 for leave to file a written opposition.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The c
ourt, without reaching the merits, granted judgment based on Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s non-opposition.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
The court also stated for the record that Brown may seek set-aside by filing an appropriate motion.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [7]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Brown himself was not at the June 11, 1997 hearing and was unaware that a second motion for summary judgment went unopposed.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 He only learned of the dismissal of his case at a meeting with Perez on July 10, 1997.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
At this meeting, Brown alleges that Perez promised to file a motion for set-aside.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 However, no such motion was ever filed.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [8]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Brown thereafter engaged the services of present counsel, who brought the set-aside motion below.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Supporting documentation included, }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 inter alia}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , a Declaration from Brown and copies of a Complaint and Order in an unrelated disciplinary proceeding against Perez.}{\insrsid10434085  }
{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The Order was based on the default by Perez because of his failure to answer the Complaint.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
The Order provided that Perez was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law for unprofessional conduct in matters with the complainants.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
In addition, he was ordered to undergo psychiatric counseling and treatment for substance abuse and was also ordered to make restitution.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 There was no factual recitation whatsoever of Perez}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s psychological or medical condition, other than the oblique reference to his rehabilitation.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In re Michael F. Perez}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , ADC 98-002, Order (Supreme Ct. Guam Sep. 28, 1998).}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [9]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab At the set-aside hearing, present counsel broached the subject of Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s conduct by first referring to his divorce.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Then, present counsel discussed Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s personal problems:}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
[I]t was not immediately apparent that [the divorce] was going to have a devastating impact on [Perez].}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Certainly the Court was practicing back during that 
time period, and I would only ask the court to call on its own recollection of just general bar comments during this time period and afterwards, that there was some scuttlebutt within the bar that [Perez] was having some kind of problems.}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085  
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Transcript at p.7 (Motion for Relief, Jan. 21, 1999).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 A ground that present counsel argued for Rule 60(b) relief was extraordinary circumstances in Perez}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s alleged personal problems.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 However, Defendants-Appellants objected 
to comments regarding Perez because Brown had no direct evidence of Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s mental condition.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Present counsel responded that the court was }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
always free to simply be aware of whatever experiences the Court has had . . . I think it would be impossible for the Court not to have some cognizance of [Perez] during this time period.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Transcript at p.7 (Motion for Relief, Jan. 21, 1999).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Defendants-Appellants again objected, 
asserting that such facts were not judicially noticeable.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Transcript at p. 8.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
When Defendants-Appellants inquired whether the court would take judicial notice of Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s mental condition, the court stated, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [t]he Court has knowledge of Mr. Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s problems, because the Court has dealt with Mr. Perez as a practicing attorney, and getting him just to sign a stipulation that has been agreed to, and in other matters.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Transcript at p. 39.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [10]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab On February 26, 1999, the trial court issued its Decision and Order setting aside the judgment, pursuant to GRCP 60(b)(6).}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We now take interlocutory review of the trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s decision to grant relief.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 II.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [11]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab We review a trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s set-aside under GRCP 60(b) for an abuse of discretion.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Parkland Dev., Inc. v. Anderson}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 2000 Guam 8, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  5; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea Industrial, Inc. v. HK Engineering, Ltd.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 12, }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  4.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 A trial court abuses its discretion when its 
}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or where the record contains no evidence on which the judge could have rationally based the decision.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  4 (citation omitted).}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [12]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Defendants-Appellees assert error in the trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s application of law to review the standard of party culpability }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 vis a vis }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 attorney conduct in this case in addition to error in its grant of the set-aside.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We review a trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s application of law }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 de novo}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 .}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Hemlani v. Nelson}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 2000 Guam 20, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  8.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 A.}{\b\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085\charrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [13]\tab }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The 
trial court set aside the June 11, 1997 judgment pursuant to GRCP 60(b), which provides, in relevant part:}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Mistakes, Inadvertence, Excusable Neglect, Newly Discovered Evidence, Fraud, etc.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have b
een discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, r
e
