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Camacho vs. Camacho, 1997 Guam 5, (Opinion)
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\f5\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 IN THE SUPREME COURT
\par TERRITORY OF GUAM}{\b\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 MARIE TAITANO CAMACHO
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Appellant,
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 vs.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 ANTHONY ANGOCO CAMACHO,
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Appellee.
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Civil Case No. CVA96-006}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Filed: March 31, 1997}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Cite as: 1997 Guam 5
\par }\pard \ql \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Appeal from the Superior Court of Guam
\par Argued and Submitted 29 January 1997
\par Agana, Guam}{\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Appearing for the Appellant
\par THOMAS PARKER
\par Zamsky Law Firm
\par Suite 501, Bank of Guam Building
\par 111 Chalan Santo Papa
\par Agana, Guam 96910}{\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4995738 
\par 
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Appearing for the Appellee
\par BENJAMIN C. SISON, JR.
\par Law Offices of Robert J. Torres
\par A Professional Corporation
\par 173 Aspinall Avenue, Suite 206A
\par Agana, Guam 96910
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 _______________
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 OPINION
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 
\par BEFORE: PETER C. SIGUENZA, Chief Justice, JANET HEALY WEEKS, and MONESSA G. LUJAN,}{\cs15\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi432\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx432\tx864\tx1296\tx1728\tx2160\tx2592\tx3024\tx3456\tx3888\tx4320\tx4752\tx5184\tx5616\tx6048\tx6480\tx6912\tx7344\tx7776\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f5\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\b\f176\fs22\super\insrsid10821561 
\chftn }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 Justice Monessa G. Lujan participated in the decision in this case but passed away on 15 March 1997 before this opinion had been completed.}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738  Associate Justices.
\par 
\par }{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 WEEKS, J.:
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 
\par }\pard \qj \fi432\li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 Appellant Marie Camacho appeals from a Decision and Order of the Superior Court, t
he Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena, III, presiding, finding that a separation agreement between Appellant and her husband, Appellee Anthony Camacho, had been rescinded by implication. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the Decision and Order of the tria
l court.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 
\par }{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4995738 \tab I. BACKGROUND
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [1]\tab Marie Camacho and Anthony Camacho have been married since 9 May 1987. They separated on 12 October 1993 and executed a separation agreement on 21 October 1993. The separation agreement specified how the Camachos}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  assets and liabilities were to be divided. According to the agreement, the Camachos}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  home is the separate property of Mrs. Camacho. The Camacho}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s community property consisted of two automobiles, an Acura Vigor and a Mazda Truck, and the household appliances and furniture. According to the separation agreement, the furniture, appliances, and the Acura Vigor were to go to Mrs. Camacho, and the
 Mazda Truck was to go to Mr. Camacho. Also under the agreement, Mrs. Camacho was to assume all of the community debts, and Mr. Camacho was to pay $1,000.00 per month in child support. The separation agreement was incorporated into a Judgment of Separate 
Maintenance, }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 binding between these parties,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  signed by Judge Lamorena, and filed on 21 October 1993 in case number DM0955-93. The judgment was prepared by counsel for M
rs. Camacho.
\par 
\par [2]\tab Approximately two months after the Judgement of Separate Maintenance was filed, Mr. and Mrs. Camacho reconciled and resumed married life for nearly two more years, only to separate again on 14 August 1995. Mr. and Mrs. Camacho are in disp
ute as to what took place during the two year period of reconciliation. According to Mr. Camacho, they verbally agreed to disregard the separation agreement, and to carry on as though it never existed. Mr. Camacho claims that he helped pay the debts that 
M
rs. Camacho agreed to pay under the agreement, including the mortgage on the house, and that the parties jointly incurred new loans in order to pay these community debts. Mr. Camacho further claims that certain loan payments were being deducted directly f
rom his paychecks.
\par 
\par [3]\tab Mrs. Camacho, on the other hand, claims that, during the two year reconciliation period, the separation agreement was never discussed. She claims that Mr. Camacho has never contributed toward any mortgage payments on the house, which
 she claims has always been her separate property, and that the couple did not jointly incur new debts during the reconciliation period.
