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People v. Mendiola, }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 1999 Guam 8, Opinion\tab Page }{\field{\*\fldinst {\fs20\insrsid9184266 PAGE }}{\fldrslt {\fs20\lang1024\langfe1024\noproof\insrsid10105469 19}}}{\fs20\insrsid9184266  of 31
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\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF GUAM}{\b\insrsid12592186 
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\par }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Plaintiff -Appellee
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 vs.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 JERRY CASTRO MENDIOLA}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 ,
\par Defendant-Appellant
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Supreme Court Case No. CRA97-014
\par Superior Court Case No. CF0273-95
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 OPINION}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Filed: April 28, 1999
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Cite as: 1999 Guam 8}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
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\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
\par Argued and Submitted on October 7, 1998
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam}{\insrsid12592186 
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\par }{\ul\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appearing for the Plaintiff-Appellee}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 :
\par Monica J. Hickey, Assistant Attorney General
\par Office of the Attorney General
\par Prosecution Division
\par Suite 2-200E, Judicial Center Building
\par 120 W. O\rquote Brien Drive
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910\cell 
\par }{\ul\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appearing for the Defendant-Appellant:}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
\par Ladd A. Baumann, Esq.
\par Suite 903 Pacific News Building
\par 238 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.
\par Hag\'e5t\'f1a, Guam 96910\cell }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\intbl\aspalpha\aspnum\faauto\adjustright\rin0\lin0 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \trowd \irow0\irowband0\lastrow 
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\par BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief Justice}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {
\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 The signatures in this opinion reflect the titles of the justices at the time this matter was considered and determined.}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
; JANET HEALY WEEKS, and BENJAMIN J.F. CRUZ, Associate Justices.}{\insrsid12592186 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid10105469 CRUZ, J.:
\par }{\insrsid10105469\charrsid12592186 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [1]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab This is an appeal of the trial court\rquote s denial of Appellant Jerry Castro Mendiola\rquote 
s Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Delay. Appellant also appeals his convictions for 1) Negligent Homicide (as a third degree felony) with a Special Allegation of Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Fel
ony; and 2) Possession of a Firearm Without an Identification Card based upon the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Upon review of the pertinent facts and analysis of the relevant legal authorities, we affirm the decision of the trial
 court and Appellant\rquote s convictions for the reasons set forth below.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 BACKGROUND}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [2]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab On June 25, 1992, Appellant Mendiola (hereinafter }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 ) and his }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 stepfather}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Veta Feja Guerrero were attending a barbecue at Appellant\rquote 
s residence. The evidence adduced at trial showed that an altercation occurred between the two men concerning Appellant\rquote 
s plans to open his own business. Ultimately, this confrontation turned violent. Indeed, shortly after the barbecue concluded, Appellant shot Guerrero four to five times. Appellant, however, claimed he acted entirely in self-defense.}{\insrsid10105469 

\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [3]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In the early morning following this incident, the Guam Police Department (hereinafter }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 GPD}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
) placed Appellant under arrest and detained him. About two weeks after his release
, Appellant made inquiries of GPD as to approximately one hundred dollars missing from his wallet from the time of the arrest. Appellant claims that GPD Internal Affairs investigators conducted a polygraph test regarding the money. Appellant contends that
 the investigators also questioned him regarding the homicide. As to that matter, Appellant maintains, that at the conclusion of the test, the investigators indicated that the results were in his favor and that he was telling the truth.}{\insrsid10105469 

\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [4]\tab }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Approximately one year after his arrest, Appellant moved to Rota, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, in response to death threats allegedly made by Guerrero\rquote 
s family. Prior to this move, Appellant claims that he notified both GPD and the Attorney General\rquote s Office.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [5]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
On June 7, 1995, nearly three years after the actual incident, a grand jury convened and indicted Mendiola for: (1) Aggravated Murder; (2) Murder; (3) Manslaughter; and (4) Possession of a Firearm Without an Identification Card. Each charge include
d a Special Allegation of Possession and Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony. On June 13, 1996, approximately one year after the indictment, an order for extradition was issued by the Superior Court for the Commonwealth of the Northern Ma
riana Islands, resulting in Appellant\rquote s return to Guam.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [6]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
Appellant was arraigned on June 18, 1996. On this same date, he asserted his statutory and Constitutional right to a speedy trial for the first time. On June 27, 1996, Appellant waived his right to
 a speedy trial. Appellant later re-asserted his right to a speedy trial on October 16, 1996.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [7]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The trial court heard pre-trial motions on November 21, 1996. Relevant to the instant appeal, Appellant brought the following motions in the court below: (1) 
a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment due to Prosecutorial Delay; and (2) a Motion to Compel Discovery. During the pre-trial hearing, the prosecutor disclosed that no record of the polygraph examination existed. The prosecution also filed a Notice of Lost Ev
i
dence concerning the t-shirt obtained from the decedent on the night of the incident. At this time, defense counsel advised the trial court of the unavailability of investigating officer Winnie B. Rojas, as well as three guests at the barbecue, Greg Castr
o, Chris Chambers, and Mattias Salvatierra.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [8]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Appellant\rquote 
s trial began on January 6, 1997. On January 17, 1997, the jury returned a guilty verdict for Negligent Homicide (as a Third Degree Felony) with a Special Allegation of Possession and Use of a Deadly
 Weapon in the Commission of a Felony, and for Possession of a Firearm Without an Identification Card. After sentencing on May 5, 1997, the trial court entered judgment}{\insrsid10105469  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
on August 8, 1997. Appellant then filed the Notice of Appeal on August 13, 1997.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 ANALYSIS}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [9]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 7 GCA }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  3107 and 3108 (1994).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 A.\tab Pre-indictment Delay}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [10]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The trial court\rquote s decision on a defendant\rquote s motion to dismiss charges for pre-indictment delay shall be reviewed for abuse of discretion. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Huntley}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992). }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Findings on the issue of prejudice are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, keeping in mind [Appellant\rquote s] heavy burden,}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  to prove such prejudice. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Dudden, 65 }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995).}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [11]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Pre-indictment delay violates due process only if the defendant meets a two-part test. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Huntley, }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9th Cir. 1992). First, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