leased or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or if it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from operation of the
 judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 89 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Guam R. Civ. P. 60 (b) (1996).}{\insrsid10434085  
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [14]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Guam}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s Rule 60(b) was adopted from Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Cf. }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Guam Civ. Proc. Code }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  60(b) }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 with}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The subsections of the rule are mutually exclusive.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 See Klapprott v. United States}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 335 U.S. 601, 613-16, 69 S.Ct. 384, 389-90 (1948).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Thus, if the circumstances alleged fall into any of the other subsections allowing set aside, then relief under subsection (6) can not be had.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 See id}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 . at 613-14.}{
\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [15]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab The motion for Rule 60(b)(6) relief must be brought within a reasonable time.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 GRCP 60(b)(6); }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 United States v. Cirami}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 563 F.2d 26, 32 (2d Cir. 1977).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Judgment went unopposed at the June 11, 1997 hearing.}{\insrsid10434085  }
{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown became informed of the default on July 20, 1997 and moved for set-aside on or about September 22, 1997.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We find the motion timely.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [16]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab The extraordinary circumstances found in this case fall into patterns similar to those found in other Rule 60(b)(6) cases.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 For instance, in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In re Cremidas}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, the trial court vacated an order setting aside an order of the probate court declaring a minor sole heir because the attorney was so drunk that he was incapable of presenting evidence that the minor was entitled to a share of the estate.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In re Cremidas}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 14 F.R.D. 15 (D. Alaska 1953).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Lucas v. City of Juneau}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 provides an example wherein a plaintiff}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s attorney abandoned the case without informing him, and summary judgment based on failure to prosecute was set aside.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Lucas v. City of Juneau}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 20 F.R.D. 407 (D. Alaska 1957).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 United States v. Cirami}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , a taxpayer took summary judgment by default when his attorney failed to oppose the motion.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Cirami}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 563 F.2d at 29.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Judgment was set aside under circumstances consisting of gross negligence on the part of the attorney coupled with lack of neglect on the part of the taxpayer.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The taxpayer alleged that mental illness caused the attorney to neglect opposition to the motion, to remain inaccessible in the time prior to taking of the judgment, and to induce reliance on the part of his clients.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id. }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 at 34-35.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Likewise in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Fuller v. Quire}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , the attorney filed suit, and a discovery schedule was set.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Fuller v. Quire}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 916 F.2d 358 (6th Cir. 1990).}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The attorney never proceeded through discovery but suggested to the plaintiff that a settlement was pending then ceased all contact with him.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
When the plaintiff failed to appear at docket call, his suit was dismissed for lack of prosecution.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Fuller}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 563 F.2d at 359.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The district court set aside the judgment because it reasoned that equities warranted the set-aside in the interests of justice.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
The plaintiff lived some distance from the jurisdiction and displayed reasonable diligence in attempting to discover the status of his case, and there was no showing of undue prejudice to the defendant.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Grant of the set-aside was found to be within the trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s discretion.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  at 361.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [17]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Here, we see allegations similar to that found in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Cirami }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 and }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Fuller.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Perez, allegedly suffering from substance abuse and marital problems, fostered Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s reliance but took no action to prosecute the case.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Perez evidently avoided Brown, who was diligent himself in attempts to contact his attorney.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
The result was summary judgment taken on default, and Brown acted quickly to set aside the default.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [18]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Rule 60 is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Falk v. Allen}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, 739 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1984) (citation omitted); }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}
}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  6 (citation omitted); }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 see also Cremidas}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 14 F.R.D. at 17.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
The power vested in the courts under Rule 60(b)(6) is sufficient to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Klapprott}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 335 U.S. at 614-15.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Judgment by default is a drastic step, appropriate only in extreme circumstances, and a case should, whenever possible, be decided on the merits.}
{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Falk}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 739 F.2d at 463; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 14, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  6.}{\i\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