\par 
\par [4]\tab After the couple separated for the second time in August of 1995, Mrs. Camacho filed for divorce with the Superior
 Court, on 17 October 1995. In her divorce complaint, Mrs. Camacho requested that the court grant the divorce and also that the court approve the separation agreement, executed and incorporated into a judgment two years prior. The divorce case, DM0924-95,
 was assigned to Judge Manibusan. Mr. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s Answer to the divorce complaint included the defense that the separation agreement had been mutually rescinded by the parties through their actions during the reconc
iliation period. On 13 November 1995, Mrs. Camacho filed, in DM0924-95, an Application for Order to Show Cause (}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 OSC}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 ), in which application she alleged that Mr. Camach
o has wilfully and wrongfully refused to make child support payments in the amount provided for in the separation agreement.
\par 
\par [5]\tab Two hearings were conducted on the Application for Order to Show Cause before Judge Manibusan. At the first hearing, on 22 Nov
ember 1995, Judge Manibusan heard the arguments from both sides, and issued a temporary child support order in the amount of $290.85 per month. Judge Manibusan scheduled another hearing to give Mrs. Camacho time to counter Mr. Camacho}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s affidavit regarding the alleged rescission of the separation agreement.
\par 
\par [6]\tab At the second hearing, on 13 December 1995, Judge Manibusan refused to take any action to either approve or invalidate the separation agreement because, a
ccording to Judge Manibusan, the determination of that issue requires a trial. The judge instructed counsel for Mrs. Camacho that if he wanted an Order to Show Cause to enforce the Judgment of Separate Maintenance signed by Judge Lamorena in DM0955-93, th
en counsel would have to file an Application for OSC in that case before Judge Lamorena. Counsel for Mrs. Camacho agreed to do so.
\par 
\par [7]\tab On 23 February 1996, Mrs. Camacho filed an OSC Application before Judge Lamorena in DM0955-93. Her application was nearly
 identical to the one filed before Judge Manibusan, and added only that under the separation agreement, she agreed to assume liability for certain jointly incurred debts. A hearing on this OSC Application was conducted before Judge Lamorena on 2 April 199
6
. At this hearing, Judge Lamorena heard arguments from both sides on the issue of whether the separation agreement had been mutually rescinded by implication. The validity of the Judgment of Separate Maintenance was never questioned by counsel or by the c
ourt at this hearing.
\par 
\par [8]\tab In addition to her arguments in support of the validity of the separation agreement, Mrs. Camacho represented to the judge that she is only seeking payments to cover the periods of separation, not includ
ing the reconciliation period. Mrs. Camacho further stated that Mr. Camacho had made some child support payments pursuant to the temporary order of Judge Manibusan, in an amount totaling approximately $1,000.00. The court took the matter under advisement,
 and issued a Decision and Order, filed 11 September 1996.
\par 
\par [9]\tab In its Decision and Order, the trial court held that the separation agreement is invalid because the actions of the parties subsequent to execution evidenced an intent to rescind the agreement. The Judge cited }{
\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco v. Lo Vasco}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 115 P.2d 562 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941) to support the conclusion that the agreement had been mutually rescinded. The court also rejected an argu
ment from Mrs. Camacho that the agreement expressly provides that neither party may }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
alter, amend, or modify our marital property agreement contained in this instrument, except by an instrument in writing executed by both of us.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  According to Judge Lamorena, }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
[n]owhere does it state that a rescission, cancellation or termination of the Agreement has to be in writing}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  (}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Camacho v. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
, DM0955-93 (Super. Ct. Guam Sept. 11, 1996) at 2. The Decision and Order concludes that the separation agreement is invalid and that }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 the order [of Judge Manibusan] to reduce the child support to $290.85 is upheld until the time of the dissolution.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\cs15\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi432\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx432\tx864\tx1296\tx1728\tx2160\tx2592\tx3024\tx3456\tx3888\tx4320\tx4752\tx5184\tx5616\tx6048\tx6480\tx6912\tx7344\tx7776\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f5\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\b\f176\fs22\super\insrsid10821561 
\chftn }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 Despite the fact that the 11 September Decision and Order disposed of all of the issues before the court, the last sent
ence of the Decision and Order sets a scheduling conference for 27 September 1996 at 10:30 a.m. It is unclear from the record why the court found it necessary to order this scheduling conference. }}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 The Decision and Order makes no mention, however, of the effect of the invalid agreement upon the court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s own prior judgment incorporating the agreement. Notice of appeal was timely filed.}{\cs15\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi432\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx432\tx864\tx1296\tx1728\tx2160\tx2592\tx3024\tx3456\tx3888\tx4320\tx4752\tx5184\tx5616\tx6048\tx6480\tx6912\tx7344\tx7776\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f5\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\b\f176\fs22\super\insrsid10821561 