the defendant must prove actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id. }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 If the defendant meets this burden, the second part of the test shall then be employed. To meet the second step, the defendant must prove that, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the length of the delay, when balanced 
against the reason for the delay, [offends] those fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id. citing United States v. Sherlock, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 962 F.2d 1349, 1353-4 (9th Cir. 1992).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [12]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
Demonstrating the actual prejudice necessary to invoke the second part of the test requires Appellant to show more than the mere loss of testimony, which generally is protected against by the statute of limitations. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
United States v. Dudden, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 65 F.3d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir. 1995). Appellant must show }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 by definite and non-speculative evidence how the loss of a witness or evidence is prejudicial to the defendant\rquote s case.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [13]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Illustrative of the burden of establishing }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 actual prejudice,}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  the court in }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Huntley }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 remarked, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
[t]he task of establishing the requisite prejudice for a possible due process violation is }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 so heavy
\rquote  that we have found only two cases since 1975 in which any circuit has upheld a due process claim.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id. }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
(citations omitted). In the two cases that did find actual prejudice as a result of pre-indictment delay, evidence of non-speculative and non-cumulative nature existed to buttress the claim of actual prejudice. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
See, United States v. Barket, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 530 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1976); }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Howell v. Barker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 904 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1990).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [14]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In the first of these two cases, the appellate court in }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barket }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
considered several factors in determining that the defendant did incur actual prejudice as a result of the pre-trial delay. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barket, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
530 F.2d at 192. Among these factors were: 1) the passage of forty-seven (47) months for which the defendant was not responsible; 2) the failure of the prosecution to exercise prosecutorial discreti
on concerning evidence adduced during a pre-trial hearing; and 3) the loss of material testimony from six witnesses that died during the delay as well as from others with faded memories who would have provided testimony material to the defense. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\i\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Notably, as to the third factor, the court held that the loss of the witnesses }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 undoubtedly impaired}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  the defendant\rquote s ability to defend himself. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [15]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In the second case involving actual prejudice, }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Howell v. Baker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
904 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1990) the actual prejudice necessary to }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
ripen a due process claim for adjudication}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  was assumed and c
onceded by both the court and the parties. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Howell, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
904 F.2d at 895. This assumption was made solely to allow the court to reach an entirely different issue, to wit, whether a defendant must also prove prosecutorial misconduct. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [16]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The aforementioned cases in which prejudice was deemed to exist are distinguishable from the case at bar. In }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barket, }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the relevant time period of forty-seven months is substantially longer than the pre-indictment period of approximately thirty-six months in this case. The reco
rd before this court is also devoid of evidence of prosecutorial indiscretion involving the handling of evidence. As for the last factor, once again, the record fails to demonstrate how the loss of testimony, if any, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 undoubtedly impaired}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Appellant\rquote s case. The }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Howell }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
case is similarly distinguishable. No such assumption or concession relating to the existence of actual prejudice has been made in this case by either the parties or the trial court.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Likewise, this court will neither assume, nor concede, the existence of actual prejudice.}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 The United States Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of pre-indictment delay. In both }{\i\fs20\insrsid9184266 United St
ates v. Lovasco, }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 431 U.S. 783,797,97 S.Ct. 2044, 2052 (1977) and }{\i\fs20\insrsid9184266 United States v. Marion, }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 404 U.S. 307, 325,92 S.Ct. 455, 466 (1971), }{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 
the Court concluded that the particular facts of each case warranted a holding that the pre-indictment }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 delay in each case did not rise to the level of a due process violation.}{\insrsid9184266 
\par }}}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [17]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Appellant Mendiola argues that the pre-indictment delay in his case resulted in }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the loss of witnesses, loss of evidence, and faded memories.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  However, in order to base the claim of actual prejudice on }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 lost}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  witnesses and }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 diminished memories,}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Appellant }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
must show that the loss of testimony meaningfully has impaired his ability to defend himself\rquote  using only }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 definite and non-speculative evidence.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Huntley, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 976 F.2d at 1290.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Here, Appellant attempts to establish the impact of the absence of the lost witnesses\rquote 
 testimony by contending that the jury was not able to appreciate the victim\rquote s demeanor. In addition, Appellant claims that some witnesses even refused to testify solely because the passage of time had faded their memories of the incident.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [18]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The trial court found that the majority of the alleged prejudice alleged by the Defendant was }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 personal in nature}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  and did not }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 relate to the defense of this case.}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  We agree. Nothing in the record supports Appellant\rquote 
s claim that the testimony of witnesses would be non-cumulative or non-speculative. The trial court further found that the Appellant }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 did not offer any specifics as to how his defense will be impaired except for the fact that one or two witnesses may not be able to testify or that such witnesses\rquote  memories may have faded.}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Recognizing that these allegations may have been true, the court nevertheless concluded that, }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 such factors do not constitute sufficient prejudice as to warrant dismissal of this case.}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 Although Appellant is quite insistent that he has experienced, }{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f172\fs20}}}{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 loss of witnesses, loss of evidence and faded memories...,}{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f172\fs20}}}{