In this case, we do find extraordinary circumstances sufficient to warrant relief from operation of the judgment.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [19]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Defendants-Appellants}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 several arguments that the trial court erred in its linkage of the disciplinary Order and Complaint to its finding of extraordinary circumstances in Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s conduct go to whether Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s allegations in the aggregate support set aside by reason of such circumstances.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Defendants-Appellants various grounds can be summarized as complaining of the lack of a nexus between the facts averred and the disciplinary Complaint and Order and lack of corroboration between such, Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s allegations, and the remaining record.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [20]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab We do not find Defendant-Appellants}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  arguments convincing.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Defendants-Appellants single out but one document in Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s moving papers, suggesting that it provides the only basis for the trial court}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s finding extraordinary circumstances.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
For this opinion, we take the facts to be as Plaintiff-Appellee alleges because we must determine whether the allegations, if proved, would justify relief.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 See}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Cirami}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 563 F.2d at 28; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 United States v. Karahalias}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 205 F.2d 331, 333 (2d Cir. 1953).}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [21]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab On the whole, the record reveals a pattern of inexcusable neglect of Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s case.}{\insrsid10434085  }
{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 First, as alleged in Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s Declaration, we see that Perez did not defend against the first motion for summary judgment even though he was the attorney Brown had hired.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Perez also repeatedly reassured Brown that his case was proceeding forward when in fact it was not.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Perez even claimed additional preparation time was needed by Defendants-Appellants, as a matter of professional courtesy, when another attorney undertook Defendant-Appellant}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s case.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Against this backdrop, Brown experienced difficulty trying to contact Perez, and that the periods out of communication were not insubstantial.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 See
}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  Brown Decl. at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}
{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  9-12.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [22]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Second, it is apparent that Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct was peculiar during the relevant period in this case.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Counsel for Defendants-Appellants told the court at the second summary judgment hearing that she had encountered extreme difficulty in her attempts to contact Perez.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 When describing the progression of the case in the weeks immediately preceding the hearing, counsel stated:}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Our messenger was unable to serve [Perez] because his office was closed.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
And, Your Honor, we had attempted to serve some other discovery matters on [Perez] prior to this date, even by certified mail, and when it was returned unsigned, we attempted to leave it at the office and put notice in the Court mailbox.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 On the 21st, because we couldn}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 t serve in person because the office was closed, I mailed the pleadings to [Perez}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s] office and the Declaration of my mailing was filed with this Court on May 23rd.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
On May 22nd, I left a telephone message at [Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s] phone number to let him know.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
And this is not a voice mail message, Your Honor.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown v. Kodak}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 et al}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , CV1890-92, Transcript Mot. to Dismiss and Mot. for Summ. J. at p. 11 (June 11 1997).}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ironically, Defendants-Appellants}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  statements at the June 11, 1997 hearing corroborate Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s allegations that Perez could not easily be found prior to the June 11, 1997 hearing date.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [23]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Third, it is an inescapable conclusion that prosecution of the case proceeded forth until Perez undertook direct participation.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s first counsel filed the original complaint, other attorneys in Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s former firm handled matters, and Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s partner defended against the first motion for summary judgment.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [24]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Fourth, there are sufficient facts to warrant the conclusion that Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s conduct went beyond mere professional negligence.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Benhil Shirt Shops}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Inc. v. Lynns}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 87 B.R. 275, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), an attorney experienced extraordinary personal problems which caused him to neglect his client}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s case, and the trial court there stated:}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Although we have been presented with no medical evidence or documentation that Rodgers was or is 
suffering from a psychological impairment or a physical illness, the lack of such information is not fatal to the present motion.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Rodgers, an attorney with over thirty years experience, was with the Firm for six years.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 During those six years there was no indication that he was anything other than a competent attorney.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 It does not require medical expertise to know that when a competent veteran attorney fails to perform, and covers up his non-performance by lying to his clients and his colleagues, somethin
g is obviously wrong with him.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 There is no reason to demand medical proof when the facts speak for themselves.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , at 278.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Defendants-Appellants argue the distinction that, in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Benhil}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , the attorney}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s affidavit corroborated allegations of extraordinary circumstances.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Although there is no similar affidavit here, we agree with Brown and the lower court that it was difficult not to notice a fairly seasoned member of this modestly-sized bar conducting himself in a manner which affected his professional performance.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 There was no reason to demand medical proof when the facts speak for themselves.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [25]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Under Rule 60(b)(6), in addition to showing an extraordinary set of facts, the movant must satisfy the court that it has a meritorious case, that s