\chftn }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 The Court notes that Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure for the Supre
me Court of Guam specifies that filing of the notice of appeal is to be no later than thirty (30) days from the entry of judgment. Furthermore, Title 7 Guam Code Annotated }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 
 3108 provides that final judgment must be filed before an appeal to this Court may be taken. Although the record does not indicate a final judgment in this case, Appellee has waived the separate judgment requirement by failing to object to this appeal on
 that ground. }{\b\i\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 Vernon v. Heckler}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 , 811 F.2d 1274, 1276 (9}{\b\f176\fs20\super\insrsid10821561 th}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561  Cir. 1987).}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 II. DISCUSSION
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 I.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [10]\tab Appellant raises two arguments regarding the Judgment of Separate Maintenance which incorporated the terms of the separation agreement. Specifically, Appellant 
argues that, unlike a separation agreement, a Judgment of Separate Maintenance may not be rescinded by implication. In addition, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in lowering the child support amount incorporated into the judgment without proper
 notice or hearing. We need not address these two arguments, however, because we find the Judgment of Separate Maintenance in this case to be invalid.
\par 
\par [11]\tab The provision within Guam law that authorizes the separate maintenance cause of action is Civil Code }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  137, also codified at 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 8402. With the exception of references to the prior code, this section appears in the Guam Code Annotated exactly as it was enacted into the Civil Code in 1953.
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi11\li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
8402. Alimony, Permanent Support.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  When a
n action for dissolution of marriage is pending, the court may, in its discretion, require the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay as alimony any money necessary to enable the wife, or husband, to support herself and her children, or to support hi
mself and his children, or prosecute or defend the action. }{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
When the husband or wife willfully deserts the wife or husband, or when the husband or wife has any cause of action for dissolution of marriage as provided in }{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 8203 of this Title }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
[adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect, habitual intemperance, or conviction of felony]}{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
, he or she may, without applying for dissolution of marriage, maintain in the Superior Court an action against her or h
im for permanent support and maintenance of himself or herself or of himself and children or of herself and children. When the husband willfully fails to provide for the wife, she may, without applying for dissolution of marriage, maintain in the Superior
 Court an action against him for permanent support and maintenance of herself or of herself and children.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
During the pendency of any such action the court may, in its discretion, require the husband or wife, as the case may be, to pay as alimony any money 
necessary for the prosecution of the action and for support and maintenance, and execution may issue therefor in the discretion of the court. The court, in granting the husband or wife permanent support and maintenance of himself or herself, or of himself
 
and children or herself and children, in any such action, shall make the same disposition of the community property and of the homestead, if any, as would have been made if the marriage had been dissolved by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction
. The final judgment in such action may be enforced by the court by such order or orders as in its discretion it may from time to time deem necessary, and such order or orders may be varied, altered, or revoked at the discretion of the court.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 19 GCA }{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 (emphasis added).
\par 
\par [12]\tab As stated previously, 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402 is re-codification of Guam Civil Code }{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  137, which was adopted from former }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  137 of the California Civil Code. As is often the case with Guam code provisions, due to changes in California law, Guam Civil Code }{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  137 no longer 
has a counterpart in the California Civil Code. Irreconcilable differences are now grounds for both divorce and legal separation in California. Guam law, however, continues to require that divorce and separate maintenance actions be based upon allegations
 of adultery, extreme cruelty, willful desertion, willful neglect, habitual intemperance, or conviction of felony. 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8203. In other words, unlike California, Guam has not moved to a }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 no fault}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 statutory scheme in the area of divorce and separation.
\par 
\par [13]\tab Under Guam}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s statutory scheme, therefore, the requirements for maintaining a cause of action for separate maintenance are as follows: (1) there must be some alleged grounds for the action, generally the same as for a divorce action; and (2) the cause of action must 
be for the purpose of obtaining spousal support. Both of these requirements are expressed in 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 8402.