\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266  this court notes the fact that Appellant has chosen to prevent, his wife, possibly the most informed witness, from testifying in this case. While we are mindful of Appellant\rquote 
s right to assert the spousal testimonial privilege, we still note that what littl
e prejudice that is present in this case may have been brought about, at least in some part by Appellant, himself. This court will not allow a party to base his defense motion on circumstances he created. To exclude key testimony by asserting a privilege 
and then claim prejudice as a direct result of the loss of similar testimony, the relevance of which is even more attenuated, is spurious at worse, curious at best.}}}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
We agree. Although Appellant asserts that witnesses\rquote  memories of the victim\rquote s demeanor }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 had faded}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  and that most were }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 unwilling to testify,}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  the unwillingness of witnesses to testify, though possibly detrimental to Appellant\rquote 
s case, is hardly evidence of actual prejudice. Even if we assume that their refusal to testify stems from their faded memories, these allegations, however plausible, are simply not definite and non-speculative evidence.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [19] }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab As to the loss of the victim\rquote s t-shirt and the polygraph-related records, Appellant argues, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the issue is not whether the loss of evidence itself is in violation of his Constitutional right to a fair trial, but a symptom of the cause, pre-indictment delay.}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Although Appellant\rquote 
s arguments on this specific point are well taken, it does not follow that proof of lost evidence thereby entails the
 existence of actual prejudice. To make such a leap would do violence to the legal analysis requiring actual prejudice to be firmly established and convincingly proven rather than indirectly presumed. While insufficient to prove actual prejudice, the loss
 of evidence may instead indicate negligence.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 However, even if this court were to find the People\rquote 
s conduct to be negligent, the delay and/or prejudice suffered by the Appellant will have to be greater than what presently appears in the record before the court. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Ross, }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 123 F.3d 1181, 1885 (9th Cir. 1997).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [20]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Appellant\rquote s assertions notwithstanding, the instant case presents no reliable indicia of prosecutorial misconduct or negligence.}{
\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 
There is a clear and fundamental distinction between a d
elay necessitated by an ongoing investigation in search of an unknown suspect on one hand, and a delay of three years prior to an indictment of a readily ascertainable suspect on the other. The former delay is defensible and completely understandable. How
e
ver, this court, while tolerant of the former, justifiable delay, has serious concerns as to the latter delay. A three year lapse of time between a homicide involving a known suspect and the indictment as in the case here, treads perilously close to the l
imits of justice.}}}{\super\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Indeed, the trial court directly addressed this issue, finding that there had been no showing of prosecutorial misconduct in this matter and that the delay in bringing this case was not unduly long.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [21]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In determining that Appellant has 
failed to prove actual prejudice, we need not reach the second prong of the analysis whereby the court balances the length of the delay and the reasons for it.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court\rquote s decision to deny Appellant\rquote s motion to dismiss due to prosecutorial pre-indictment delay.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 B.\tab Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [22]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Appellant\rquote s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim shall be reviewed }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 de novo. Coffey v. Gov}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 t}{\i\insrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 of Guam, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 1997 Guam 14, }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 38 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  6. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial . . . .
}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has set out a four-part test for determining whether the delay between the initiation of criminal proceedings and the beginning of trial violates a defendant\rquote s right to a speedy trial. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker v. Wingo, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 407 U.S. 514, 53092 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972). This test requires the court to consider the }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [l]ength of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant\rquote s assertion of his right t
o a speedy trial, and the presence or absence of prejudice resulting from the delay.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\i\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\insrsid10105469\charrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 1.\tab Length of the delay.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [23]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [T]he length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. In }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Marion, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
the Sixth Amendment speedy trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes an }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 accused\rquote  . . . .}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
However, the period between arrest and indictment must still be considered in evaluating a Speedy Trial claim. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 See United States v. MacDonald, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 (1982). Thus, contrary to the prosecution\rquote s assertion, the delay in this case of arguably three years as measured from the time of the incident to the indictment is still relevant to this analysis.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [24]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Appellant was arrested on June 26, 1992. Appellant was indicted on June 7, 1995. His trial began on January 6, 1997. Thus, the total period at issue amounts to a
pproximately four years and six months. While }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 held that length of delay serves to trigger the analysis, the Court also held that, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [u]ntil there is some delay that is presumptively prejudicial, there is no
 necessity for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 We note that Appellant waived his right to a speedy}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
trial for a period of three and one half months post-indictment, and the trial took place within sixty-two (62) days (two days beyond the statutorily prescribed period) of his re-assertion of this right. However, we believe the four year and six month per
iod that preceded the trial is sufficient to trigger a careful review of the other three }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 factors required to establish a violation of the right to speedy trial.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 2.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Reasons for the delay.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [25]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab An allegation of unconstitutional delay must be evaluated by the facts of each particular case. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Marion, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 404 U.S. at 325, 92 S.Ct. at 465-66. Different weights should also be assigned to different reasons when analyzing the reasons for delaying a defendant\rquote 
s public and speedy trial. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. For instance, a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense would weigh heavily against the government. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id. }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 This is so because the government has a duty to make a diligent, good faith effort to bring an indicted defendant promptly to trial. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Smith v. Hooey, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 393 U.S. 374, 382-83, 89 S.Ct. 575, 579 (1969). Negligence or overcrowded courts, although counted against the government, weigh less heavily under this analysis. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Barker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Alternatively, a missing witness should serve as a valid reason, justifying the delay. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [26]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Addressing local law, }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 People v. Vincent P. Palomo, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Crim. No. 