ubstantial injustice to the movant would otherwise result, and that it would be appropriate to set aside default so that the case can proceed to the merits.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 See Cirami}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 563 F.2d at 35; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Benhil}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 87 B.R. at 278 (citation omitted).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 It is not possible for thi
s court to determine whether Brown may have had a meritorious case because judgment arose by default.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Nevertheless, we find the other two factors present.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 First, Brown has been pursuing his claim for eight years; it would work substantial injustice to extinguish his claim by default.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Second, it is appropriate to allow Brown}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s case to proceed because this jurisdiction favors adjudication on the merits.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ,}{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 1998 Guam 12, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  6 (citation omitted); }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 15, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  5.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [26]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab 
Our conclusion that there was sufficient reason for the trial court to exercise its discretion to set aside the judgment is further supported by cases where that extraordinary circumstances exis
t when counsel inexcusably neglects prosecution or defense of a case and the client}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct does not constitute neglect within rule 60(b).}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Accord}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Fuller}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 916 F.2d 358; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 L.P. Steuart, Inc. v. Matthews}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 329 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964); }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 King v. Mordowanec}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Lucas}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ,}{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 20 F.R.D. 407; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Benhil }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 87 B.R. 275; }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 see also Pioneer Inv. Serv.,}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Inc}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 .}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 v. Brunswick Assoc.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, 507 U.S. 380, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1489, 1497-98 (1993) (}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [A] party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s failure to file on time for reasons beyond his or her control is not considered to constitute }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 neglect}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  within rule 60(b)).}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We likewise find gross negligence on the part of Perez and diligence on the part of Brown.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [27]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab The lower court further found that, since Defendants-Appellants were on notice that set-aside would be forthcoming, they would suffer no prejudice if it were granted.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We agree.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Equitable considerations may warrant set aside in the interests of justice.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Fuller
}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 916 F.2d at 361.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Weighing the injustice to Brown and the lack of prejudice to Defendants-Appellants, we can not say that the lower court abused its discretion in granting set aside of the default taken on June 11, 1997.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 B.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [28]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab The second ground Defendants-Appellants cite as error is the trial court}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s application of the incorrect standards of culpability to judge attorney conduct.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Defendants-Appellants complain that }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 14, and }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, 1998 Guam 15, were wrongly decided insofar as those cases incorporate standards of culpability not in conformity with }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link v. Wabash}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386 (1962) and }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer Investment Services,}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Inc}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ., 507 U.S. 380, 113 S.Ct. 1489.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 These cases stand for the proposition that a client may not seek to avoid acts and omissions of freely-chosen counsel.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Defendants-Appellants urge us to overrule }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 and }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , arguing that under the holdings of }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 and }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct cannot be divorced from Brown}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s and that Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s various failures associated with missing deadlines must be equated with Brown}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s failure to oppose summary judgment.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
We note this serious challenge to established Rule 60(b) precedents in this jurisdiction and dispose of it accordingly for clarification of issues of importance in the administration of justice.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [29]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Preliminarily, we note that neither }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 nor }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  deal with directly with Rule 60(b)(6), and, therefore, neither are dispositive of the question of law before us.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Nevertheless, we will address Defendants-Appellants}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  reliance on these cases as support for their contention.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , the trial court }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 sua sponte}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  dismissed a case for want of prosecution when counsel failed to attend a pretrial conference and was historica
lly dilatory.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The client there had claimed that dismissal worked an unjust penalty on him.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