\par 
\par [14]\tab In the instant case, neither of these two basic elements of a separate maintenance action are presen
t. First, from the Complaint for Separate Maintenance, filed on 21 October 1993, that led to the Judgment of Separate Maintenance, there are no allegations of any grounds whatsoever for the action. In fact, the only statement of a reason for the separatio
n is at the bottom of page one of the separation agreement, where it states that }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
[u]nhappy differences have arisen between us as a result of which we have agreed to separate and hereafter live permanently apart.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Even if this were one of the grounds for divorce or separation provided in }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8203, which it is not, it still should have been in the complaint, or, at least, in the Judgment of Separate Maintenance.
\par 
\par [15]\tab It is possible that the trial court in this case allowed judgment to be entered without any alleged grounds, based on Mr. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s Appearance and Consent Declaration, filed with Mrs. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s Complaint for Separate Maintenance. In the declaration, Mr. Camacho states, among other things, the following:
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 I waive the time allowed by law to answer the Complaint, and consent that the Co
urt enter a default and default judgment against me for a Separate Maintenance and/or other relief requested in the Complaint. I waive further notice of proceedings, and waive the filing of findings of fact and conclusions of law.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 

\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 I further stipulate and 
agree that there exists adequate grounds as stated in the Complaint for Separate Maintenance and other requested relief. I agree that this matter go forward as an uncontested Separate Maintenance without hearing, based on this consent. I waive any objecti
ons to entry of default and/or entry of default judgment which I may be able to raise under the Soldier and Sailor}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s Civil Relief Act.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [16]\tab Clearly, from Mr. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s 
consent declaration, he did not intend to contest any portion of Mrs. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s Complaint against him for separate maintenance. The fact that Mr. Camacho consented, however, does not remove the statutory requirement that Mrs. Camacho allege one of the specified grounds for the action. Mr. Camacho}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s stipulation that adequate grounds exist }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 as stated in the Complaint for Separate Maintenance,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  is of no help because no grounds were stated in the complaint.
\par 
\par [17]\tab Mr. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s consent declaration, and the }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 unhappy differences}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  language of the separation agreement suggest that the parties may have had in mind a court approved separation by consent. Separation by consent, however, is only mentioned in Title 19 in
 order to make clear that such a separation is }{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 not}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  a valid ground for a divorce or separate maintenance action. 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8210.
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
8210. Separation by Consent; Not Desertion.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Separation by consent, with or without the understanding that one of the parties will apply for a dissolution of marriage, is not desertion.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par As }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8210 indicates, parti
es may separate by consent without fear of being accused of desertion, and thereby creating grounds for divorce or separate maintenance. There is no need, however, for parties to come to court to effectuate this type of separation, and, for this type of s
eparation, there is no need to comply with the requirements of }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402.
\par 
\par [18]\tab Under the facts of this case, the parties separated by consent and sought court approval of a separation agreement. Aside from }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 unhappy differences}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 stated in the separation agreement, however, there were no grounds for the action alleged in the complaint, in the agreement, or in the Judgment of Separate Maintenance.
\par 
\par [19]\tab Secondly, the Complaint for Separate Maintenance does not include a request for court ordered support of Mrs. Camacho. In fact, page seven of the separation agreement contains a paragraph that expressly waives any claim of spousal supp
ort. In addition, the Judgment of Separate Maintenance states only that the }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
spouses are hereby authorized to live separate and apart from each other, that is, from bed and board, without dissolving their marital union,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  and that }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
[t]he Separation Agreement between the parties, dated OCTOBER 21, 1993, which provides for the division of their community and/or quasi-community pro
perty, community debts and/or liabilities, custody of the minor child, and child support, is hereby approved by the Court and made valid and binding between these parties.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Nowhere in the judgment does the court order that Mr. Camacho separately support and maintain Mrs. Camacho, the very purpose of a separate maintenance judgment.