00061 A, 1993 WL 129624 (D. Guam App. Div. Apr. 8, 1993), touched upon the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant\rquote s motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial on statutory grounds.}{
\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 
Our analysis rests exclusively on constitutional rather than statutory grounds. Although not essential to the discussion, the citation to }{\i\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 Palomo}{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266  informs the issue.}}}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 While that case correctly cited }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 People v. Johnson }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 26 Cal. 3d 557, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738 (1980), for the proposition that the defendant
\rquote s motions did indeed }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 constitute good cause for delay of a criminal trial}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  it neglected to quote this proposition in its entirety. The paragraph misleadingly cited by }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Palomo }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 states:}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The courts agree, for example, that delay caused by the conduct of the defendant constitutes good cause to deny his motion to dismiss. Delay for defendant\rquote s benefit also constitutes good cause. Finally, delay arising fro
m unforeseen circumstances, such as the unexpected illness or unavailability of counsel or witnesses constitutes good cause to avoid dismissal. }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Delay attributable to the fault of the prosecution, on the other hand, does not constitute good cause. Neither does delay caused by improper court administration.}{\b\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469\charrsid10105469 
\par }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Johnson }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 26 Cal. 3d 557 at 570, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 439-40, 606 P.2d at 746-7. (Emphasis added to the portion omitted in Palomo.);}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  but cf Palomo, }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 1993 WL 129624 at *8.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [27]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The facts of this case indicate reasons for the delay that do not support Appellant\rquote 
s assertion of error. The initial date for hearing pre-trial motions was set for November 8, 1996. Because of Typhoon Dale, these proceedings were rescheduled to November 14, 1996. The People then filed a m
otion to recuse Judge Tydingco-Gatewood on November 13, 1996, the day before the hearing.}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa196\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\f83\fs20\insrsid9184266 
This court is compelled to comment that proper trial preparation completed well in advance of trial as opposed to a mere day or two before would likely have apprised
 the People of the potential conflict. Surely, this apprisal would then have allowed the parties to avoid unnecessary delays of this nature.}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 At the November l4th hearing, Judge Tydingco-Gatewood recused herself. On November 15, 1996 Judge Manibusan then set the trial for January 6, 1997.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [28]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
Without evidence of deliberate delay, fault on the part of the prosecution, or improper court administration, we have no reason to find that the delay in this case should weigh significantly against either party. We a
ttribute the delay to the recusal, re-assignment, and rescheduling of this case. However, pursuant to }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 we consider these reasons to carry nominal weight.}{\insrsid10105469 

\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 3.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Demand for speedy trial.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [29]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab A defendant has the }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 407 U.S. at 529,}{\insrsid10105469  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 92 S.Ct. at 2191. The }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that}{\insrsid10105469  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
he was denied a speedy trial.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id. }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [30]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Here, Appellant asserted this right on two occasions. The first assertion took place on June}{\insrsid10105469  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 18, 1996, 
the second assertion took place on October 16, 1996. Significantly, Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider the Trial Date on November 18, 1996. In his motion, Appellant requested that the date for trial be changed to an earlier date to allow commencement 
within the sixty-day time period prescribed in 8 GCA }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  80.60 (a) (3) (1993).}{
\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 8 GCA }{
\fs20\insrsid9184266 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f172\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid9184266  80.60 (1993) provides in relevant part:
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f172\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid9184266 
 80.60. When a Case to be Dismissed, or Not Dismissed for Reasons of Time.
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 (a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (b), the court shall dismiss a criminal action if:
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 (3) The trial of a defendant, who is not in custody at the time of his arraignment, has not commenced within sixty (60) days after his arraignment.
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 (b) A criminal action shall not be dismissed pursuant to Subsection (a) if:
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li720\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 (1) The action is set on a date 
beyond the prescribed period upon motion of the defendant or with his consent, express or implied, and he is brought to trial on the date so set or within ten (10) days thereafter;
\par (3) Good cause is shown for the failure to commence the trial within the prescribed period.}{\insrsid9184266 
\par }}}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
In response to the motion, the People argued below that the time period within which the trial must have been commenced would not have expired on or before January 6, 1997 because the motions on behalf of both the prosecution and defense
 tolled this period.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The People further asserted that, assuming the sixty day period did expire, the trial, set just two days after the sixty day period elapsed, would commence within the 10 day grace period that is allowed as per 8 GCA }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  80.60 (b) (1) (1993). This court notes the absence of the defendant\rquote 
s requisite consent to the extension. From the record it is clear that defendant denied this consent explicitly in his motion to reconsider the trial date.}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 8 GCA }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f172\fs20}}}{\fs20\insrsid9184266  80.60 (b) (1) (1993) provides that:
\par (b) A criminal action shall not be dismissed pursuant to Subsection (a) if:
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li720\ri0\sa196\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0 {\fs20\insrsid9184266 (1) The action is set on a date beyond the prescribed period upon motion of the defendant }{\b\fs20\insrsid9184266 or with his consent,}{\fs20\insrsid9184266 
 express or implied, }{\b\fs20\insrsid9184266 and}{\fs20\insrsid9184266  he is brought to trial on the date so set or within ten (10) days thereafter; (emphasis added).}}}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [31]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Given the fundamental nature of the right to speedy trial, only the defendant, himself, and not his counsel, may waive this right. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
People v. Johnson, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 26 Cal. 3d 577, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738 (1980). Such a waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Id.; see also Curlee Townsend v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
15 Cal. 3d 774, 781 543 P.2d 619 (1975). In the instant case, there is no record of the defendant himself waiving or asserting the right to speedy trial specifically to allow the ten day extension period to take effect.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 4. Prejudice to the defendant.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [32]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
The right to speedy trial was designed to protect three interests: 1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; 2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and 3) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. 2182 at 2193. Of these three interests, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [33]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The facts of the instant case only touch upon the latter two interests protected by the right to speedy trial. With due respect for the anxi
ety and concern the Appellant undoubtedly endured during the period after his indictment, the weight of this factor is counter-balanced by his June 27, 1996 waiver of his right to a speedy trial and most especially, the manner in which the trial date was 
set as soon as possible after pre-trial motions were heard.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [34]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
As for the third interest, Appellant claims that he was prejudiced by the erosion of testimony and exculpatory evidence such as the polygraph results and the t-shirt. Conclusory allegations do
 not establish the required showing of prejudice. Indeed, Appellate courts have consistently held that conclusory assertions of prejudice, including unsubstantiated allegations of witnesses\rquote 
 faded memories, are insufficient to constitute proof of actual prejudice. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 See e.g., United States v. Young, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 906 F.2d 615, 620 (11th Cir. 1990); }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