at 633, 82 S.Ct. at 1390.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In response, the Court stated: }{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Petitioner voluntarily chose this attorney as his representative in the action, and he cannot now a
void the consequences of the acts or omissions of this freely selected agent.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Any other notion would be wholly inconsistent with our system of representative litigation, in which each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  at 633-34, 82 S.Ct. at 1390}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 (citation omitted).}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 However the Court, in considering the fact that the trial court had not given notice of possible }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 sua sponte}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 dismissal to the aggrieved party, further stated that given the history of counsel}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s dilatory conduct, due process arguments were unconvincing, especially when the c
lient did not first seek remedy available under Rule 60(b) for setting aside final orders inadvisedly entered.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 370 U.S. at 632, 82 S.Ct. at 1389-90.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Apparently, even the }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Court believed tha
t rule 60(b) may have been available as relief from the judgment, notwithstanding conduct of counsel, at least upon the inadvised grant of judgment.}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid1275814 \chftn }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 See also}{\fs20\insrsid1275814  }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 King v. Mordowanec}{
\fs20\insrsid1275814 , 46 F.R.D. 474, 478 (D.R.I. 1969) (holding that }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 Link}{\fs20\insrsid1275814  expressly left open the question whether the facts of that case left open rule 60(b) as relief); }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 Cirami}{
\fs20\insrsid1275814 , 563 F.2d at 34 (recognizing that attorney misconduct which is deliberate or the product of inexcusable neglect falls within subsection (6) of the rule).  }}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Likewise, it seems 
logical that the }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Court would approve of the use of GRCP 60(b) in this case, where trial court discretion was exercised to grant judgment on mere non-opposition and inexcusable conduct on the part of the attorney.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [30]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab By comparison, we see that in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ,}{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 the party seeking Rule 60(b) relief took default after failing to answer a complaint.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 14 at }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  2.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
We determined that it was within the trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s discretion to grant relief when failure to meet a deadline could be attributed to the party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s attorney.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 . at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  7, 9.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
We disposed of the very same argument that Defendants-Appellants here pose by opining that default judgments are not to be used to discipline attorneys whose conduct was inexcusable }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 neglect and inattention.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 . at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  8.}{\insrsid10434085  }
{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Our stated policy was a preference for deciding cases on their merits instead of allowing a case to fail by way of default.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
. at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  11.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [31]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer Investment Services}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , a c
reditor failed to file its claim by the bar date set by the bankruptcy court.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Defendants-Appellants submit that this case is an example of culpability requisite for GRCP 60(b)(6).}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 There, the U.S. Supreme Court in evaluating standards of party culpability wrote,}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
[a]t one end of the spectrum, a party may be prevented from complying by forces beyond its control, such as by an act of God or unforeseeable human intervention.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
At the other, a party simply may choose to flout a deadline.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In between lie cases wh
ere a party may choose to miss a deadline although for a very good reason, such as to render first aid to an accident victim discovered on the way to the courthouse, as well as cases where a party misses a deadline through inadvertence, miscalculation, or
 negligence.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer Investment Serv., Inc.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  at 387-88, 113 S.Ct. at 1494.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
The Court held that it was proper to make an equitable inquiry into circumstances of neglect to determine whether it was excusable.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, at 389-92, 395, 113 S.Ct. 1495-96.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 The Court then found excusable neglect when failure to meet a deadline was due to the court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s providing deficient notice of a deadline.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , at 395, 113 S.Ct. at 1498.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , we granted set-aside when the party seeking Rule 60(b) relief failed deadlines and took default because of excusable neglect.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 15 at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  7, 9.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 To this extent, we therefore find }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  analogous and find no appealing reason to overturn our decision.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [32]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Turning specifically to the standard of law at issue here, as it had done in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, the U.S. Supreme Court in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  provided an explanation of how subsection (6) is to be treated in the context of a party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s culpability.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 To justify relief under subsection (6), a party }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 must show extraordinary circumstances suggesting that a party is faultless in the delay.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer Investment Serv., Inc}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  at 393, 113 S.Ct. at 1497 (citations omitted).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
If the party is partly to blame for the delay, relief must be sought within one year and the party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s neglect must be excusable.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Id.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 If the inability to comply with a deadline is due to reasons beyond a party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s control, party culpability is not considered to constitute neglect, and the case falls without subsection (1) of the rule.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  507 U.S. 394, 113 S.Ct. at 1497-98.