\par 
\par [20]\tab Cases interpreting the source of Guam}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s separate maintenance statutory provision, fo
rmer }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 137 of the California Civil Code, have expressly held that a decree of separate maintenance cannot be entered independent of any need for support. }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Solomon v. Solomon}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
, 257 P.2d 760, 763 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953). The court in }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Solomon}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  considered a husband}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s request that the court grant a decree of separate maintenance primarily to resolve the property ownership rights of the 
parties. The husband did not request an amount for his own support. The court held as follows:
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi-11\li720\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 The prayer is not for any certain amount of maintenance but that the court }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 grant a decree of separate maintenance}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  and further asks determination of right in the property and an accounting. This complaint seems predicated on the idea that there can be a }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 decree of separate maintenance}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  independent of any need for support, in the manner of a decree for separation }{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 from bed and board}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
. However such a limited divorce is unknown in California, }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 O}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Connor v. O}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Connor,}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  91 Cal.App.2d 147, 149, 204 P.2d 916; }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Monroe v. Superior Court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
, 28 Cal.2d 427, 431, 170 P.2d 473; 35 Cal.L.Rev. 153, and although there is some resemblance between separate maintenance and separati
on from bed and board, no cases have been found indicating that an action for separate maintenance without any need of support is permitted in California.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Solomon}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 257 P.2d at 763 (emphasis added).
\par 
\par [21]\tab While, arguably, a provision for child support might be deemed an indirect request for spousal support, the language of }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402 seems too specific to allow such a broad interpretation. According to the language of }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402, either spouse may, under certain specified circumstances, maintain an action against the other }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 for permanent support and maintenance }{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 of himself or herself or of himself and children or of herself and children}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 .}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  19 }{\scaps\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 GCA }{\scaps\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\scaps\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402 }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
(emphasis added). Nowhere in the section does it authorize a separate cause of action solely for support and maintenance of children. The California Legislature addressed this issue in 1941 by amending former California Civil Code }{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  137, from which the Guam provision was adopted, to include a separate cause of a
ction for support and maintenance of children.}{\cs15\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi432\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx432\tx864\tx1296\tx1728\tx2160\tx2592\tx3024\tx3456\tx3888\tx4320\tx4752\tx5184\tx5616\tx6048\tx6480\tx6912\tx7344\tx7776\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f5\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\b\f176\fs22\super\insrsid10821561 
\chftn }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 Section 137 has since been repealed in California. The statutory basis in California for a cause of action for support and maintenance of children is now California Family Code }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561  4000.}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  The law on Guam, however, 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402, has never been amended in any manner.
\par 
\par [22]\tab There are, of course, other sections of Title 19 that authorize causes of action for child support. 19 GCA }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  4105, 8403, 8405, 8406. As the language of }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  8402 indicates, however, the purpose of an action for 
separate maintenance is to protect a spouse against desertion or willful failure, on the part of the other spouse, to provide support to the complaining spouse. If there is no need for spousal support, there may still be a basis for a cause of action for 
child support, but there is no basis for an action for separate maintenance.
\par 
\par [23]\tab Thus, according to the provision of Guam law authorizing separate maintenance actions, the Judgment of Separate Maintenance, incorporating the separation agreement in this case is invalid. The consequence of this conclusion, is that this Court}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s inquiry is properly limited to the separation agreement itself, and whether the trial court erred in finding it to be rescinded by implication.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 II.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [24]\tab Appellant maintains that the trial court erroneously applied the law in arriving at the conclusion that the separation agreement had been rescinded by implication. We review the trial court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s application of law }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 de novo}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 . }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
United States v. Michael R.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 90 F.3d 340, 343 (9}{\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 th}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Cir. 1996); }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 United States v. Sahhar,}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  56 F.3d 1026, 1028 (9}{\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 th}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Cir. 1995).}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }{\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 a. Application of Case Law
\par on Rescission by Implication}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [25]\tab Appellant contends that the case the trial court relied upon, }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco v. Lo Vasco,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 115 P.2d 562 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941), is inapplicable to the case at bar. We disagree.
\par 
\par [26]\tab The trial court relied upon }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  a California case, presumably because 
the Civil Code of Guam, which governs contracts including separation agreements, was adopted from the California Civil Code. See }{\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Forward to Volume I of}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 Guam Civ. Code (1970). In }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , a married couple executed a separation agreement and then reconciled
 for ten years. During the reconciliation period, the couple made loan payments and mortgage payments from family earnings, and otherwise failed to carry out the separation agreement. Furthermore, the parties in }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
Lo Vasco}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  physically destroyed the document containing the agreement. The }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 court held the separation agreement to have been mutually rescinded by the parties. Id. at 664. According to Appellant, because physical destruction of the separation agreement in the instant case never took place, the trial court}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s determination that the agreement had been rescinded was erroneous. We find this contention to be without merit. The }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 court cited destruction of the document as one factor among several factors leading to the conclusion that }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 [t]he evidence and the conduct of the parties rather conclusively show a rescission and cancellation of the separation agreement in question.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Id.