United States v. Russo, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 796 F.2d 1443, 1451 (11th Cir. 1986).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 CONCLUSION}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [35]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Applying the }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
analysis, the balancing of the requisite factors: specifically, the length of 
delay, the reasons for the delay, the assertion of the right to speedy trial, and finally, prejudice to Appellant, leads this court to but one conclusion. The four and one half year period at issue, though long, is more than counter-balanced by the other 
factors in the analysis. Appellant\rquote s inability to prove actual prejudice coupled with the justifiable reasons for the delay tip the balance against Appellant\rquote s assertion of error.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [36]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Accordingly, we affirm the trial court\rquote s decision and thereby uphold Appellant\rquote s conviction. Appellant\rquote s appeal is therefore DENIED.}{\insrsid10105469 

\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 BENJAMIN J.F. CRUZ\tab \tab \tab \tab JANET HEALY WEEKS}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Associate Justice\tab \tab \tab \tab }{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Associate Justice}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\tx-1440\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid10105469 SIGUENZA, C.J.:}{\b\insrsid10105469\charrsid10105469 
\par }{\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [37]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab I concur with the decision of the court that the Appellant suffered neither a denial
 of his rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment nor of his Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right as secured by the Sixth Amendment.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
With respect, however, it is my opinion that the majority did not adequately engage in the evaluation necess
ary for disposition of the matter and broached a subject in a way that was inapplicable to this case and would only serve to confuse the issues. Accordingly, I file this opinion.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 I- Rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [38]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The trial court}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s decision on a defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s motion to dismiss charges for pre-indictment delay is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Martinez}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 77 F.3d 332, 335 (9}{\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}
{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Cir. 1996); }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Huntley}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 976 F.2d 1287, 1290 (9}{\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 Cir. 1992).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [39]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects an accused against pre-indictment delay. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Lovasco}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 431 U.S. 783, 789, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 (1977). A two-part test is used to determine whether pre-indictment delay denied a defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s due process rights:}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
First, the defendant must prove actual, non-speculative prejudice from the delay; and second, the length of delay, when balanced against the reason for the delay, must offend those }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at the base of our civil and political institutions.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Huntley}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 976 F.2d at 1290 (9}{
\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Cir. 1992)(citing}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  United States v. Sherlock}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 962 F.2d 1349, 1353-54 (9}{
\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Cir. 1992)). However, the first prong of the test, proof of actual prejudice, must be satisfied before reaching the balancing portion of the under the second prong. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Such prejudice will inevitably be either the loss of witnesses and/or physical evidence or the impairment of their use, e.g., dimming of the witnesses}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  memory.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Mays}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 549 F.2d 670, 677 (9}{\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Cir. 1977). }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
To establish actual prejudice sufficient to warrant a dismissal, the defendant must show not only the loss of the witness and/or evidence but also just demonstrate how that loss is prejudicial to him.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  (citations omitted). Proof of such must be definite and not speculative. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . (citation omitted).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [40]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Barket}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 530 F.2d 189 (8}{\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Cir. 1976), the defendant was indicted forty-seven months after the transaction which was the gravamen of the complaint against him.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The defendant was the president, chairman and primary beneficial owner of a bank. He had been charged with consenting to the contribution and expenditure of n
ational bank funds to a political organization to pay election expenses and with mis-applying the same funds by means of the same contribution guised as a bank loan. The defendant claimed that his case was prejudiced by the forty-seven month delay because
}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 six witnesses who would have materially aided his defense died before the case could have come to trial.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [41]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The Eighth Circuit affirmed the trial court}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s dismissal of the indictment. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . at 193. The appellate 
court concluded that the defendant had demonstrated that the loss each of the witnesses impaired the defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s ability to defend himself on the crucial issue of whether the funds in question were actually a loan made in the ordinary course of business or a political contribution. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 .}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Each witness who died in the intervening delay was either}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
involved in the receipt of the questioned funds or was familiar with its repayment as a permissible loan.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [42]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Howell v. Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 904 F.2d 889 (4}{\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 Cir. 1990), the defendant, in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, asserted a due process violation arising out of a delay by law enforcement personnel in the service of his arrest warrant and the return of an indictment. The 
defendant specifically asserted that he was unable to locate an alibi witness for use at his trial as a result of delay lasting two years and four months. The federal magistrate, after conducting an evidentiary hearing, agreed.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The magistrate made findings that the defendant had demonstrated actual prejudice because of the absence of the lone alibi witness.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [43]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The issue before the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether, after proving actual prejudice, a defendant seeking due process relief from pre-
indictment delay must further prove improper prosecutorial motive as the cause for the delay. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
. at 894. Although the court had assumed that the issue of actual prejudice had been conceded by the State of North Carolina, }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 ., the case is illustrative of the defendant}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s burden in showing at an evidentiary hearing both: (1) the identification of the lost witness; and (2) a particularized demonstration of the content of the witness}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  testimony.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [44]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In contrast, in the case of}{\insrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Ross}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 123 F.3d 1181 (9}{
\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 th}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Cir. 1997), there was an eight year delay between the underlying incident and the first grand jury indictment. The defendant sought to demonstrate actual preju
dice by asserting that, during the intervening eight years, his son, a potential witness, had died.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The defendant presented evidence implying that the witness who died would have been implicated in the incident.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 In addition, defendant argued that the witne
ss would have impeached the testimony of another witness. Finally, the defendant averred that because the government, at trial, argued that he was conveniently avoiding guilt by pointing the finger at his late son, who could not defend himself;}{
\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the presence of the defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s son would have bolstered his defense.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [45]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The Ninth Circuit found this prejudice speculative. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