}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In other words, a court making inq
uiry into the culpability of a party seeking relief under subsection (6) should ask whether the circumstances alleged suggest that a party is faultless in her failure to comply with a deadline.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
If the answer to that question is affirmative, then relief may be had under subsection (6).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
If the party is completely at fault, no relief may be had under subsection (6), but if the party is only partly at fault, its culpability or neglect must be excusable, and the motion must be made within a year of the judgmen
t; or relief comes under subsection (1).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 However, if the failure to comply with a deadline is due to reasons beyond a party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s control, such is not neglect within GRCP 60(b)(1), and therefore subsection (6) would be the appropriate mechanism for relief.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [33]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab 
For Brown, one inquiry is dispositive as to whether he may have relief under subsection (6): whether he has alleged extraordinary circumstances suggesting no fault in his failure to timely file a written opposition to summary judgment.}{\insrsid10434085  
}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 After comparison with the cases cited in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , specifically, }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackermann v. United States}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 340 U.S. 193, 71 S.Ct. 209 (1950) and }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Klapprott}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, we find circumstances suggesting no culpability attributable to Brown for the failure to timely file a written opposition.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [34]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Klapprott}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, the circumstances suggesting no fault on the party seeking relief was that the party was deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend against charges when he was ill, incarcerated, and without funds to hire counsel.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Klapprott, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 335 U.S. 604, 69 S.Ct. at 385.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Here, Brown was likewise deprived of a reasonable opportunity to defend against summary judgment.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Perez gave assurances that the case was proceeding in a normal fashion when, in fact, summary jud
gment was proceeding unopposed.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Perez also did not inform Brown of the June 11, 1997 hearing.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct was ostensibly a product of his personal problems.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 If counsel}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s personal}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 problems caused him to misrepresent the status of the case to the cli
ent; to neglect to inform his client of upcoming motion hearings which may dispose of the case; and to neglect to file a written opposition to said motions, then the client is deprived of any reasonable opportunity to defend against proceedings brought to
 dispose of the case.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Therefore, we find that the facts that Brown alleges suggest no fault for his failure to timely oppose summary judgment and that such circumstances would pass muster under }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 .}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [35]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackerman}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , by comparison, provides
 an example of circumstances insufficient to suggest no fault on a party in his failure to meet a deadline.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackerman}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , at 197-200, 71 S.Ct. at 211-12.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackerman}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , the party seeking relief made a bald unproven assertion that judgment after trial on the merits was in error.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 .}{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
at 202, 71 S.Ct. at 213. Here, the trial court granted judgment not because of any decision on the merits but because local rules allow it when a party fails to file a written opposition.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackerman}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , the party seeking relief had allegedly forgone appeal because of financial inability.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id. }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 at 197, 71 S.Ct. 212.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In this case, Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s alleged substance abuse problems suggest that Brown}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s failure to meet the opposition deadlines arose out of counsel}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s neglect.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackerman}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , instead o
f relying on advice from counsel on whether to pursue appeal, the party relied on advice from an alien control officer, who was a layperson and a stranger.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 at 197-98, 71 S.Ct. at 211.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 In this case, the allegations concerning Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s
 substance abuse-related conduct and circumstances suggesting that Plaintiff-Appellee had no input whatsoever in the decision to allow summary judgment to go unopposed militate against any conclusion that Brown was at fault.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Thus, unlike the insufficient circumstances found in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Ackerman}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
, here the circumstances suggest no fault on the part of Brown for the failure to comply with the opposition deadline.}{\insrsid10434085  
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [36]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab After oral argument in this case, this court decided }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Parkland}{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ,}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 2000 Guam 8.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Parkland}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  did not involve a default.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Instead, the party seeking relief argued that failure to raise an affirmative defense was included as }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 any other reason justifying relief from operation of the judgment}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 within subsection (6) of the Rule.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id.}{\i\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  7.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