\par 
\par [27]\tab Appellant also argues that mutual rescission of a separation agreement by implication requires more than just a showing that the parties reconciled. Appellant correctly cites }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 In re Marriage of Broderick,}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  257 Cal. Rptr. 397 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), and several other California cases, to support this proposition. In }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Broderick,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 the court was asked to invalidate a quitclaim deed from a wife to her husband on the grounds that the parties to the deed had executed it during a separation but had subsequently reconciled. Rejecting this argument, the court held as follows:
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 While it has been held that reconciliation and resumption of marital relations may cancel the executory provisions of a }{
\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 property settlement agreement}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  (}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Tompkins v. Tompkins}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 55, 59-60 [20 Cal.Rptr. 530]; }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Harrold v. Harrold}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 (1950) 100 Cal.App.2d 601, 609 [224 P.2d 66]), it is well settled that proof of reconciliation alone does not abrogate the agreement (}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Bluhm v. Bluhm}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 546, 550 [277
 P.2d 421]). To avoid the contract on this basis, there must be a clear indication that by reconciling the parties intended to annul the agreement and restore their earlier property rights. Such intent can be proven, for example, by the destruction of the
 document containing the agreement, execution of reconveyances or restoration of the control of the property to one who formerly exercised it. (}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Plante v. Gray}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 (1945) 68 Cal.App.2d 582, 588 [157 P.2d 421]; 33 Cal.Jur.3d, Family Law, }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 529, p.104.) This is particularly true where the parties have received or accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement. (}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Bluhm v. Bluhm,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  }{
\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 supra}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 129 Cal.App.2d at p.550; see also }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Crossley v. Crossley}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  (1950) 97 Cal.App.2d 627 [218 P
.2d 132].) At any rate, the issue of whether the parties intended to abrogate their property agreement by resuming their mutual marital responsibilities constitutes a factual determination and the finding of the trier of fact will not be overruled if supp
orted by the record. (}{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Tompkins v. Tompkins}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 supra}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 202 Cal.App.2d at p.59; see also }{
\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Morgan v. Morgan}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 supra}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  106 Cal.App.2d at p.193.)
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Broderick}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 257 Cal. Rptr. at 401.
\par 
\par [28]\tab Appellant appears to be correct in relying upon }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Broderick}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  for the proposition that
 reconciliation of the parties alone is insufficient to support a finding of mutual rescission of a separation agreement. Neither }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Broderick}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 nor any of the cases cited therein, however, undermines the holding in }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , the case cited by the trial court. In }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Lo Vasco}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , more than just the reconciliation led the court to conclude that the agreement had been rescinded. Likewise, the trial court, in the instant case, relied not just upon the parties}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  reconciliation, bu
t also upon a finding that community funds were used to pay debts assigned solely to Mrs. Camacho under the agreement, and upon a finding that, since executing the agreement, Mr. Camacho has obtained several loans in order to pay debts Mrs. Camacho agreed
 to pay.
\par 
\par [29]\tab As in all of the cases cited by both parties, courts base the decision on this issue on a variety of facts that indicate the parties}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  intent that the separation agreement no longer be in force. The 
trial court, in the instant case, took this same approach, and thus did not, as Appellant contends, erroneously apply the law relating to separation agreements.
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li720\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin720\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\ul\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 b. Interpretation of the Language
\par of the Separation Agreement}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [30]\tab Appellant contends that th
e court erred in its interpretation of the language of the separation agreement, and in disregarding the express language of the separation agreement in favor of the intent of the parties. To support this argument, Appellant relies upon various sections o
f
 Title 18 of the Guam Code Annotated pertaining to contract interpretation. According to Appellant, the clause in the separation agreement that requires alterations, amendments, and modifications to be in writing should be interpreted to require also that
 a rescission of the agreement be in writing. This express language, Appellant argues, should have controlled the trial court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s interpretation of the agreement. We find this argument unpersuasive.