. at 1185. It observed that the defendant did not claim to know, in fact, whether the missing witness did or did not do the acts which would have implied that he was involved with the incident. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . Further, the testimony would have been cumulative and its effect speculative, given other evidence presented at trial. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
. at 1186. Thus, because the defendant could not demonstrate actual prejudice, there was no need to weigh the reasons for the delay versus its length. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Cf. Huntley}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 976 F.2d 1287 (Concluding no actual prejudice occurs when the unavailable witness}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  testimony would have been cumulative and speculative and when another witness refused to incriminate himself.).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [46]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In the instant case, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate the actual prejudice that necessitates this court}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s consideration of the length and reasons for the delay. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 See Huntley}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 976 F.2d at 1290.}
{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The Appellant claims that his defense was prejudiced by the loss of evidence, the loss of witnesses and diminished memories.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Unlike the def
endants in }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barket }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 and }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Howell}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s showing in this respect falls woefully short.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [47]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab First, the Appellant claims that the loss of the blood-stained shirt of the victim prejudiced his defense; however, he
 does not demonstrate how this evidence would have helped him.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appellant seems to ask this court to engage in speculation to discern what exculpatory value this piece of evidence would have.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [48]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Next, he claims a polygraph examination which was allegedly taken would have shown}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
he was cooperative and truthful. Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s Opening Brief at 13. He argues the polygraph would have been corroborative of his testimony at trial. Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s Opening Brief at 15. The fact of its very existence had been contested by the parties. Transcript, vol. II at pp. 57, 75 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996). At the hearing, the Appellant offered no other proof as to the fact of its existence
 other than his self-serving statement that the test was given. Transcript, vol. II at}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
pp. 57, 75 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996). The trial court found that, even if the test were given, its results would be questionable at best. Excerpts of Record at 28.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
While it is true, notwithstanding arguments to the contrary, that such evidence, if it existed,}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 may be admissible under certain situations, }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
see United States v. Crumby}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 895 F.Supp. 1354 (D. Ariz. 1995), our review of the record}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 indicates the effect of
 this evidence is too speculative to demonstrate that its loss prejudiced the Appellant.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 In fact, the parties had argued extensively to the jury that, for the most part, Appellant}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s testimony was consistent with 
his original account of the incident. The thrust of the case against the Appellant was the inconsistency between the}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 physical evidence and his claim of self-defense. }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [49]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Appellant next claims that he had suffered actual prejudice by the loss of several witnesses.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
First, Appellant argues GPD Officer Winnie Rojas had obtained statements from the Appellant and his wife and that Appellant wanted to cross-examine the officer as to whether or not she obtained his wife}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s statement though duress or coercion. Transcript, vol II at p. 65 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996).}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 However, the trial court had earlier granted Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s own motion to exclude the testimony of his wife, on the basis of}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
spousal immunity. Transcript, vol. II at p. 62 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996). The trial court was correct when it observed that her absence was not an issue nor was it prejudicial because neither the Government nor Appellant had plans 
to call the wife as a witness.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Transcript, vol. II}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 at p. 65 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996).}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Thus, Officer Rojas}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s testimony would have been unnecessary and Appellant can not claim prejudice for its loss.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [50]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
Appellant also asserts prejudice as to the loss of Chris Chambers, Greg Castro and Mattias Salvatierra. However, Appellant failed to demonstrate how his case would be prejudiced by their loss. He continues to argue their testimony had the potential of pr
oviding exculpatory evidence because the witnesses could testify as to what they heard at the time of the shooting.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Transcript, vol. II}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
at p. 66 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996). Again, Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s argument is without merit. He merely speculates as to the content and value of the evidence these witnesses would have provided. He does not set forth the actual prejudice necessary to make a Due Process violation. }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [51]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Finally, Appellant avers actual prejudice because of dimmed memories.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
At the hearing, he indicated that there were five witnesses who heard gun shots and ten witnesses who had seen the victim before the shooting. Transcript, Vol II at p. 69 (Hearing on Motions, Nov. 21, 1996). Again, Appe
llant fails to identify who these witnesses are or what they would have testified to.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [52]}{\b\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
The trial record is replete with indications that several witnesses had difficulty remembering exact details of what occurred or what they did. Appellant speculates
 that these witnesses, had their memories been better, would have shown behavior by the victim that caused}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 imminent fear of injury and therefore,}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
justified Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s use of force. However, in spite of such limi
tations, Appellant was able to present evidence at trial to make out his self-defense claim. At trial, Everett Torregrosa testified that he had heard an argument, gunshots, and a pipe falling at the scene of the incident. In addition, Appellant called, at
 minimum, five witnesses to testify as to the victim}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s propensity for violence. Also, Bernal Castro was called by the Appellant and testified that he had been present when the victim was allegedly confronting Appe
llant. Other witnesses were called and testified that they had seen the victim arrive at the barbecue.}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa196\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 
\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 
The need for the other witnesses becomes especially troublesome because Appellant fails to identify who and what these witnesses with dimmed memories would have provided; all one might do is speculate.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid9184266 See United States v. Mays,}
{\fs20\insrsid9184266  549 F.2d 670 (9}{\fs20\super\insrsid9184266 th}{\fs20\insrsid9184266  Cir. 1977).  Given the evidence presented at trial, my view is that any additional evidence these unidentified witnesses would have provided would have been mer
ely cumulative.}}}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Appellant could not demonstrate actual prejudice because of the delay in this case. Because Appellant fails to demonstrate that actual prejudice resulted from the delay, the
re is no need to reach the second prong of the due process test, balancing the length of delay against the reasons for it.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 II- Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Right}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [53]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The right of an accused to a speedy trial is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Klopfer v. North Carolina}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993 (1967).}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 In determining whether a defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s right to a speedy trial has been violated, the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant must be balanced utilizing the following four factors: (1) the length of delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s assertion of his right, and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker v. Wingo}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2191-2192 (1972).}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 None of the four factors are }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.