We disagreed and held that the failure to raise an affirmative defense did not constitute gross negligence or exceptional circumstances within the meaning of subsection (6).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 . at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  16.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Moreover, because the matter was fully adjudicated we opined that, in accordance with }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Link}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , it was dangerous policy to allow a party to distance himself from the acts a
nd omissions of his freely-chosen counsel.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Id. }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 at }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  15.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [37]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab In this case, the trial court found Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct to constitute extraordinary circumstances.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Such extraordinary circumstances justify the court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
s exercise of discretion to set aside a judgment, especially in instances of default.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Unlike }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Parkland }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
there are extraordinary circumstances in counsel}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 This case is also unlike }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Adams}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  because Perez}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s conduct is inexcusable neglect.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Thus, we see no reason to overrule those holdings.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 On the other hand, this case is like }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 because attorney culpability led to the party}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s default.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Applying }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Pioneer}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ,}{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 we see that in both this case and in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 the party alleged extraordinary circumstances suggesting that the party is faultless for the delay.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 While it was a closer call in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , this jurisdiction shall favor adjudication on the merits when the party opposing set-aside can show no prejudice.}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Cf.}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 1998 Guam 14, }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f36\fs24}}}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
 9 (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion to grant set-aside when no prejudice to the opposing party can be shown).}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Accordingly, we see no reason to overrule }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 .}{\insrsid10434085 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [38]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab 
Thus, our review of the standards of culpability with respect to party conduct as it relates to GRCP 60(b) leads us to conclude that the circumstances here are appropriate for providing relief from operation of the judgment.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 We therefore find that the trial court committed no reversible error in its application of }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085  to set aside the default here.}{\insrsid10434085 

\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 III.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 [39]}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab There is no disguising that we decide between two extremes in this case.}{\insrsid10434085  }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Should this court circumvent the trial court}{\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s discretion and not allow set-aside of a judgment arising from inexcusable attorney conduct as in }{
\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Midsea}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , or should the court suggest a party seek recourse from the attorney by filing a malpractice action, as indicated in }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Parkland}{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 ?}{\insrsid10434085  }{\i\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 See Parkland}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 , 2000 Guam 8, at n. 5.}{\i\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 
Application of U.S. Supreme Court case law concerning standards of party culpability indic
ates that the question of whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief is appropriate when attorney conduct is alleged to result in default may be answered by examining whether a party seeking relief alleges circumstances suggesting that it was faultless in the delay.}{
\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 Having incorporated party culpability standards applicable on Rule 60(b) review, we find no reason to overrule our previous Rule 60(b) opinions.}{\cs15\super\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \chftn 
{\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid1275814 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid1275814 
In a closer case, the question might turn on facts not so apparent.  Nevertheless, we observe that the local bar has no mandatory Practice Liability Fund.  The bar must police itself.  When counsel notices that opposing party}{\fs20\insrsid13196147 '}{
\fs20\insrsid1275814 s case is adversely affected by opposing counsel}{\fs20\insrsid13196147 '}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 s inexcusable and possibly disciplinable conduct, there may be a reason to act in the utmost 
professional manner.  We do not say that there is a whistle-blowing duty, nor do we say that counsel failed to act.  However, if opposing counsel fails in this regard and thereby directly or indirectly benefits, we see no reason to allow stand a judgment 
that is possibly connected with a failure to protect the integrity of the bar.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 Cf.}{\fs20\insrsid1275814  }{\i\fs20\insrsid1275814 Liljberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp.}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 
, 486 U.S. 847, 867-69, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2206-07 (1988) (holding that vacating a judgment due to judge}{\fs20\insrsid13196147 '}{\fs20\insrsid1275814 s failure to recuse himself w
hen he should have known of a financial interest in litigation before him encourages a judge or litigant to examine and remediate disciplinable conduct).}}}{\insrsid10434085  }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 For the reasons stated, the trial court}{
\insrsid13196147\charrsid10434085 '}{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 s grant of set-aside is }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 AFFIRMED }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 and the case is }{\b\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 REMANDED }{
\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 for proceedings consistent with this opinion.}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 JOHN A. MANGLONA\tab \tab \tab FRANCES TYDINGCO-GATEWOOD
\par Designated Justice\tab \tab \tab }{\insrsid5261691 \tab }{\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 \tab Designated Justice}{\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid10434085 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10434085 {\insrsid1275814\charrsid10434085 PETER C. SIGUENZA, JR.
\par Chief Justice (Acting)
\par }}