\par 
\par [31]\tab In its Decision and Order, the trial court specifically addressed the following provision contained within the settlement agreement: }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 We agree that we may not alter, amend, or modify our marital property agreement contained in this instrument, except by an instrument in writing executed by both of us.}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  The trial court rejected Mrs. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s argument that this language also requires that a rescission be in writing. The court reasoned that }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 [n]owhere does it state that a rescission, cancellation or termination of the Agreement has to be in writing.}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  We agree with the trial court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s interpretation of this provision.
\par 
\par [32]\tab Title 18 of the Guam Code Annotated, Chapter 87, relates to the interpretation of contracts. The following sections of Title 18 are particularly applicable in this case:
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
87104. Intention from language.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  The language of a contract is to govern its interpretation, if the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an absurdity.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
87105. Interpretation of written contracts.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 When a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone, if possible; subject, however, to the other provisions of this Chapter.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
87110. Words in usual sense.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 The words of a contract are to be understood in their ordinary and popular sense, rather than according to their strict legal meaning, unless used by the parties in a technical sense, or unless a special meaning is given to them by usage, in which cas
e the latter must be followed.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 39 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
87111. Technical words.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  Technical words are to be interpreted as usually understood by persons in the profession or business to which they relate, unless clearly used in a different sense.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 [33]\tab With regard to the intent of the parties at the time of contracting, the intent that must be ascertained from the language of the contract is whether the clause that requires alterations, amendments
, and modifications to be in writing includes complete rescission, termination, or cancellation of the agreement. It is clear from the four sections of Title 18, cited above, that in interpreting a clause of a contract to determine the intent of the contr
acting parties, whenever possible, the express language of the contract should control. The words of a contract should be given an ordinary meaning, unless they are technical words, such as legal terms of art.
\par 
\par [34]\tab The words }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 alter,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 amend,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  and }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
{\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 modify}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 are clearly terms of art, routinely used by lawyers to denote specific legal concepts. When contained within a written contract, as in the instant case, these terms should not be interpreted to include additional concepts with distinct legal defini
tions. Alteration or modification refers to a change in the terms of a contract and does not describe a complete abandonment of the contract. See }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Honda v. Reed,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 319 P.2d 728 (Cal. Dist. C{\*\bkmkstart QuickMark}{\*\bkmkend QuickMark}t. App. 1958). The California Court of Appeals in }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Honda,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 construed a provision of the California Civil Code which provides that alterations of written contracts must be in writing. The }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Honda}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 court described the distinction between abandonment of a contract by mutual consent and alteration of the contract as follows:
\par 
\par }\pard \qj \fi11\li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Abandonment is not an }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt
\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 alteration}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 or modification of a contract. Abandonment of a contract terminates it and entirely abrogates so much of it as is unperformed. }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Grant v. Aerodraulics Co.,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 91 Cal.App.2d at page 75, 204 P.2d at page 687, and cases there cited.}{\f0\insrsid10821561 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4789792\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \fi11\li709\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin709\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
A contract may be mutually abandoned by the parties at any stage of its performance or before any performance has been commenced, and by such abandonme
nt each party is released from any further performance, or, as in the instant action, each party is released from any performance at all. }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Martin v. Butter}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
, 93 Cal.App.2d 562, 566, 209 P.2d 636, and cases there cited; }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Evans v. Rancho Royale Hotel Co.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 114 Cal.App.2d 503, 508, 250 P.2d 283.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Honda}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 319 P.2d at 731.