}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 A- Length of Delay}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [54]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The analysis of the Speedy Trial issue begins with an examination of the length of delay.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The length of delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into the balance. Nevertheless, because of the imprecision of the right to
 speedy trial, the length of delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\ul\insrsid10105469\charrsid10105469 
\par }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 407 U.S. at 530-531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [55]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab There are three distinct periods of time that the court must address in the instant case. The victim was shot and killed on June 25, 1992.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The Appellant was immediately taken into police custody, arrested, but subsequently released.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Approximately three years after the incident and arrest, the Superior Court Territorial Grand Jury returned an indictment charging the Appellant with Manslaughter and Possession of a Firearm without a Firearm Identification.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The Appellant was returned from Rota and appeared before the court on June 15, 1996. Appellant was arraigned on June 18, 1996.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Trial on the matter began on January 6, 1997.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Thus, there was a period of approximately fifty-four months from the date of arrest and trial and another period of time, eighteen months, from the date of the indictment to trial.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [56]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Marion}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
, 404 U.S. 307, 321, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463-464 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to the period before a defendant is indicted, arrested, or otherwise officially accused. The Court observed that:}
{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
On its face, the protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 accused}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 in the course of that prosecution.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet accused, nor would they seem to require the Government to discover, investigate, and accuse any person within any particular period of time.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The Amendment would appear to guarantee to a criminal defendant that the Government will move with the dispatch that is appropriate to assure him an early and proper disposit}{\insrsid10105469 
ion of the charges against him.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . at 313, 92 S.Ct. at 459.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [57]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In addition to the period after indictment, the period between arrest and indictment must be considered in evaluating a speedy trial claim. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Dillingham v. United States}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 423 U.S. 64, 96 S.Ct. 303 (1975). }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Although delay prior to arrest
 or indictment may give rise to a due process claim under the Fifth Amendment, or to a claim under any applicable statutes of limitations, no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises until charges are pending.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  United States v. MacDonald}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
, 456 U.S. 1, 7, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501 (1982) (citation omitted). Here, Appellant became an}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
"accused" when he was arrested and the government, for purposes of the speedy trial guarantee, thereby commenced}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 prosecution of him.}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  Marion}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  made this clear where the Court stated: }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
To legally arrest and detain, the Government must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrup
t his employment, drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family and his friends. These considerations were substantial underpinnings for the decision in}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Klopfer v. North Carolina,}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988 (1967); }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 see also}{\i\insrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Smith v. Hooey}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 393 U.S. 374, 377\_378, 89 S.Ct. 575, 576\_577 (1969). So viewed, it is readily understandable that it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest
 and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment. Invocation of the speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other formal charge.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Marion}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 404 U.S. 307, 320-321, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [58]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Accordingly, I disagree with the position taken by the Appellee, and would hold that consideration of the time from the date of Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s arrest to the date of trial must be examined in this speedy trial claim. }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [59]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Moreover,}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 in the case of }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Doggett v. United States}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 505 U.S. 647, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (1992),}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the Supreme Court observed that the lower courts have generally found post accusation delay to be presumptively preju
dicial at least as it approaches one year. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . at 652, n.1, 112 S.Ct. at 2691, n.1. The Court further advised that, in this threshold context, the term }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 presumptive prejudice}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  simply marks the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 inquiry. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [60]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In this case, I am very concerned with the amount of time that had elapsed between the date of the incident, the arrest and the trial
. The underlying incident was clearly a homicide. The suspect was identified and had made inculpatory statements regarding the incident. The passage of approximately thirty-six months from the date of the incident to the date the grand jury returned the i
ndictment seems long despite the seriousness of this case. I can only conclude that the delay in this case warrants a more deliberate review of the other factors of }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 to determine whether Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. }{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 B- Reasons for the Delay}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [61]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The next step in the analysis is to evaluate the reason the government seeks to justify the delay. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 court observed that:}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [h]ere, too, different weights should be assigned to different reasons.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts shou
ld be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 .}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [62]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab A review of the entire record reveals that, from the period of Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s arrest to the date the indictment was returned, the case had been in the hands of at least five different prosecutors.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Transcript, vol. I at pp. 61-62 (Further Proceedings, Nov. 14, 1996).}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Further, the presence of a viable issue of self-defense seems to have apparently influenced the initial decision to pursue or not pursue further prosecution of Appellant. Transcript, vol. I at 53 (Further
 Proceedings, Nov. 14, 1996). As was observed by the United States Supreme Court:}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 It requires no extended argument to establish that prosecutors do not deviate from }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 fundamental conceptions of justice}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}
}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  when they defer seeking indictments until they have probable cause to believe an accused is guilty; indeed it is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to recommend an indictment on less than probable cause.}{
\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 It should be equally obvious that prosecutors are under no duty to file charges as soon as probable cause exists but before they are satisfied they will be able to establish the suspect}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
To impose such a duty }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of society to protect itself.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 United States v. Lovasco}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 431 U.S. 783, 790-791, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2049 (1977). }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [T]hus no one}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s interests would be well served by compelling prosecutors to initiate prosecutions as soon as they are legally entitled to do so.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . at 792, 97 S.Ct. at 2050.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [63]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Although}{\insrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Lovasco}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 dealt with pre-indictment delay and this case deals with post-arrest delay, I do not perceive any particular distinction when judging the reasonableness of the government}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s inaction in this case. The issue of self-defense was properly a concern of the prosecutors as evidenced by the fact that the grand jury had refused to return an indictment charging the Appellant with two more serious forms of criminal homicide;}{
\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 rather, the grand jury settled on the Manslaughter charge upon which the defendant was ultimately convicted.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [64]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Turning to the period after the indictment, the record is barren of any justification, by the government, for the delay in extraditing the Appellant from Rota.}{
\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 In fact, the prosecutor who was present at the return of the indictment was aware that the Appellant was residing in Rota when he had asked for a bench warrant to issue. Transcript, vol. I at p. 3
 (Return of Grand Jury, June 7, 1995). }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [65]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Finally, the government brought a motion to recuse the original judge assigned to the case.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Trial had originally been set for December 5, 1996.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The originally assigned judge had been the Chief Prosecutor at the time of the incident.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The prosecuting attorney explained that}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
as more information was gathered, it appeared the judge herself may have been involved in the disposition of the case. Although she could not recall if she was involved in the investigation, the
 judge recused herself from the case and it was immediately re-assigned to the trial judge below.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 I find no fault in the government}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s motion to recuse and, in my view, does not represent dilatory conduct on its part. }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [66]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab 
In conclusion, the trial court found, and my review of the record is in agreement, no deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense. Such action would be }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 weighted heavily against the government.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. At most, what the record indicates is that the various prosecutors who had the case were either seriously considering the self-defense issue or were unintentionally inactive.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Nevertheless, for purposes of the }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  analysis, the factor weighs against the government }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . }{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 C- Defendant}{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s Assertion of Rights}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [67]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial must also be considered in an inquiry into the deprivation of}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 the right. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. As the }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 court observed:}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The strength of his efforts will be affected b
y the length of delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The defendant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 407 U.S. at 531-532, 92 S.Ct. at 2192-2193.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [68]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Moreover, if a defendant was aware of the charges pending against him, failure to invoke the right would be weighed heavily against him. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Doggett}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 505 U.S. at 653, 112 S.Ct. at 2691.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [69]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In this case, the record indicates the Appellant was aware, by virtue of his arrest, of the pending charges against him.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 At the bail hearing, Appellant argued that he had been in contact with the government and the police and that he was constantly asking about the status of the case; however,}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 no finding supporting such claim was made by the court below, nor can I find evidence of such in the record.}{\cs15\super\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain 
\qj \fi720\li0\ri0\sa196\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\super\insrsid9184266 \chftn }{\fs20\insrsid9184266 The record shows that a document was pr
esented to the court but no indication as to its contents was made by the court.  }{\i\fs20\insrsid9184266 See}{\fs20\insrsid9184266 
 Transcript, vol. I at p. 16 (Bail Hearing, June 17, 1996). We cannot speculate what the document was nor what value it would have in this appeal.  We do observe that hear
ings on the motions, including the motion for dismissal because of prosecutorial delay, offered Appellant countless opportunities to solidify the record which he did not do.}}}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Appellant offered no specifics as to the identification of the individuals he had allegedly contacted.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Appellant claimed that he had left Guam for Rota because of alleged threats; however, he failed to demonstrate the existence of police reports or other proof justifying his departure.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [70]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Thus, without more, I can only conclude that Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}
}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s failure to invoke his right must weigh against him and that his acquiescence contributed to the delay in bringing him to trial even though he proceeded to formally assert it while the case was before the court.}{
\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Although I recognize that the defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial, }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 see Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
, 407 U.S. at 527, 92 S.Ct. at 2190, he does have a responsibility to assert a speedy trial claim, the quality and quantity of which this court must take into account in evaluating into the deprivation of the right. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id
}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . at 528-529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi720\li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 D- Prejudice}{\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [71]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The last factor to consider is the prejudice to the defendant. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Prejudice should be assessed in light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was designed to protect. 
}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 .}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 The }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
 court identified three such interests: (1) to prevent oppressive pre-trial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; (3) to limit the possibility that the defense would be impaired. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 .}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [72]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab }{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 From the record before the court,}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
it does not appear that Appellant was subjected to the disadvantages that }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  found associated with lengthy pretrial incarceration.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Furthermore,}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 he has not demonstrated that the anxiety and concern he experienced was anything more than minimal.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
In this case, the Appellant was released shortly after he was formally arrested on June 26, 1992. Transcript, vol. I at p. 63 (Further Proceedings, Nov. 14, 1996).}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
He was neither brought before the magistrate judge nor was he required to post bail to secure his release. Transcript, vol. I at p. 63 (Further Proceedings, Nov. 14, 1996). There is no indication that there was some other restraint on his liberty.}{
\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appellant had claimed that his re-location from Guam to Rota was because of alleged threats; but, as stated earlier, no proof on the record exists to support his claim.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [73]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab The remaining interest to be evaluated, the impairment of his defense, is the most serious. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. This is }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
[b]ecause the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system.}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 .}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s argument in this regard was the same as that made for his Due Process claim.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
For purposes of a speedy trial claim, I would also adopt the finding that the Appellant has suffered no prejudice because of the delay.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [74]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab At this point, it must be mentioned that the Supreme Court in }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Doggett, }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 observed that: }{
\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri720\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin720\lin720\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifica
lly demonstrable . . . affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim. . .}{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  explicitly recognized that impairment of one}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s defense is the most difficult form of prejudice to prove because time}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s erosion of exculpatory evidence and testimony can }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 rarely be shown}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}
}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 . . .Thus, we generally have recognized that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove, or, for that matter, identify.}{\insrsid12592186  }{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.}{
\insrsid10105469 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid12592186 {\insrsid10105469 
\par }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 505 U.S. at 655-656, 112 S.Ct. at 2692-2693 (citations omitted).}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [75]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Doggett}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , the court fo
und that a eight and a half year delay in arresting an accused from the date of his indictment violated his speedy trial rights as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The court applied the }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  criteria and found that Doggett}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
s failure to cite any specifically demonstrable prejudice did not doom his claim. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Doggett}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 , 505 U.S. at 658, 112 S.Ct. at 2694. The court held that the government}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s egregious persistence in failing to prosecute Doggett was sufficient to warrant granting relief. }{
\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
. The court found that the negligence caused a delay six times longer than generally deemed sufficient to trigger judicial review, and the presumption of prejudice was neither extenuated by Doggett}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s acquiescence, nor persuasively rebutted. }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Id}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 .}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [76]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab In this case, although the delay due to government negligence is significant; its effect is counter-balanced by the consideration that the Appellant was
 aware of the unresolved charges against him and failed to take steps to assert his right in any meaningful way.}{\insrsid12592186  }{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 
Moreover, a finding of prejudice to his case is militated against because the case itself was a straight-forward homicide involving a claim tha
t Appellant acted in self-defense and that there were no other eyewitnesses to the incident beside the Appellant and his wife (whom he had excluded as a witness). Thus, it is difficult to conclude that the delay in this case adversely affected the Appella
nt}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s ability to present an effective defense.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [77]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Therefore, after due consideration of the factors in }{\i\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 Barker,}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186  I conclude that the Appellant}{
\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s speedy trial right, as protected by the Sixth Amendment, was not denied.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }{\b\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 [78]}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 \tab Accordingly, I join the court and would AFFIRM the Appellant}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 61 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f172\fs24}}}{\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 s conviction.}{\insrsid10105469 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\nowidctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid10105469 {\insrsid9184266\charrsid12592186 PETER C. SIGUENZA
\par Chief Justice
\par }}