\par 
\par [35]\tab Like the court in }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Honda,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 the trial court, in this case, found the parties, subsequent to executing their agreement, to have rescinded, or abandoned, the agreement. The court refused Mrs. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s invitation to include rescission within the definition of }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 alter,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  }{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 amend,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f 
"WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  or }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
modify}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 for purposes of interpreting the language in the agreement that requires alterations, amendments, and modification to be in writing. We find the trial court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s interpretation of this language to be correct.}{\cs15\f0\super\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 \chftn {\footnote \pard\plain \qj \fi270\li0\ri0\sa240\nowidctlpar
\tx0\tx270\tx864\tx1296\tx1728\tx2160\tx2592\tx3024\tx3456\tx3888\tx4320\tx4752\tx5184\tx5616\tx6048\tx6480\tx6912\tx7344\tx7776\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0 \f5\fs24\lang1033\langfe1033\cgrid\langnp1033\langfenp1033 {\cs15\b\f176\fs22\super\insrsid10821561 
\chftn }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 In view of our approval of the trial court}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 s interpretation of the lang
uage of the agreement, we may quickly dispose of Appellant}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 
s argument that the trial court disregarded the express language of the agreement in favor of the intent of the parties. The trial court focused upon the
 intent of the parties, as evidenced by their actions subsequent to execution of the agreement, only after it had determined that the provision in the agreement requiring written alterations, amendments, and modifications does not apply to a rescission. T
he trial court}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 s somewhat misleading statement that }{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 [i]nstead of looking at the technical language of the Agreement, we will look to the actual intent of the parties}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst 
SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561  may have caused some confusion on this point. When the trial court}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols"
 \\s 10}{\fldrslt\f169\fs20}}}{\b\f176\fs20\insrsid10821561 s Decision and Order is read as a whole, it is clear that this statement is intended to apply to th
e question of whether the parties, subsequent to executing the separation agreement, intended to rescind or cancel the agreement.}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 III.
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [36]\tab Appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to receive evidence to support its conclusion that the separation agreement had been rescinded by implication. Appellant}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL
 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s contention is essentially that a
 trial, or at least an evidentiary hearing, should have been conducted to determine whether the separation agreement had been rescinded by implication. Such a question, Appellant argues, is a question of fact and cannot be determined without evidence of s
ome kind.
\par 
\par [37]\tab We review the factual determinations of the trial court with regard to rescission by implication of a separation agreement under the substantial evidence standard. }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Estate of Zlacket}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 4 Cal. Rptr. 450, 453 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Margolis v. Margolis}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 251 P.2d 396, 400 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); }{
\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Morgan v. Morgan,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  234 P.2d 782, 784 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1951); }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Plante v. Gray,}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
 157 P.2d 421, 424 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1945). Under this standard, factual findings of the trial court are upheld }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 unless there is an entire lack of substantial evidence in support thereof.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Plante}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 157 P.2d at 424. For example, the court in }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Estate of Zlacket}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , in upholding the validity of a separation agreement, held that }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 65 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 [t]here was substantial evidence upon which the trial court based its finding on the question involved and in that there was such substantial evid
ence we are without power to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
s, even if we were so inclined.}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 64 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792  }{\i\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Estate of Zlacket}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 , 4 Cal. Rptr. at 453.
\par 
\par [38]\tab Our revi
ew of the record reveals that certain factual assertions by Mr. Camacho remain undisputed. First, it is undisputed that Mr. and Mrs. Camacho reconciled for nearly two years subsequent to executing the separation agreement. Second, Appellant has not disput
e
d that, subsequent to execution of the agreement, community funds have been used to pay debts assigned under the agreement to Mrs. Camacho. Finally, it is undisputed that, since the time the parties reconciled, Mr. Camacho has himself obtained new loans i
n order to pay some of these debts, and that repayment amounts on these loans are regularly deducted from Mr. Camacho}{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 {\field{\*\fldinst SYMBOL 62 \\f "WP TypographicSymbols" \\s 12}{\fldrslt\f169\fs24}}}{
\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 s paychecks. These undisputed assertions led the trial court to conclude that the parties inten
ded to rescind the separation agreement. We find these undisputed factual assertions, contained in affidavits and raised at hearings before the trial court, sufficient to satisfy the substantial evidence standard.
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\b\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 CONCLUSION
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par [39]\tab For the foregoing reasons, the Decision and Order of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.}{\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4789792 
\par 
\par }{\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 Dated: 27 March 1997.}{\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4789792 
\par 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 JANET HEALY WEEKS,
\par Associate Justice}{\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid4995738\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 MONESSA G. LUJAN,
\par Associate Justice
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 PETER C. SIGUENZA,
\par Chief Justice
\par }\pard \qj \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 
\par }\pard \qc \li0\ri0\widctlpar\faauto\rin0\lin0\itap0\pararsid4789792 {\f0\insrsid10821561\charrsid4789792 ____________
\par }}